



ISSN 0970-5368

THE
TIBET
JOURNAL

Vol. .XXXVIII, No. 1&2, Spring-Summer 2013



a publication for the study of Tibet

The Tibet Journal

EDITORIAL BOARD

Geshe Lhakdor, Tashi Tsering, Toni Huber, Lobsang Shastri, Roberto Vitali, Erberto Lo Bue, Geoff Childs, Christian Luczanits, Agata Bareja-Starzynska

POLICIES

The Tibet Journal is a quarterly publication of the Library of Tibetan Works & Archives (LTWA) dedicated to the presentation of scholarly and general interest articles on Tibetan culture and civilization by Tibetans and non-Tibetans. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Editorial Board of *The Tibet Journal* or the LTWA. Responsibility for views expressed and the accuracy of articles rests entirely with the authors.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE

The Tibet Journal welcomes submission of articles and research papers in English, adequately substantiated or otherwise documented, with Wylie romanisation system. Article should be typed and double-spaced. We request that all contributions sent to the journal have both the print and CD copy (in MS Word). Contributors will receive a copy of the *Journal*, and up to 20 offprints of their article. Unaccepted articles will be returned upon request. The *Journal* encourages readers' comments on articles published in recent issues. Address articles, rejoinders, notes, reviews and general enquiries to:

Managing Editor, The Tibet Journal, Library of Tibetan Works & Archives, Gangchen Kyishong, Dharamsala 176 215, H.P., INDIA Tel: +91 9218422467 (Main Office), 9882255047 (Reception), email: tjeditor@ltwa.net, <www.tibetanlibrary.org>

PRINT SUBSCRIPTION/DISTRIBUTION

We have appointed M/S Biblia Impex Pvt. Ltd. as the sole distributing and selling agent of *The Tibet Journal* in print form w.e.f. Vol.XII, 1987. Please send all enquiries relating to subscriptions to: **Biblia Impex Pvt. Ltd., 2/18, Ansari Road, New Delhi 110 002, INDIA, email: contact@bibliaimpex.com, Website: <www.bibliaimpex.com>**

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Inland	Rs. 350 Single copy Rs. 100
Overseas	US \$ 45 (Air Mail) Single copy US \$ 12 (Air Mail)

ELECTRONIC SUBSCRIPTION

Following an agreement, we have appointed EBSCO Publishing, USA, our sole distributing and selling agent for electronic publication w.e.f. Vol.XXVII, 2002. For subscription contact **EBSCO Publishing, 10 Estes Street, Ipswich, Massachusetts 01938-0682, USA, email: ep@epnet.com, <www.epnet.com>**

COPYRIGHT

Except where otherwise declared, the entire contents of *The Tibet Journal* are under the protection of the Indian Copyright Act of 1957, the Berne Convention of 1956, and the Universal Copyright of 1952. In case of reprint usage, the Managing Editor should be informed and source credit given to the authors of the individual articles, as well as to *The Tibet Journal*.

The Tibet Journal

A publication for the study of Tibet

Lobsang Shastri
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Yeshe Dhondup
MANAGING EDITOR

SPRING-SUMMER VOL. XXXVIII, No.1&2 2013

ARTICLES

The Mi-ser in Tibetan Society: Why is it Problematic to Refer to the Peasantry of Pre-1959 Tibet as “serfs”? 3-21

Michael Zrenner

The Great Seal of Voidness
The root text for the Geluk/Kagyue Tradition of Mahamudra 23-41

First Panchen Lama

Are We a Rape Culture? Understanding Delhi Rape Horror and Underlying Perspectives 43-53

Adfer Rahi Shah

The Psycho-Social Understanding of Shrine Visiting Practice in Conflict Times: A Case Study of Hazratbal Shrine in Indian Kashmir 55-67

Pirzada M Amin

Locating Tibet, Dalai Lama Lineage and Tibetan Muslims: A Brief Commentary Mushtaque B Barq	69-75
Creating Safe School Environment: Role of School Principals Swaleha A. Sindhi	77-89
Distorted Versions of Buddhism: Agnostic and Athiest B. Alan Wallace	91-98
Urine Analysis in Tibetan Medicine Lobsang Rabgay	99-106
A Compendium of Ways of Knowing Akya Yongzin Gawai Lodro	107-155

Article Review

Adfer Rashid Shah.(2012). Restless Beings: Understanding Kashmiri Youth in Sociological Contour. <i>The Tibet Journal</i> , Winter Issue, Vol. XXXVII, NO.4, Pp 3-33. Aijaz Ahmad Mir	157-159
---	---------

Book Reviews

<i>At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities</i> by Jean Amery (Sidney Rosenfled & Stella Rosenfled) Adfer Rashid Shah	160-164
<i>The Ninth Karmapa's Ocean of Definitive Meaning</i> by Khenchen Thragru Rinpoche D R Chaudhry	165-166
<i>An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth</i> Gandhi, MK. (trans. Mahadev Desai) Adfer Rashid Shah & Swaleha A. Sindhi	167-170

The Mi-ser in Tibetan Society: Why is it Problematic to Refer to the Peasantry of Pre-1959 Tibet as “serfs”?

Michael Zrenner

Abstract

Mi-ser (lit. “yellow person”) is an indigenous Tibetan term applied to several socio-economic strata of the non-aristocratic lay population¹. Aziz (1978), Dargyay (1978; 1982), Michael (1982: 45-7), Miller (1961; 1963) and Goldstein (1971–) have raised a lively and informative debate over Tibet’s socio-political system that investigated the degree of “serfdom” in Tibet and the particular place the *mi-ser* occupied therein. Whilst we wish to express our heartfelt respect for the outstanding contributions of Prof. Goldstein in the areas of Central Asian history, anthropology and linguistics, we do feel the need to investigate more closely the notion that pre-1959 Tibet had been characterized by “*pervasive serfdom*”². In doing so, we shall work with the definition of “serfdom” as provided by Prof. Goldstein³. Secondly, in response to Prof. Goldstein’s basic argument⁴, it shall be contended that both a landlord’s economic and socio-political authority was of provisional nature only since the economic upward mobility⁵ of a great variety of *mi-ser* enabled them to transcend the social, political and systematic constraints of “serfdom”.

Categories of mi-ser: an analysis

Goldstein (1986: 90) explains that

[t]he *mi-ser* system prevalent in Tibet, [...] was intricately linked with economic production and labor. It was an efficient system of economic exploitation that guaranteed the country’s religious and secular elites both land resources and a permanent and secure labor force to cultivate that land without burdening them with any direct day-to-day responsibility for the *mi-ser*’s subsistence. It was a system of production for use rather than for market, that served the needs of an elite who were detached from direct production.

Whilst this pithy account succinctly sketches the general contours of the socio-economic system prevalent in pre 1959-Tibet, it might be beneficial to provide a few contextual details. Most importantly, the “Tibetan *mi-ser* were neither a

homogeneous category nor inevitably impoverished or abused with no chance of social or economic mobility”⁶. In fact, there existed at least four different subcategories of *mi-ser* who varied widely in the nature of their obligations and socio-economical upward and downward mobility⁷. Secondly, a considerable number of *mi-ser* rivalled or excelled the aristocratic (*sger-pa*) and government-related strata (*gzhung-rgyug-pa*) as presented in the appendix to this paper⁸. Moreover, there are important systematic and analytical distinctions to be made between *mi-ser* tied to monastic estates (*chos-gzhi'i mi-ser*), *mi-ser* tied to noble estates (*sger-ba'i mi-ser*), and *khral-pa* tax paying *mi-ser* ‘bound’ to the government (*gzhung-rgyug khral-pa*)^{9; 10}. The stratification of the individual sub-groups of *mi-ser* is listed in ascending order of tax-burden, rights, social standing and economic opportunity¹¹:

1. The *mi-ser* without status¹²

Mi-ser who would leave the estate of their lord (*dpon-po*) without express consent would lose status and legal protection from the lord. If recaptured, they would face corporal punishment and imprisonment as corrective measure sanctioned by the central government¹³. Having escaped their landlord’s estate, *mi-ser* held this status in transition from one status to another—after three years without a claiming party, the *mi-ser* without status could either take up government responsibilities as *gzhung-rgyugs-pa* or attain the documented status of a *mi-bogs* on another estate¹⁴.

2. The *mi-ser* not wielding rights to cultivate tenement lands for subsistence and profit from the landlords estate

- a. hereditary servant or *tshe-g.yog*. According to Goldstein “*this type closely approximated slaves*”¹⁵ since they, by birth, neither held land tenement rights nor were they paid for their services¹⁶.
- b. tax-appendage *mi-ser*, also known as “helpers of the tax-payer” *mi-ser* (*khral-rogs*, *khral-skyong* or *khral-snon*)¹⁷.
- c. human-lease or *mi-bogs*. *Mi-ser* of this category could leave their lord’s estate against a yearly fee to be specified by the landlord¹⁸, for example, if hired by an affluent *khral-pa mi-ser*¹⁹ or “bound” *dud-chung*²⁰. The hiring party would in some cases pay the fee²¹ directly to the landlord from whom the *mi-bogs* was to be rented. More often, a *mi-bogs* would pay the fee himself and seek employment on his own. Economic opportunities included military service—often in substitution for more affluent (non)-government *khral-pa mi-ser* unwilling to be conscripted by the government

—agricultural labour, trading, craftsmanship, and sometimes setting up a business (Michael: 1982, 46). In this way, the *mi-bogs* gained freedom of movement and could readily make profit from which to pay his fee, all the while remaining under the legal protection of his lord who would come to his aid if disputes were to arise.

3. *Mi-ser* wielding rights²² to cultivate tenement lands for subsistence and profit from the landlord's estate

- a. "Bound" *dud-chung mi-ser*²³ held insignificant *rkang*²⁴ of land that generally did not yield abundant crops. Yet, at the same time, they had to face a considerably lighter tax-load than the *khral-pa mi-ser*²⁵. Obligations included payment in crops, herding-animals, money (*lag-'don*) and services such as spinning wool and estate maintenance and labour on the manorial *demesne* land.
- b. The *khral-pa* ("taxpayer") *mi-ser* derived this appellation not from the fact that his was the only category of taxed peasant-subjects, but because his "tax obligation was the most varied and in particular included the difficult *corvée* carrying tax"²⁶ (*rkang-'gro*) that forced him to maintain by his own means a considerable amount of pack-animals that could not be gainfully employed for his own purposes²⁷. Instead, *gzhung-rgyugs-pa mi-ser*²⁸ could claim these animals for *corvée* assignment (*khal-ma*), usually in combination with accompanying personnel (*'u-lag*) that had to be provided by the *khral-pa*. The manpower and pack-animals could be claimed for official travel at any point, "on an open-ended basis" and by authority of the government. (Goldstein, 1971a: p. 527). Unlike landless *mi-ser*, they held the hereditary and legal rights to both reap profits gained from the cultivation of tenements (that remained in the possession of the landlord)²⁹ and reinvest these profits according to their own preference, unlocking an economic upward-mobility difficult to rival by most classes of *mi-ser*.

4. The government *mi-ser*

The *gzhungs-rgyugs-pa mi-ser* ("government" *mi-ser*), comprised a class "bound" to the respective "government serf type corporate village"³⁰ and a class "bound" to the governing district. This type of *mi-ser* can further be classified as "administrative *mi-ser*" and "non-administrative *mi-ser*".

- a. Non-administrative government *mi-ser* contained the following sub-strata:

- I. Firstly a variant of the *mi-bogs* category in that it comprised of runaway *mi-ser* who have not been claimed by their landlord for three years and

thereafter obtained governmental “*human lease status at a nominal annual cost*” (Goldstein, 1986: 105), together with the concomitant legal protection.

- II. The second type of non-administrative government *mi-ser* was bound to the land and held rights and duties largely comparable to the “taxpaying” *khral-pa mi-ser* with the simple exception that he was accountable to a governmental estate steward appointed by the district commissioner (*rdzong dpon*)³¹, rather than a private land-owner (Goldstein: 1986, p. 89). Government *khral-pa* had both individual (household) tax-duties and tax-obligations to be provided from the community as a whole³².
- b. “administrative government *mi-ser*” did not have any obligation to pay taxes derived from agriculture and its derivatives, or be legally accountable either to a landlord or the governmental estate steward. Instead, they would collect taxes for the government, record income, and in doing so travel along the governmental transportation and communication network (*sa-tshig*), demanding manpower and animal corvée service as discussed in (3b).

Difficulties arise when attempting to find a singular, unifying term for this range of socio-economic groupings and their underlying power-structures. Goldstein has suggested a non-feudal version of “serfdom” as conceptual framework for analyzing the Tibetan phenomenon, wherein the *mi-ser* features as “serf”. Following Bloch’s definition of the term, he categorizes a “*serf*” as an individual, who

- (a) was hereditarily tied to land and lord.
- (b) in contradistinction to ‘*slaves proper*’ had rights and possessed (but did not own) productive resources (land) from which to derive his livelihood.
- (c) were subjects to their landlords legal and institutionally buttressed right [to extract resources from them and] to command them to accomplish work for him.

Goldstein (1986: 80)

Systematic Context

Although indeed all *mi-ser* were “*hereditarily tied to land and lord*”³³ (first characteristic in the definition of “serfdom”), it is necessary to contextualize the precise nature of these ties with the opportunities that sprung from it in order to avoid a distorted picture. The “landlord”—an aristocrat, ecclesiast or a government *rdzong-dpon*—grants legal protection to the *mi-ser* in return for

tax obligations³⁴ that included services, perishable goods, livestock and financial remuneration. This legally binding and officially documented contract was compulsorily inherited through “parallel descent”³⁵ on the side of the *mi-ser* and was fixed as an inalienable, built-in feature of the estate-structure, binding also for a new landlord, in case of estate take-over³⁶.

As for the third characteristic of “*serfdom*” listed above—the fact that the landlords held a “*legal and institutionally buttressed right* [to extract resources from them and] *to command them to accomplish work for him*”—this criterion again has to be put into perspective. Firstly, the serfs also held the “*right to initiate legal action against their lords*”³⁷. In this way

the estates had only very limited, delegated juridical authority to carry out minor legal duties and to settle local quarrels. The state alone—through the district magistrate and, in the final instance, the Dalai Lama’s government—had full juridical authority³⁸. What is more, if a *mi-ser* complained to the Lhasa government about any act of oppression by his estate owner, the Lhasa government would investigate, and its decision was binding on the estate owner

(Michael: 1982, 46).

Furthermore, the contractually delimited tax and service-obligations³⁹ were demanded not from individual *mi-ser* personally but from the *khral-pa* household as a conceptual entity⁴⁰. Whilst a *mi-ser* was certainly held accountable for delivery of demanded goods and services, he was neither forced into being part of the production process, nor was he given *quomodo* parameters for the extraction procedure of the required goods and services. As a consequence, *khral-pa mi-ser* were free to “delegate” tax-service demands made by the government (e.g. “conscription tax”⁴¹) to paid *mi-bogs*—thereby effectually transcending structural limitations by economic means. *Khral-pa mi-ser* also were entitled to “outsource” work-processes necessary for the acquisition of profit⁴². If done with sufficient economic acumen, *khral-pa mi-ser* could rest ascertained that both the contractually set annual government duties and sporadic unforeseen demands made by their lords were fulfilled whilst profits kept growing without direct and continuous involvement. Instead, the *khral-pa* could go on extended pilgrimage, start trading ventures, pursue craftsmanship and engage in a multiplicity of other activities that no “*serf*” as such could foster any realistic hopes of ever participating in⁴³. Having a legally buttressed, documented right (*lag-’dzin*)⁴⁴ to cultivate or even sublet tenement plots, the *khral-pa* had a firm base (*rten*), from which they “*could not be evicted*”⁴⁵ and from which to derive their

livelihood and foster economic expansion. Speaking from a purely structural standpoint, the degree to which *de jure* parameters of “serfdom” could be transcended depended directly on a *mi-ser*’s individual capacity to make financial profit and efficiently delegate responsibilities⁴⁶. The empirical figures found in Michael (1982: 46)⁴⁷ indicate that a considerable amount of *mi-ser* did in fact achieve a level of affluence that secured personal, social and economical freedom unattainable in most societies whose social system is marked by “serfdom”⁴⁸. If a “landless” *mi-bogs* decided to work on a contractual basis as wage-earner, he could expect to be paid for his service and labour and could decline or agree to a work-offer on an individual basis⁴⁹—all the while under legal protection from the lord who had granted him *mi-bogs* status. Apart from working as wage-earners, *mi-bogs* could, and often did, become *tsong-pa*, i.e.

traders and private entrepreneurs, who could become very wealthy. Although most of them remained nominally *mi-ser*, their *mi-bog* [...] was negligible in comparison to their practically untaxed income from trade and business. Many *tsong-pa* came from rural origins but did well with their enterprises, so their income matched or surpassed that of the wealthy aristocratic families”

(Michael: 1982, 119).

This feature in particular—“*a form of market competition for labor resources*”⁵⁰ and private enterprise—runs counter to most popular conceptions of “serfdom”, as a social order primarily based on the systematic extraction of unpaid labour from the ‘serfs’. Instead, in pre-1959 Tibet, “*rural life at the ground level was [...] characterized by considerable flexibility*”⁵¹: the freedom to engage in trade and to set up economic enterprises was readily attainable by both *mi-ser* who did not hold the right to cultivate lands for personal use and those who did⁵².

Nevertheless, it needs to be stated that in line with Prof. Goldstein’s presentation, *mi-ser* classes 2(a-b) did in fact experience a high degree of non-economic and systematic compulsion from which they were generally unable to escape for lack of economic opportunity and social standing. Also, the damaging effects on personal initiative that ensued from their situation need to be taken into consideration⁵³. Yet, since “landless” *mi-bogs* did not have hereditary access rights to “*productive resources ... from which to derive their livelihood*”—which features as second criterion in Goldstein’s definition of “serfdom”—they also fail to qualify as “serfs”.

Concluding remarks

It goes without saying that none of the observations made in this paper would carry any cogency without the untiring effort of Prof. Goldstein in compiling ample, sharp, and detailed analyses of the Tibetan social system throughout more than five decades of dedicated work. It also needs to be stated in support of Prof. Goldstein's perspective—and in defense of his specific use of terminology—that Vladimirtsov (1948: 110–168), in his analysis of the social system of mediaeval Mongolia, comes to the conclusion that a highly stratified form of “nomadic feudalism” characterised the relationship of Mongol overlords with their conquered tributary vassal states during the Yuan and Ming dynasties of the 16th and 17th centuries (1948: 15). Even domestically, the Mongol clans would enter ‘feudalistic’ relationships with each other where entire clans would pledge fealty to more powerful Mongol tribes and consequently become their ‘serfs’ (Mongolian: *unaġan boġol*)⁵⁴. Since the Mongols exercised a very strong influence on Tibet through Yuan administrative rule from 1270–1350 CE⁵⁵ and also went to great lengths in actively remodeling the Tibetan social and administrative system⁵⁶, it would not be very far fetched to look for corresponding features of the same “nomadic feudalism” which characterized Mongol society in Tibet at that period of time.

Surprisingly, however, and much in support of the basic arguments of this article, the same socio-economical upward mobility⁵⁷ that enabled the Tibetan *mi-bogs*, “bound” and runaway *mi-ser*⁵⁸ to overcome the in-built limitations of “serfdom” can be found in their mediaeval Mongolian equivalents. Vladimirtsov (1948: 125) explains: “*au temps de Èhinggis-hān, les unaġan boġol n'étaient pas des 'esclaves' mais des 'vassaux serfs', pouvant facilement accéder aux places d'honneur, devenir par exemple noyan-chiliarque*”⁵⁹. Considering these points, it is difficult to agree with the contention that either the Mongolian *unaġan boġol* or the Tibetan *mi-ser* thus “clearly fits the definitions of serfdom cited in the beginning of the paper”⁶⁰.

If indeed a translation for the term *mi-ser* is to be essayed at all, any authoritative designation needs to be based on an accurate assessment of the systematic function of the *mi-ser* population⁶¹. Analytically, the *mi-ser* as a socio-economic and political unit needs to be seen in contradistinction to the governmental, aristocratic and ecclesiastical holders of estates, who act as systematic antipodes. Since these latter groups “constitute the ruling class organized into a state” (Carrasco: 1959, 210), it might be more practicable to present the *mi-ser* more as “non-aristocratic lay subjects” than as ‘serfs’.

APPENDIX

The social stratification of subjects surpassing the *mi-ser* in socio-political significance at the time of Skal-bzang rgya-mtsho (the 7th Dalai Lama) 1708-1758 CE

This classification is entirely based on Schuh's interpretation and German translation of the official letter commissioned by Skal-bzang rgya-mtsho to Zil-gnon dbang-rgyal rdo-rje, an official of the stupa at Bodhnath, Nepal (*See* Schuh, 1974: 430-1).

(a) Citizens whose high social status excels their politico-administrative significance:

rgyal-po	Local lords whose political authority is limited by the central government
rgyal-rigs	Exceedingly affluent high nobility
mkhan(-po)	Abbotts
slob(-dpon)	Tantric ritual master
bla-gnyer	Administrator at a reincarnate master's estate (<i>bla-brang</i>)

(b) Citizens performing highly respected civic duties that excel their high social status:

bka'(-blon)	Members of the governing council (<i>bka-shag</i>)
mda'(-dpon)	Provincial governor
rtsis(-dpon)	Finance minister; chief accountant (Compare Carrasco: 1959, 95).
hor & sog (-dpon)	Leaders of the Mongol tribes known as Hor and Sog.

(c) Officials at District-level:

rdzong-sdod	
<i>a.k.a.</i> rdzong-dpon	district governor
gzhis-sdod	Administrator of government–property
yong(-sdud-pa)	Tax-collector
bkar('jug-pa)	Administrator of granaries/storehouses

gnyer(-pa)	either “low-level administrator” ⁶² or estate steward ⁶³ (phyag-mdzod; gzhis-gnyer)
las-’dzin	administrative employees

(d) **Officials at local level (*rdzong* and *tsho*)**⁶⁴

[rdzong-dpon] ⁶⁵	governors of the <i>rdzong</i> comprising 1 lay official, 1 monk official ⁶⁶ .
[rdzong-gnyer]	“storekeepers” (Carrasco: 1959, 93) of the <i>bka’-rgya</i> (reserve store) and <i>rdzong-mdzod</i> (repository).
(tsho-)dpon	provost of the <i>tsho</i>
lding(-dpon)	“Cohort leader”.
bcu(-dpon)	“Leader of ten”

(e) ***Mi-ser* and foreign travelers (as discussed in this paper)**

Caveat: Dargyay (1982: 26) argues that a considerable degree of *spyi-pa’i mi-ser* (commoners) actually rivaled and outclassed nobility in affluence and social status despite their “technical” classification as “commoners” [*cmp.* footnote 8 in this paper]. Further invaluable information concerning the hierarchical and social status of individual bureaucrats of the *dga’-ldan pho-brang* government administration can be found in Petech (1973: 8) as discussed by Cüppers (in Krasser (ed.): 1997(1), 189–92), who also provides further references to other noteworthy sources such as the *rdzong-gzhis dang dkar-yong-sogs-kyi[s] [m]tshon-pa’i rtsis-su gtong-’jog-skor-gyi rtsa-tshig* (available from the Bavarian State Library of Munich, Germany) and the *blang-dor gsal-ba ston-pa’i drang thig dwangs-shel-gyi me-long nyer-gcig-pa* written by the Sde-srid Sangs-rgyas rgya-mtsho of the fifth Dalai Lama (compare Footnotes 5 and 7 (*ibid.*)). See also Richardson (1980).

Notes

1. Goldstein: 1971(b), p. 522.
2. Goldstein: 1971(b), p. 521. Michael (1982: 47) perceives the term ‘serfdom’ to be “*a misnomer and very misleading*”. Instead he argues for a Weberian “*bureaucracy*” to be a more fitting analytical framework, presenting it as “*a term that may be used for the political and religious system as well as for the social order*” (*ibid.* 45).
3. Goldstein (1986: p.80).

4. See Goldstein (2007: 10).
5. Attainable, in Michael's analysis, by "*marriage, appointment or enterprise*" (1982: 119).⁶ Goldstein: 1986, p. 90.
7. Goldstein: 1986, p. 93. Dargyay (1982: 30-32) shows ways in which a *mi-ser* could actually benefit from a demotion in the social system and actively sought to effectuate the latter.
8. See Dargyay (1982:26).
9. Compare Dargyay (1982: 22-6), who also argues that the *gzhung-rgyug khral-pa* deserves a special categorization (in our paper: category 4, below), since the "*prestige and responsibility which they held, tended to make the governmental tax-payers into a solid group, into almost a special cultural structure, or what is called a 'subculture' by sociologists*" (ibid. 23).
10. Without specifying the exact point in time at which these figures were applicable, Carrasco (1959: 86) informs us that the Church held 42% of the land, whilst the government estates controlled 37% of arable land, followed by the nobility with 21%.
11. Dargyay (1982: 27) shows that stratification was more pronounced in the towns and cities than amongst villages and nomads. Nevertheless, rural strata in Dargyay's study (ibid. 29) are presented congruent to the analysis in this paper (cmp. ibid. 29). Carrasco (1959: 28) evaluates social rank on the basis of "1. *ownership of land and herds*, and 2. *The amount of self-determination exercised by the family*" (in Dargyay: 1982, 27).
12. Michael (1982:46) lists a stratum of professional beggars (*yawa*) which is difficult to categorize, and which he presents as stratum below the class of *mi-ser*. Carrasco classifies them as "*out-castes*", including "*corpse-cutters, butchers, fishers, and smiths*" (1959: 121). Similar difficulties occur with an unambiguous classification of the 'untouchables' (*rab gyab pa*). This "*caste, which has been described in Barbara Nimri Aziz, Tibetan Frontier Families (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 56-66, appears to have been recognized as a special social stratum only in the South Tibetan area of Dingri, the location of Aziz's study*" (ibid. 201, note 7).
13. Goldstein: 1986, p. 95.
14. Goldstein: 1971(b), p. 529.
15. Goldstein: 1985, p. 95.
16. Goldstein: 2007, p. 6. It should be noted, however, that a convicted criminal could re-enter the social system as "*servants in the nobleman's household to fetch water, sweep the house*" and work as "*shepherds*" (Dargyay: 1982, 26).
17. Dargyay 1982: 31.
18. Goldstein: (1971[a], p.5). Michael (1982, 118, citing Shuh: 1976) contends that this fee was "*in practice a very small amount*".
19. Goldstein: 1986, p. 96.

20. Goldstein: 1971(a), p. 4.
21. “*Human lease status fees varied significantly in size and nature. The fee was typically money but sometimes also labor or goods or even both*” (Goldstein: 2007, p.11).
22. Carrasco (1959: 44).
23. Coleman points to the fact that Goldstein’s (1986) article defines *dud-chung mi-ser* as “landless serfs” whereas his earlier presentation posits that they did hold rights to cultivate small tenements 1971(a), p.5 (Coleman: Master’s Thesis, Ch. 3). Michael (1982: 117), too, classifies *dud-chung* as *mi-bogs mi-ser*.
24. *rkang* is a unit in the measuring of lands that considers factors such as geographical size, fertility and climatic conditions (Goldstein 1971[b], p. 7).
25. Goldstein: 1971(a), p. 5.
26. Goldstein (1971[a]: p. 4). Michael (1982: 117).
27. Since *khral-pa* ‘tax-payer’ *mi-ser* both had to pay taxes in goods and service to the government and their respective (usually *sger-ba* or ‘noble’) estate, Dargyay (1982: 25) classifies them as “dual-tariffed tax-payers”.
28. See *mi-ser* category 4b.
29. Goldstein: 2007, p. 10. In fact, landlords themselves never exercised any property rights over the land allocated to them (Carrasco: 1959, 211), all lands remained property of the ruler.
30. Goldstein (1971[a]: p. 4). Michael (1982: 117-8).
31. Goldstein: 1971(a), p. 4.
32. Goldstein: 1971(a), pp. 10-13. Michael (1982: 120) explains the administration of villages through elders (of the *khral-pa* stratum), who were chosen either by election or rotation. It was up to the leading families to decide how to meet the tax-obligations on the village level. In nomadic areas, communities were linked to the government officials via the tribal chieftain and their direct subordinates, the headmen (*mgo-pa*).
33. Compare Dargyay (1982: 22-5), who observes that the nexus of rights and obligations towards the respective estate was inherited by government-taxpayer-*mi-ser*, noble-estate *mi-ser* and monastic estate *mi-ser* families alike. This included the “petition for man separation” (*mi-bkrol zhu-ba*) that needed to be granted before a *mi-ser* can leave an estate: in this way he is tied to “land” and “lord” (Carrasco: 1959, 108).
34. It is important to note that according to Michael (1982: 115), both clerical and aristocratic estates were tax exempt, although “[a]dditional estates, acquired or granted, were taxable to different degrees”.
35. Daughters would be tied to the contractual specifications inherited from her mother whilst sons would be born with the rights and obligations of their fathers. See Goldstein: 1971(b), p. 522. Dargyay (1982, 31), however, reports

that in her investigated area social status was inherited through paternal descent: “Even if only the father belonged to the ‘common people’ (*spyi-mi*), his children inherited this rank”.

36. Goldstein: 2007, p. p.10.
37. Goldstein: 1971(b), p. 523: “*If a serf felt his lord had (or was) overstepping his authority—whether this involved land, taxes, or the lord’s settlement of some dispute—the serf could unilaterally take his grievance to the central government for adjudication*”. The government, too, had a strict penal system to follow, the *khriims-yig* which, according to Rahul (1969: 44), “laid down what punishments were to be inflicted for the various offences. These codes, *Shal lche bchu drug pa* and *Shal lche bchu gsum pa*, were very nearly the same in substance”, yet the latter underwent revision under “*Changchub Gyaltzen of Phagmo Drupa and Later By the Dalai Lama V and Desi Sangye Gyatso*” (*ibid.* 44).
38. The district governors’ (*rdzong-dpon*) office as well was subjected to scrutiny and clear regulations against nepotism, partiality, corruption, sexual abuse and the like (see *shes-rab sdong-bu* in Carrasco: 1959, 93).
39. See Dargyay (1982: 58-80) for a detailed investigation of the tax-system in noble estates, clerical estates and governmental estates. See Schuh, D. (1974), for a discussion of public taxes (e.g. *’gab-bre*; *sgo-khral*; *la-khrod*; *’bab-sdud*; *sga-khral*; *se-ba* etc).
40. Dargyay notes (1982: 25) that this rule applied only to the *sger-ba mi-ser* working at noble-manors rather than the *chos-gzhi’i mi-ser* working at clerical estates.
41. Tib. *dmag-khral*.
42. Michael (1982: 119).
43. Michael (1982: 118-9).
44. Goldstein: 1971(a), p. 8.
45. Goldstein: 1971(a), p. 4.
46. The following examples illustrate the importance of economical prowess as a *mi-ser*’s key asset to personal freedom from “serfdom”: A “bound” *mi-ser* could only leave the estate to marry a *mi-ser* of another estate if an agreement was reached that either (a) the landlord was to be provided with a replacement workforce or (provided by the *mi-ser* or the landlord whose estate he was to marry into) or (b) if a *mi-ser* transferred to *mi-bogs* status, which involved a fee and sporadic duties. See Goldstein (2007: p. 11) and Carrasco (1959: 108). Furthermore, a *mi-ser* could only ‘out-source’ work-processes and services to other *mi-ser* if he could pay the wages, and a *mi-bogs* could only enjoy legal protection from a land-lord if he was able to pay the *mi-bogs* fee.

47. According to Aziz (1978: 68 *as cited by* Michael: 1982, 117) the “bound” mi-ser (category 3 in our scheme) comprised 54% of the traditional village. Dargyay (1982: 27), citing Peissel (1973: 86), makes a similar assessment, concluding that “*government and private tax-payers owned together about fifty percent of the whole of the cultivated land*”. Category 2c mi-bogs mi-ser, classified by as “*landless laborers who were free to sell their labor*” provided 43% of the population (Michael: 1982, 117). Uncertainties in categorization, definition and empirical methods aside, the study cited by Michael indicates that the great majority of the traditional Tibetan population indeed fell under the categories of the *khral-pa/dud-chung* and *mi-bogs* categories, although it might not exactly have been the 97% as presented in the study. Another important indicator of ‘serfdom’ or any of its derivative systems is the degree of economic polarization. According to Dargyay (1982: 80), almost “*half the profits of the noble and monastic estates were returned to the subjects in the form of provisions and salaries, and the governmental tax-payers delivered a relatively large proportion of their annual income to the state as taxes. This had the effect of preventing large amounts of wealth from being hoarded by the extensively landed gentry, and on the other hand assured that a certain amount of the total proceeds flowed into the poorer social levels by way of remuneration. It contributed to the prevention of sharp divisions being formed between the rich and the poor; this balancing tendency in the Tibetan economic system was a further factor in the stability of the social structure.*”
48. In sum, Michael’s verdict (*ibid.*) on his own figures contends that “[a]ll mi-ser were thus much better off and economically far more independent than the termserf implies”. Compare Goldstein (2007, p.13), who comes to a similar conclusion.
49. Goldstein: 1971(b), p. 527: “*the ‘human-lease’ holding serf was free to decide how and for what purpose to commit himself as a resource. He could work where and at whatever he liked and for contracted wages or lease rather than as corvée service*”.
50. Goldstein: 1971(b), p. 528.
51. Goldstein: 2007, p.12.
52. According to Michael (1982: 46), who argues that both types of mi-ser “*were free to engage in other enterprises, particularly trade, a major source of income on which there was no taxation to speak of. As a result, a substantial proportion of the mi-ser were traders (tsong-pa), a well-to-do group, which, together with the dü-chung, made up the largest proportion of the town-dwellers.*”

53. Goldstein: 1971(b), p. 523: “*This vulnerability of serfs was exacerbated further since lords held primary adjudicative rights over their serfs, including the right to mete out even severe punishment and imprisonment.*”
54. Les “*relations de servitude se manifest[aient] lorsqu’un clan se trouvait dans la situation de vassal-serf (unağan boğol) d’un autre clan* (Vladimirtsov: 1948: 123).
55. See Petech (1990: 40–44, 62).
56. Petech (1990: 139–140), Kaschewsky (1971: 7).
57. Compare Michael (1982: 116), who describes a “*considerable social mobility of individuals (perhaps with the exception of a small outcast group of yawa) [...] aside from this open ladder for both spiritual and mundane advancement, the status structure was even less constraining than is sometimes believed.*” He describes the village aristocracy as consisting of “*well-to-do families—who might be farmers or herdsmen or traders—who had not only practically but also legally risen from the status of mi-ser to one of social prestige, which they transferred to their children*”, concluding that the “*very existence of their status is an indication of the social mobility in the agricultural and nomadic communities*” (ibid. 121-2).
58. As noted above, the “runaway” *mi-ser* could reapply for entrance in the social system as *mi-bogs mi-ser* and soon thereafter enjoyed the same opportunities.
59. Vladimirtsov (1948: 135) explains the administrative chain of command of the Mongol system as being headed by a Khan, followed by the “Imperial Prince”, the “myriarch”, “Chiliarch” and the “leader of a hundred”. An *unağan boğol*, or ‘serf’ in the Mongol system, could thus head a sub-division to the myriarchy.
60. Goldstein: 1986, p. 108.
61. A term derived from a *mi-ser*’s systemic function is helpful since otherwise “*the application of the term mi-ser to all people in these various sectors of economic and social life conceals more than it explains*” Michael (1982: 117).
62. Schuh (1974: 431).
63. Carrasco (1959: 101)
64. Schuh, D. (1974: 431) argues that the *lho-tsho dgu* as territorial units appear to have been introduced at a different time than the standardized *rdzong* administrative system devised by ’Phags-pa. Whilst these systems had not been fully integrated, the *tsho* is presented as subservient to the *rdzong*. Carrasco (1959: 92) shows there have been 53 districts and 123 sub-districts in pre-1959 Tibet.

65. *rdzong-dpon* and *rdzong-gnyer* do not figure in Schuh's account and are supplied by merit of Carrasco's study (1959: 92)
66. *rdzong-dpon* and *rdzong-gnyer* do not figure in Schuh's account and are supplied by merit of Carrasco's study (1959: 92)

Bibliography

- Ahmad, Zahiruddin. 1970. *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century*. Serie Orientale Roma XL, Roma: Instituto Italiano Per Il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
- Aziz, Barbara N. 1978. *Tibetan Frontier Families*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
- Carrasco, Pedro. 1959. *Land and Polity in Tibet*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Cassinelli, C.W. & Ekval, Robert B. 1969. *A Tibetan Principality: The Political System of the Sakya*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Cüppers, C. (2004). "The Relationship between religion and state (chos srid zung 'brel) in traditional Tibet": proceedings of a seminar held in Lumbini, Nepal, March 2000. Lumbini, Nepal: Lumbini International Research Institute, 2004. *LIRI Seminar proceedings series* (1).
- Dargyay, Eva. 1991. 'Sangha and State in Imperial Tibet.' In *Tibetan History and Language: Studies Dedicated to Uray Géza on his Seventieth Birthday*, Steinkellner, E. (ed.) (111-27). Wien: Arbeitskreis Für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.
- . 1977. *The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Davidson, Ronald 2002. *Indian Esoteric Buddhism: a Social History of the Tantric Movement*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dhondup, K. 1984. *The Water-Horse and Other Years: a History of 17th and 18th Century Tibet*. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.
- Douglas, N., and White M. 1976. *Karmapa: The Black Hat Lama of Tibet*. London: Luzac.
- Dung-dkar Blo-bzang 'Phrin-las. 1983. *Bod-kyi chos-srid zung-'brel-skor bshad-pa*. Chen Guansheng (transl.), Beijing: Foreign Language Press.
- Emmerick, R. E. 1967. *Tibetan Texts Concerning Khotan*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Farquhar, M. David 1978. 'Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch'ing Empire'. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 38(1):5-34

- Franz, Michael. 1982. *Rule by Incarnation: Tibetan Buddhism and its Role in Society and State*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Goldstein, Melvyn and Matthew Kapstein. 1999. (eds) *Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas.
- Goldstein, Melvyn. 2007. *Modern Tibetan History—Vol. 2: The Estate System*. Univ. of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles/London.
- . 1993. *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951*. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.
- . 1989. *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State*. University of California Press.
- . 1986. Reexamining choice, dependency and command in the Tibetan social system: “tax appendages” and other landless serfs. *The Tibet Journal*, 11(4).
- . 1973. ‘The Circulation of Estates in Tibet: Reincarnation, Land and Politics’. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 32(3): 445-55.
- . 1971(a) “Taxation and the Structure of a Tibetan Village”. *Central Asiatic Journal*. 15(1): 1–27.
- . 1971(b) “Serfdom and Mobility: An Examination of the Institution of ‘Human Lease’ in Traditional Tibetan Society”. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 30(3): 521-534.
- Gyatso, Janet. 2001. *Apparitions of the Self: The Secret Autobiographies of a Tibetan Visionary*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- . 1993. ‘The Logic of Legitimation in the Tibetan Treasure Tradition’. *History of Religions*, 33(2): 97-134.
- Harris, Ian (1999). ‘Buddhism and Politics: Textual and Historical Roots’. In *Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia*, London: Pinter.
- Ho-Chin Yang. 1969. *The Annals of Kokonor* (*mtsho sngon gyi lo-rgyus sogs bkod-pa’i tshangs glu gsar snyan zhe bya-ba bzhuks so*) by Sum-pa mKhan-po Ye-shes dPal-’byor. Bloomington: Indian University Publications, Uralic and Altaic Series vol. 106.
- Kapstein, T. Matthew. 2000. *The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Contestation, and Memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Karmay, Samten. 2000. “The Rituals and their Origins in the Visionary Accounts of the Fifth Dalai Lama.” *PIATS: 2000* Leiden: Brill.
- . 1988. *The Great Perfection: A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching of Tibetan Buddhism*. Leiden: Brill.
- Kaschewsky, Rudolf. 1971. *Das Leben des lamaistischen Heiligen Tsongkhapa blo-bzaE-grags-pa (1357-1419) — dargestellt und erläutert anhand seiner Vita “Quellort allen Glückes”*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, p. 33.

- Krasser, Helmut (1997). *Tibetan Studies* (2 volumes). Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies. Graz, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Miller, D. Beatrice. 1961. 'The Web of Tibetan Monasticism'. *Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 20(2): 197- 203.
- .1987. "A response to Goldstein's 'Re-examining choice, dependency and Command in the Tibetan Social System'". In *The Tibet Journal* XII(2): 65-7
- Mills, A. Martin. 2003. *Identity, Ritual and State in Tibetan Buddhism: the Foundations of Authority in Gelukpa Monasticism*. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Norbu, Dawa. 1985. 'An Analysis of Sino-Tibetan Relationships, 1245-1911: Imperial Power, Non-coercive Regime, and Military Dependency'. In *Soundings of Tibetan Civilization*, pp.176-195.
- Ninth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Obermiller, Yevgenij Yevgenyevich. 1931. *History of Buddhism (Chos-'byung)* by Bu-ston. Pt. 1, The Jewelry of Scripture and Pt. 2, *The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*. Heidelberg: Harrassowitz.
- Petech, Luciano. 1990. "The Yüan- Sa-skya period of tibetan history". In *Central Tibet and the Mongols*. Serie Orientale (65). Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
- Rahul, Ram.1969. *The Government and Politics of Tibet*. Delhi: Vikas Publications.
- Richardson, Hugh. 1985. *A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions*. London: Royal Asiatic Society.
- .1980. 'The Fifth Dalai Lama's Decree Appointing Sangs-rgyas rgya-mtsho as Regent'. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 43(2): 329-44, University of London.
- Roerich, George. 1976. *The Blue Annals*. by Gos lo-tsa-ba gzhon-nu dpal. 2 vols. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Ruegg, Seyfort D. 1997. 'The Preceptor-Donor (*Yon Mchod*) Relation in Thirteenth Century Tibetan Society and Polity, its Inner Asian Precursors and Indian Models'. PIATS 1995: *Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Samuel, Geoffrey. 1993. *Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies*. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- .1982. 'Tibet as a Stateless Society and Some Islamic Parallels'. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 49(2): 215-29.

- Schuh, D. 1974. "Ein Rechtsbrief des 7. Dalai Lama für den Residenten am Stupa von Bodhnath". In *Zentralasiatische Studien*, (8), 1974. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
- Schwartz, Ronald. 1999. 'Renewal and Resistance: Tibetan Buddhism in the Modern Era'. In *Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia*, London: Pinter.
- Snellgrove, L. David. 1987. *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: Indian Buddhists and their Tibetan Successors*. London: Serindia Publications.
- . 1959. 'The Notion of Divine Kingship in Tantric Buddhism'. *Studies in the History of Religions* (Supplements to Numen, IV), Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- Smith, E. Gene. 2001. *Among Tibetan Texts: History and Literature in the Himalayan Plateau*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
- Stein, Rolf Alfred. 1972. *Tibetan Civilization*. Translated from the French by J.E. Stapleton Driver. London: Faber and Faber Ltd.
- Sangs-rGyas rGya-mTsho. 1999. *Life of the Fifth Dalai Lama*. Vol. IV, Part I. Translated by Zahiruddin Ahmad. Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture.
- Samuel, Geoffrey. 1993. *Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies*. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- . 1982. 'Tibet as a Stateless Society and Some Islamic Parallels'. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 49(2): 215-29.
- Schwartz, Ronald. 1999. 'Renewal and Resistance: Tibetan Buddhism in the Modern Era'. In *Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia*, London: Pinter.
- Shakabpa, W. D. Tsepon. 1984. *Tibet: A Political History*. NY: Potala Publications.
- Snellgrove, L. David. 1987. *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: Indian Buddhists and their Tibetan Successors*. London: Serindia Publications.
- . 1959. 'The Notion of Divine Kingship in Tantric Buddhism'. *Studies in the History of Religions* (Supplements to Numen, IV), Leiden: E.J. Brill.
- Smith, E. Gene. 2001. *Among Tibetan Texts: History and Literature in the Himalayan Plateau*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
- Stein, Rolf Alfred. 1972. *Tibetan Civilization*. Driver, J.E.S. (trans.). London: Faber and Faber Ltd.
- Tambiah, Stanley J. 1987. *The Buddhist Conception of Universal King and its Manifestations in South and Southeast Asia*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya.
- . (1976) *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: a Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vladimirtsov, Boris Iakovlevich. 1948. *Le regime social des Mongols—le féodalisme nomade*. Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve.

Wittfogel, Karl (1957). *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

———. (1938) “*Die Theorie der orientalischen Gesellschaft*” In *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 7(1/2), Alcan, Paris, 1938.

The Great Seal of Voidness

*The Root Text for the Geluk / Kagyue Tradition of Mahamudra**

First Panchen Lama

I prostrate to Mahamudra, the Great Seal of Voidness.

I prostrate to my peerless Guru, lord of great and extensive attainments, who teaches in all its stark details the diamond-hard Voidness of the mind, beyond all words-Mahamudra, the Great Seal of Voidness, the all-pervasive nature of all things, the indistinguishable single nature of both objects of Voidness and Voidness itself.

The First Panchen Lama, Tutor of His Holiness the Fifth Dalai Lama, prostrates to his root Guru, that is his main Guru, K'a-dr'ub Sang-gya ye-she, from whom he received this Mahamudra lineage.

Combining the essence of ocean-like oral teachings of both the sutra and tantra traditions of Mahamudra with the well-explained teachings of the Ge-lug and Ka.gyu Traditions transmitted orally from successive Guru to disciple, I shall write here specifically about the Mahamudra oral tradition teachings of the spiritual father and his son of highest attainment, Dharmavajra.

The Mahamudra oral tradition teaching presented here is of the joined Ge-lug and Ka-gyu Traditions. Its immediate lineage is traced from B'a-so ch'o-je, the Fifth Successor to the Throne of Je Tzong-k'a-pa. His spiritual son or main disciple was Dharmavajra, whose spiritual son was Gyal-wa En-sa-pa, the root Guru of the First Panchen Lama's root Guru. Moreover, the First Panchen Lama is recognised as the reincarnation of Gyal-wa En-sa-pa.

First is the preparation. In order to enter the gateway and framework of Buddha's teachings in general, and specifically those of the Mahayana, it is essential for you to take refuge and develop an Enlightened Attitude of Bodhicitta sincerely from your heart, not merely from your mouth.

Taking proper refuge was especially emphasised by Atisa, the founder of the Ka-dam Tradition, and his Gurus Dharmamati of Suvarnadvipa and

* Translated by the Translation Bureau of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives: Geshe Ngawang Dhargye, Sherpa Tulku, Khamlung Tulku, Alexander Berzin and Jonathan Landaw. It was first published by the Library in 1975.

Santipa. The First Sakya Pandit has said that you cannot be considered a proper Buddhist unless you take refuge. P'a-d'am-pa sang-gya has said you must entrust your heart to the Three Jewels of Refuge, and then all things and inspiration will follow.

Developing an Enlightened Attitude of Bodhicitta as the gateway for entering the Mahayana path was emphasised especially by Santideva and Atisa. This is the tantra teachings as well; and on this point no difference whatsoever among all the tray Buddhism in Tibet. All Mahayana Gurus have agreed that Bodhicitta is the way to lead disciples onto the Enlightenment. Je-tzun Mi-la-ra-pa and his disciple Gam-po-pa, who combined the two streams of the Ka. Mahamudra Traditions, were particularly noted Bodhicitta teachings.

As the realisation of the void nature of the mind is completely dependent upon your collection of merit and elimination obstacles, you should dispatch ahead of you as many prostrations as possible, made while reciting "The Declaration before the Thirty-five Buddhas", as well as hundreds of thousands of repetitions of the "hundred-syllable mantra of Vajrasa".

Je-tzun Mi-la-ra-pa's repeated building and dismantling of houses for his Guru Mar-pa were all for the purpose of eliminating obstacles to his spiritual progress. Having overcome the hindrances accumulated by his non-virtuous actions, Je-tzun Mi-la-ra-pa was able to attain Full Enlightenment in his one lifetime.

It was the practice of both Mar-pa, the founder D'ag-po Ka-gyu Traditions, and Je Tzong-k'a-pa, the founder of the Ge-lug Tradition, to prostrate while reciting "The Declaration before the Thirty-five Buddhas" ('Tung-shag'). As preliminary practice (ngon-dro collection of merit and the cleansing of obstacles, Tzong-k'a-pa offered thirty-five sets of 100,000 prostrations, one to each of the thirty-five Buddhas, as well as eighteen sets of 100,000 mandala offerings.

Then you must make repeated heartfelt requests to your root Guru, whom you recognise as inseparable from the Buddhas of the past, present and future, to be able to realise Voidness.

Your root Guru is the one who gives you initiations and directs your practice. He is the teacher to whom you completely entrust yourself. All Gurus of the four major Tibetan traditions of Buddhism have agreed that Guru-devotion is vital for

the realisation of Voidness. In the root text of the ‘Kalacakra Tantra’ it says, “Even if you were to make offerings to all the Buddhas of the past, present and future and practise charity to sentient beings for eons, you might still not be able to attain Enlightenment. But, by making full proper Guru-devotion, the attainment of Mahamudra becomes easy.” This point is also stressed in the ‘Guhyasamaja Tantra’. Gam-po-pa has said that when he realised that his mind and his root Guru Je-tzun Mi-la-ra-pa were one and the same, he realised Mahamudra.

There are many different ways of approaching the actual teachings of Mahamudra. In general, these can be divided into two basic classifications - the Mahamudra teachings of the sutras and those of the tantras.

For the latter, you must concentrate on the energy-channels of your vajra-body, and especially on the central energy-channel.

In order to practise the Mahamudra of the tantras, you must first receive a full initiation (wang, abhiseka) into the highest classification of tantra, anuttarayoga. Then it is essential to keep the purity of your tantric vows and your sacred words of honour (d’am-tsig, samaya) to follow the procedures precisely. In addition you must have gained proficiency in the development stage (kye-rim, utpattikrama) of anuttarayoga to the point at which you have confidence in its practice. This entails purifying your body, speech and mind through meditation on the mandala and mantra of a meditational deity (yi-d’am, istadevata) in accordance with the instructions of a fully qualified Tantric Master.

There are 72,000 energy-channels (tza, nadi) in the human body, eight of which are considered major. The vajra-body corresponds to your subtle physical body when used for tantric practice. The central energy-channel (tza u-ma, avadhuti or susumna) runs parallel to and slightly in front of your spine and is normally blocked by channel-knots. In the practice of the completion stage (dzog-rim, sampannakrama) of anuttarayoga tantra, the various energy-winds (lung; vayu, prana) of the body are channelled into the central energy-channel for the purpose of realising Voidness with the resulting blissful fine consciousness.

From following such methods as this and others, you can come to experience the blissful realisation of the Clear Light of Voidness on the finest level of consciousness.

Once all the energy-winds of the body have been channelled into the central energy-channel, if the resulting blissful fine consciousness has an

intellectual or conceptual understanding of Voidness, this understanding is known as the approximating Clear Light. The full non-conceptual direct understanding of Voidness by the finest level of consciousness is called the actual Clear Light.

This finest level of consciousness itself when it realises Voidness is known in various traditions by various names: the psychic heat of the short 'a', the undissipating drop, the unadulterated mind, the primordial mind and so forth. These are all to be understood as synonyms.

This explanation of Mahamudra as the blissful realisation of Voidness attained by channelling your body's energy-winds into the central energy-channel is attested to by Saraha, Nagarjuna, Naropa and Maitripa. It is taught specifically in "The Seven Texts of the Mahasiddhas" and "The Three Core Volumes" of Saraha. These Mahamudra teachings, thus, are the quintessence of the highest classification of tantra, anuttara-yoga. This then, in brief is the explanation of Mahamudra according to the tantra system.

The hidden etymology of the Tibetan term for Mahamu-dra, Ch'ag-gya ch'en-po, is as follows. 'Ch'ag' signifies Voidness; 'gya' Liberation from samsara; and 'ch'en-po' the great attainment of unification (zung.jug, yuganad-dha), that is the unification of the realisation of Voidness and Liberation from samsara.

As for the previous one, the Mahamudra teachings of the sutras, this refers to the ways of meditating on Voidness as taught in the three 'Prajnaparamita Sutras' and in all three traditions of the Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas. Nagarjuna has said that except for these methods there is no other path to Liberation.

According to another hidden etymology of the term Mahamudra, 'mudra' means absolute necessity or prerequisite, something without which there is no reaching of a limit. 'Maha' means great understanding. Thus the term Mahamudra implies that there is no method for gaining either Liberation or Full Enlightenment other than one based on a full understanding of Voidness.

There is no difference between Voidness understood by tantra methods and that by sutra ones. The difference lies in what understands Voidness. With the tantra methods, it is understood by the finest level of consciousness that has been channelled into the central energy-channel. With the sutra ones, it is understood by rougher levels of consciousness.

Therefore, following the wishes and teachings of Nagarjuna, I shall now explain in this discussion of Mahamudra the methods and ways of introducing yourself to the true nature of the mind in accordance with the teachings of the Gurus of unbroken lineage.

There are two levels of introduction to the mind. One is to the operative, functional or conventional mind and the other to its ultimate void nature. This is in accordance with the distinction made between the operative and ultimate levels of truth.

There are two unbroken lineages of the Mahamudra teachings: the distant traced from Buddha and the near from Je Tzong-k'a-pa. What is stressed here is the importance of an unbroken lineage for any teaching to be vital, relevant and effective.

There are numerous oral tradition teachings, such as those of Simultaneous Production and Union, the Joined Amulet Box, Possessing Five, the Six Equal Tastes, the Four Letters, the Pacifier, the Cutting-off, the Great Encompassment and the Profound Madhyamika Theory.

The tradition known as Simultaneous Production and Union is traced from Gam-po-pa. The teachings of this Ka-gyu tradition of Mahamudra entail the initial practice of the four Mahamudra preliminaries (ngon-dro). This is followed by mental quiescence meditation (zhi-na, samatha) for the development of single-minded concentration (ting-nge dzin, samadhi) and penetrative insight meditation (lhag-t'ong, vipasyana) for the realisation of Voidness (tong-pa-nyi, sunyata). The four Mahamudra preliminaries are taking refuge, developing Bodhicitta, Vajrasattva purification meditation and Guru-yoga. These practices aim for the attainment of unification (yuganad-dha), the non-dual attainment of both a Buddha's Physical Body (zug-ku, rupakaya) and Wisdom Body (ch'o-ku, dharmakaya). According to the tantra system, this attainment of unification comes with the simultaneous production and union of bliss and Voidness. According to the sutra system, this comes with the simultaneous production and union of appearance and Voidness.

The tradition of the joined Amulet Box is traced from Ky'ung-po naljor, the founder of the Shang-pa Ka-gyu Tradition. In its explanation of Mahamudra, the meditation combining bliss and Voidness is described as similar to the process of joining together the front and back halves of an amulet box.

The teachings of Possessing Five are found among all Ka-gyu Traditions, but especially in the D'ag-po Ka-gyu ones founded by Mar-pa. They are discussed in the songs of Dri-k'ung Kyob-pa jig-ten gon-po. This disciple of Gam-po-pa's disciple P'ag-mo dr'u-pa was the founder of the Dri-k'ung Ka-gyu Tradition. He was also the root Guru of one of Je-Tzong-k'a-pa's many Gurus, Dri-k'ung Chan-nga-wa. According to this set of teachings, Mahamudra is like a lion and its practice without the oral tradition of Possessing Five is like a lion robbed of his power of sight. Mahamudra Possessing Five, then, refers to the following five practices to be done in conjunction with Mahamudra: (1) meditating on the Enlightened Attitude of Bodhicitta, (2) visualising yourself as a meditational deity, (3) having faith and respect in your Guru, (4) meditating on Voidness and (5) offering prayers of dedication.

The teachings of the Six Equal Tastes originated with Ra ch'ung-pa, who, like Gam-po-pa, was a direct disciple of Je-tzun Mi-la-ra-pa. Ra ch'ung-pa hid these teachings as a treasure text (ter-ma). They were discovered and made known by Dro-gon Tzang-pa gya-ra, who, together with his Guru Ling-ra-pa Pa-ma dor-je, founded the Drug-pa Ka-gyu Tradition. The Six Equal Tastes refer to the practice of transforming the following six normally adverse conditions into paths of wisdom: (1) distorted conceptions, (2) moral and mental defilements or delusions (nyon-mong, klesa), (3) sickness, (4) harm from gods and spirits, (5) suffering and (6) death. An example of this type of practice, with reference to distorted conceptions, is transforming whatever you hear into mantra, whatever you see into the form of a meditational deity and whatever you know into wisdom. This may only be undertaken after receiving an initiation into the highest class of tantra, anuttarayoga. Its purpose is to eliminate compulsive attraction and attachment to ordinary appearances.

The teachings of the Four Letters are found widely among the various Ka-gyu Traditions, though their origin is unclear. The practice entails (1) ascertaining the condition of the conventional mind, (2) ascertaining methods to collect the scattered mind and settle it on an object of meditation, (3) severing the mind's connection with non-virtue and with conceptions of true independent existence, and (4) transforming the mind into the nature of the paths of wisdom.

The Zhi je or Pacifier Tradition was founded by P'a-d'am-pa sang-gya, a direct disciple of Nagarjuna from South India. Its name derives from a passage in 'The Heart Sutra' that the mantra of the perfection of wisdom (she-rab-kyi p'a-rol-tu ch'in-pa, prajnaparamita) is the pacifier of all suffering. Its philosophy is purely Madhyamika-Prasangika, in accordance

with the teachings of Nagarjuna, and its specific points are based on the “Sutrasamasa”.

The Cho or Cutting-off Tradition consists of the functional teachings of the Pacifier Tradition. According to these you can cut off all the bonds tying you to continued rebirth with suffering in samsara through the practice of both separate and combined meditations on Voidness and the Enlightened Attitude of Bodhicitta. This tradition originally had as its philosophic base the teachings of the Madhyamika-Prasangika. In later times its methods were adopted by all the Tibetan traditions of Buddhism and their philosophic base was varied accordingly. It has two main lineages. The Male Cutting-off lineage is traced from P’ a-d’ am-pa sang-gya, the founder of the Pacifier Tradition, to Kyo-ton So-nam Lama, while the Female Cutting-off lineage is traced from Kyo-ton So-nam Lama to the great female yogi, that is, yogini, Ma.chig lab-kyi dron-ma.

The teachings of the Great Encompassment (dzog-ch’ en) were introduced by Padma Sambhava (Guru Rinpoche) and are found in the Nying-ma Tradition. The term ‘encompassment’ (dzog) refers to the fact that all things that appear and exist in both samsara and Nirvana come together in and are encompassed by the view of non-independent existence. The term ‘great’ (ch’ en) refers to the fact that from the realisation of the non-independent existence of all things comes the Great Liberation from samsaric existence and its suffering.

The Profound Madhyamika Theory refers to the Madhyamika-Prasangika teachings of Nagarjuna on Voidness as followed in the Ge-lug Tradition founded by Je Tzong-k’ a-pa.

These individual oral tradition teachings have different names and titles. But, if an experienced yogi, who is truly a master of scripture and logic and who can differentiate correctly between scriptures of definitive and interpretive meaning, were to examine them all, he would see that all these theories and teachings are non-contradictory. He would see how all these different explanations and methods lead in the end to the same point - a true understanding of Voidness.

Buddha’s teachings can be divided into two classifications: those of interpretive and those of definitive meaning. The former are not to be taken literally, but rather are expressions of Buddha’s skilful and effective means used to lead disciples on to deeper and more profound understandings. Thus they require interpretation by a Guru to bring the disciple to the intended realisation. Teachings of definitive meaning, however, require no

further interpretation. They may be taken literally as the deep significance towards which disciples are being led.

By realising how all the traditions and teachings of the Buddhas are non-contradictory and how all of them are skilful and effective means for attaining Liberation and Enlightenment, you avoid the extremely serious error of abandoning your refuge in the Dharma by advancing sectarian views.

There are two general methods for practising the Mahamudra meditations according to the sutra system. The first is to develop an initial understanding of the theory of Voidness, and then strive to achieve single-minded concentration on that understanding. The second method is to strive for an understanding of the theory of Voidness based on the prior development of single-minded concentration in mental quiescence meditation. Of these two, what follows is an explanation of the latter one.

In the 'Mahayanasutralamkara', Maitreya has explained that a proper and conducive place to practise mental quiescence meditation (samatha) is one that has the following five conditions: (1) an easily available supply of food and water, (2) the approval and blessings of your Gurus or of past Gurus who have meditated there, (3) a secluded, quiet location with a congenial climate, (4) other meditators nearby for inspiration and (5) all the necessary instructions and texts about the practice. In addition, for the successful development of single-minded concentration (samadhi) in mental quiescence meditation, it is essential to keep the strict discipline of moral self-control (tsul-tr'im, sila). This not only eliminates mental distraction, but also leaves you with few needs. Such peaceful contentment with a simple life is a further condition conducive for this type of meditation.

The division of Mahamudra meditation techniques into two general categories is only with reference to the sutra system. These two divisions are drawn according to whether single-minded concentration in mental quiescence meditation is developed before or after gaining an understanding of Voidness. In the tantra system, however, as there is no separate practice for the development of mental quiescence, this division does not pertain.

Sitting on a comfortable meditations platform in the seven-fold posture, you should rid yourself of defiled thoughts and extraneous mental activity by first practising the Nine Breathings.

The meditation platform should be made of wood, raised three or four inches from the ground. Underneath it, reeds of kusa grass should be placed

with their tips pointing towards the centre. On top of it a cushion should be placed with its back slightly raised. Either on or beneath this cushion, grain should be arranged in the auspicious design of a swastika.

The seven-fold posture is that of Vairocana, the tantric meditational Buddha with whom you identify in order to purify your aggregate of form (zug-kyi p'ung-po, rupaskandha). The seven parts of this standard meditation posture refer to the positions of the legs, hands, spine, mouth, head, eyes and shoulders. You should sit in the full lotus position with your feet crossed and locked, resting upon the opposite thighs. Your hands should rest on your upturned feet, with the left hand beneath the right, and with the thumbs touching, forming a triangle at the level of your navel. Your spine should be straight as an arrow to allow the currents of energy-wind in your body to flow freely through the energy-channels without impediment. Your lips should be relaxed, not pursed, and teeth not clenched. Your tongue should touch the upper palate to retain saliva, so that your mouth does not become dry, and to prevent drooling. If there is excessive saliva, you may swallow, but this position of the tongue should minimise salivation.

Your head should be bent slightly forward and down. If it is raised too high, you will be able to see too much and your mind will wander. If it is bent too low, you will become dizzy. Your eyes should be kept half-open, focused loosely on the vicinity of the tip of your nose, without being strained in an unnatural cross-eyed position. If they are wide-open, again you will see too much and will easily become distracted. If they are closed, your mind will become dull and you may fall asleep.

Your shoulders should be straight back and even, at the same level as each other. This is also essential for the proper unimpeded passage of energy-wind through your body. In addition, you should keep your elbows slightly bent, leaving a small space between your body and arms for ventilation.

This seven-fold meditation posture is often referred to as the eight-fold one by adding the method of breathing. In meditations other than specific ones involving the breath, you should breathe through your nose quietly, not forcefully or unnaturally. Your in-breath should be of the same length as your out-breath. The two should be neither too deep nor too shallow, and you should not hold your breath.

The practice of the Nine Breathings is extremely effective for reducing mental wandering and disturbed states of mind. Close your left nostril with your left ring finger and breathe in slowly through the right nostril. Then without pausing change hands, close your right nostril with your right ring finger, and breathe out slowly through the left nostril. Do all this three

times and then repeat, but this time breathe in through your left nostril and out through the right. The last three rounds should be in and out through both nostrils.

These Nine Breathings may be practised with or without the following visualization of the energy-channels. You should visualise your body empty like a balloon. If you have received a tantric initiation for a particular meditational deity, you are permitted in addition to visualise your form as that of the meditational deity; otherwise you may not.

You should visualise your central energy-channel as parallel to and slightly in front of your spine, hollow, the thickness of a medium-sized bamboo, white on the outside and red on the inside. Its upper end is curved like an umbrella handle, passing over the crown of your head and ending between your brows. Its lower end is four finger-widths below your navel. You should visualise your right energy-channel (ro-ma, rasana or pingala) as red in colour, the thickness of a stalk of wheat, starting six finger-widths below your navel, running close to the central channel and ending at your right nostril. You should visualise your left energy-channel (kyang-ma, lalana or ida) as white in colour, the same thickness and length as the right one, and ending at your left nostril.

When doing the first three breathings in through your right nostril and out through the left, you should visualise the bottom end of your right energy-channel inserted into the bottom end of the left. When you breathe in, you should imagine your breath in the form of white cleansing rays of light passing down your right energy-channel and accumulating in the left in which the energy-wind of the defilement of longing desire (do-ch'ag, raga) is blocked and frustrated. When you exhale through your left nostril, you should visualise your longing desire leaving you in the form of black rays of light.

During the second three breathings in your left nostril and out of the right, you should imagine the bottom end of your left energy-channel inserted into the bottom end of the right. When you breathe in, you should visualise your breath in the form of white light passing down your left energy-channel and accumulating in the right in which the energy-wind of the defilement of fearful and angered repulsion (zhe-dang, dvesa) is blocked and frustrated. When you exhale through your right nostril, you should imagine your fearful and angered repulsion leaving you in the form of black light.

During the last three breathings in and out of both your nostrils, you should visualise the bottom ends of both your left and right energy-channels inserted into the bottom end of the central energy-channel. When you

breathe in, you should imagine your breath in the form of white light passing down both right and left energy-channels and accumulating in your central one in which the energy-wind of the defilement of close-minded ignorance (ti-mug, moha) is blocked and frustrated. When you exhale, you should visualise your close-minded ignorance leaving you from between your brows in the form of black light.

This meditation of the Nine Breathings should not be repeated in rapid succession. If it fails to eliminate your gross mental wandering, another method is as follows. You should breathe in and out of both your nostrils silently, not forcefully, with your in-breath the same length as your out, and without holding your breath. Concentrating totally on your breathing, you should count in your mind each round of in and out breaths as one for twenty-one rounds. As it is normally difficult to concentrate on even one thing at a time, by concentrating on both breathing and counting, there will be little room left for extraneous thoughts.

Sorting out your dull states of mind from the clear, you should begin by taking refuge and developing an Enlightened Attitude of Bodhicitta with a pure and virtuous motivation. You should then perform the profound meditation of Guru-yoga. After making fervent requests a hundred times or more with intense faith, you should visualise your Guru as dissolving into you.

Guru-yoga is basic to all Tibetan traditions of Buddhism. For Mahamudra meditation, the performance six times each day of ‘The Six Session Prayer’ (‘T’un-dr’ug’) is the most commonly practised form of Guru-yoga. In the Ge-lug Tradition, ‘The Guru Puja’ (‘La-ma ch’o-pa’) by the First Panchen Lama is often performed as well.

Fervent requests to your Guru for inspiration and success in your practice should be made by reciting the mantra of his Sanskrit name. In the Ge-lug Tradition, the verses of “Mig-tze-ma” and of “Ga-dan lha-gya-ma” are often recited as well while visualising your root Guru in the form of Je Tzong-k’a-pa.

While performing Guru-yoga and making fervent requests, you should visualise your root Guru before you. At the conclusion of this essential preliminary, you should imagine him coming to the top of your head, sitting there facing the same way as you, and then sinking to your heart and dissolving. You should then feel that your body, speech and mind have merged indistinguishably with those of your Guru.

(After these preliminaries, you should formally begin the meditation) by concentrating without the slightest mental wandering, single-mindedly on an unstructured or undetermined state of mind. This is a state of mind devoid of any pre-conceptions, doubts, wishes or aspirations for either temporary or ultimate purposes concerning either the future or the past. This does not mean, however, that you should cease all conscious attention as if you were asleep or had fainted. Rather, you should fix your unwavering memory firmly on the task of watching your mind from a distance (to see that it remains focused on its object, an unstructured state of mind). In addition you should keep yourself constantly prepared with mental alertness to sense any mental wandering.

In general, there are four types of objects or methods used for developing single-minded concentration (samadhi). The first is by meditating on a pervading visualised object. This can be of two varieties, meditation on a visualised object done either with or without examination. An example of the former is penetrative insight meditation (vipasyana) in which conceptual analysis is made on the void nature of a visualised object. An example of the latter is mental quiescence meditation (samatha) in which concentration is developed by settling the mind on a visualised object alone without the conceptualising process of analysis. The second method for developing single-minded concentration is by meditating on a specific visualised aspect of an opponent force, done together with a conceptual analysis to eliminate a specific delusion. An example of this is to concentrate on a visualised corpse, while making an analysis of the body's impermanence, in order to eliminate attachment and longing desire. Here impermanence is the opponent force for eliminating the specific delusion of attachment. A corpse is a specific visualised aspect of impermanence and developing single-minded concentration on it while analysing the body's impermanence is this type of meditation.

The third general method is by analytic meditation or a sound understanding. An example of this is to concentrate on the four close contemplations or on the Four Noble Truths after having understood them well. The four close contemplations are of the void nature of the body, feelings, the mind and all things.

The fourth method is by meditating on an analysed object for the elimination of delusions in general. This has two varieties: developing single-minded concentration in a meditation done (1) for the temporary elimination of the gross aspects of delusions and (2) for the permanent elimination of the delusions from their roots. An example of the former is to meditate on the nature of the delusions of each of the rebirth states as

having a progressively grosser mistaken basis. An example of the latter is to meditate on the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths.

In this particular explanation of Mahamudra, however none of these four general methods are used to develop single-minded concentration. Instead, the method of mental quiescence meditation with the mind itself taken as the object of concentration is explained. This, however, is suggested only for people of great intelligence as a way to develop single-minded concentration for use in Mahamudra meditation in either the sutra or tantra system.

You should then fix your attention on the nature of the mind itself as an impermanent phenomenon that can clearly and validly know things.

In general there are seven ways in which your mind can know things. Two of them are valid, and with three of them you can apprehend something correctly. With a valid way of knowing you have a fresh, non-fraudulent awareness of something validly knowable. Through bare perception you have a non-conceptual valid cognition of objective, impermanent entities. An inferential understanding is of metaphysical, permanent entities and arises by relying on a valid line of reasoning. With subsequent cognition you apprehend correctly what you have already done so through either of the two previous valid ways of knowing. Even though such awareness is non-fraudulent, because it is not fresh, it is invalid.

With the other four ways of knowing, you do not even apprehend your object correctly. With presumption you jump to a correct conclusion either for no reason, a wrong one or even a right one but of which you are not convinced. Although a validly knowable object may appear to you, with inattentive perception you are not fully aware of it. With indecisive wavering you are unable to decide about what appears to you and with distorted cognition you grasp things incorrectly.

Thus by understanding the difference between the valid and invalid ways in which your mind knows things, you should focus on the nature of your mind as something that, changing from moment to moment, can nevertheless have a fresh and non-fraudulent awareness of whatever appears to it.

Firmly tightening your attention, you must try to see their bare nature of your mind as clearly and starkly as possible, and see nothing else. Whatever extraneous thoughts arise, either try to recognise them for what they are, or, like your opponent in a duel, cut them off immediately as soon as they occur.

When extraneous thoughts arise while you are trying to concentrate, the method suggested here is to recognise them merely for what they are. This means that you should identify, “This is mental wandering,” “This is mental dullness,” “This is mental agitation.” Having recognised these thoughts, you should not pursue them any further or analyse them. Rather, you should return immediately to concentrating on the object of meditation.

Finally, when you have eliminated all extraneous mental activity and your mind is in a cleared state, you should continue the meditation in a relaxed and natural manner, concentrating on the mind as a clear cogniser, without letting your memory slacken.

To meditate properly you must have strong concentration internally, while your mind is externally relaxed and joyous. If you are too tense, you will experience mental agitation. If you are too relaxed, you will experience mental dullness. Therefore, like the strings of a guitar, your mind should be neither too high-strung nor too loose.

It has been taught, “Tighten (your attention and memory) firmly and meditate in a relaxed manner. This is the way you should settle your mind.” Elsewhere it has been said that if your mind, which had previously been constricted too forcefully with the pincers of memory and alertness, were to be relaxed slightly, then there is no doubt that you would become free of mental agitation. As it has been explained, then, you should relax your mind and meditate without any mental wandering.

In this type of meditation whenever extraneous thoughts arise in your mind, if you observe their nature long enough, you will find that they all pass and disappear. You are then left with an awareness of the clear state of your mind in its stark bareness. Moreover, whenever (you are in this meditational state free of mental wandering and) you examine your mind intensely (asking yourself, ‘What is my mind?’), its bare clarity appears vividly, unobstructed by thought-coverings. Seeing no basic difference between these two methods of settling the mind is known to the meditators as *Mixing the Two Approaches*.

These two methods, then, are (1) observing your thoughts and seeing them disappear into the clear bareness of your mind, and (2) analysing your mind and coming in this way also to its bare clarity.

Another method of settling the mind is not to block whatever extraneous thoughts arise, but to concentrate on the nature of the train of thought that has arisen and

try to comprehend it. What happens is like the example of a caged pigeon released from a ship in mid-ocean. As the scriptural reference states, “A bird that has flown from a ship in mid-ocean, after flying here and there must inevitably land back on the ship from which it left.”

To concentrate on the nature of a train of thought that has arisen while you are meditating does not mean that you should blindly let your mind wander after this train of thought. Nor does it mean that you should make a deep analysis of the void nature of this distraction. You should merely concentrate on what has arisen in your consciousness. For instance, if while meditating your nose begins to itch, this particular method is to concentrate on the itch, but not scratch it. Scratching is to follow the distracting train of thought. By merely concentrating on the itch, it will eventually disappear and thus you will have returned to your original object of meditation, your mind as something that can validly know things.

From practising such methods as these, you attain in your meditation a clear state of mind unobstructed by anything.

There are six ways in which the mind can become settled These are as follows. (1) Settling like the sun unobscured by clouds, your mind is cleared of all obstacles such a mental wandering, dullness and agitation. (2) Settling like an eagle soaring high in the sky, your mind meditates smoothly without applying effort. (3) Settling like the movement of the ocean caused by the wind, your mind can only be ruffled on the surface of its concentration, but never in its depth. (4) Settling like a small boy looking at murals in a temple, your mind never looks at the details of its wandering, but simply seeing the rough form of its distraction, goes on with meditation. (5) Settling like a bird flying in the sky and leaving no trace, no matter what feelings of pleasure, pain or indifference you experience, these leave no trace on your mind which simply goes on meditating without attachment. (6) Settling like coarse wool softening when soaked in water, your mind becomes relaxed and flexible absorbed in meditation, with the previous tensions of anger and attachment having decreased.

However, no matter how clear and concentrated a state of mind you achieve with primary consciousness, it is not considered formal mental quiescence (samatha) unless it has also been grasped with the secondary mental attitude of physical ecstasy and exhilarating mental bliss. With the attainment of this ecstasy and bliss, which come automatically as the result of training your mind through the nine stages of mental development, you

gain great flexibility. You can then use your single-minded concentration limitlessly for virtuous purposes.

Although this state of mind lacks any form or structure, and in this way is as bare as space, yet it is precisely on this mind, as on a mirror, that whatever arises to consciousness appears vividly. Thus although you can see this nature of the mind most obviously, nevertheless you can never hold on to or point to any particular thing as 'my mind'.

(After you have developed through these methods mental quiescence on the conventional mind), most meditators of the Land of the Snows agree that then to fix gently in meditation on whatever appears (on the clear mirror-like nature of your mind), without grasping at any extraneous thoughts or pre-conceptions, is an oral tradition method for the easy forging of Buddhahood. This may well be so, but what has been explained here is the best method for merely settling the mind on the initial level. I, Ch'o-kyi gyal-tsan, say that this is the way merely to introduce yourself to the conventional mind.

It is a commonly made mistake to think that when you have eliminated your gross mental dullness you have attained mental quiescence and are practically enlightened. Although this elimination is a great accomplishment, it can be a misleading and a potentially dangerous state since you may sink into blank-mindedness.

Therefore I shall now explain the methods for introducing yourself to the true nature of the mind in accordance with the oral teachings of my root Guru, who eliminates all darkness of the mind, looking like a saffron-robed monk, but being in actuality a manifestation of the wisdom of all the Buddhas.

In the same state as the previous settling of your mind (in single-minded concentration), you should, like a small fish swimming through clear undisturbed water, examine with very fine consciousness the nature of the self-identity of just who it is who is meditating. The protector Nagarjuna has said, 'An individual person is not the solid matter of his body, nor is lie the liquid, heating or gaseous matter. He is not the space of his body, nor is he the consciousness. If an individual is not any one of these, then the kind of person other than this who does exist is merely the label of a person on the six sensory spheres.'

The six sensory spheres are the collections of the objects, cognitive powers and consciousness of the senses of sight, sound, smell, taste, touch and thought. The process of labelling a striped rope as a snake and a collection of sensory spheres as a person are the same in so far as both are

processes of projecting a label onto an object of labelling. But they are different in that there is no conventionally existent snake present when a rope is labelled a “snake”, but there is a conventionally existent person accumulating and experiencing the effects of karma present when a collection of sensory spheres is labelled a person. To understand this difference is extremely crucial.

Thus a person or a self-identity (being merely a label on a collection of sensory spheres) has no ultimate true independent existence. Moreover, none of the sensory spheres has independent existence either, since each of them too is a label on a collection of parts. Therefore, if you try to find your self-identity in the light of these teachings on the non-independent existence of all things, you will never be able to find the true independent existence of even the smallest part of a meditator who is settling his mind single-pointedly in meditation.

In this state (when you have realised the true void nature of your mind in the above manner), you should single-pointedly settle your mind on this realisation without any mental wandering. In this way you cultivate the placement of single-pointed concentration on Voidness which is (empty of the obstructions of true independent existence) as space (is empty of obstruction and tangibility)

In this state of single-minded concentration (on space-like Voidness) you should further analyse the true nature of your mind, this bare clarity that appears with no form. Upon it many (different conceptual thoughts) arise, without any obstacles, (causing you to remember many things and make associations) which your mind then wanders after. But the mind or consciousness itself is merely a steadily flowing stream of unobstructed clarity or awareness without any discontinuity. Such a mind, however, appears to be an independently existing entity which does not rely on anything else for its existence, and you grasp at it as such.

Concerning the object implied (by such grasping, a mind existing truly independently), the great protector Santideva has said, “It is false to consider streams of instants and groups of parts, such as a rosary or an army, (to be independently existing entities in themselves).” Thus as Santideva has explained with scriptural authority and logic, you should single-pointedly concentrate on this state of the non self-existence of the mind - a mode of existence that is completely different from the way things ordinarily appear.

Let me record a few words from the mouth of my root Guru, Sang-gya ye-she, a truly omniscient Buddha, who has said succinctly, ‘If you can see whatever thoughts arise in your mind as a process of mental labelling, then the Sphere of All Things (ch’o-ying, dharmadhatu), the true supreme Voidness, is dawning on you without any reliance on other forces of logic. In this state, when Voidness

has appeared (on your mind's perception), fixing your consciousness single-pointedly on that Voidness is truly a wonderful feat.'

Similarly, P'a-d'am-pa sang-gya has said, "Consciousness applied in the perception of Voidness, once it has understood Voidness, should be turned round full circle to destroy the ignorance of grasping for its own true independent existence. Voidness itself and the perception of Voidness are both void of being tangible concrete entities obstructing anything, O people of D'ing-ri." All such quotations lead to the same idea.

At the conclusion of your meditation session, you should dedicate whatever virtue has accrued from meditating on Mahamudra, as well as your ocean-like accumulation of virtue in the past, present and future, towards your attainment of the peerless Enlightenment of Buddhahood (for the sake of all beings).

Having developed, in this manner, the habit of meditation on Mahamudra, then during the post-meditation period you should examine very closely whatever objects, such as forms, appear to your six types of consciousness and scrutinise how they appear to you. In this way the bare mode of existence of things will arise before you brilliantly.

The venerable Maitripa has said, "The close examination of whatever dawns on your mind is the important point of this theory of Voidness."

In short, then, whatever appears to you, such as your mind, (you should take its ordinary appearance as a truly independently existing entity to be your object of refutation for Voidness analysis). You should not grasp at such things as existing the way they appear to be. Instead you should try to ascertain their actual mode of existence. Then constantly nourishing your understanding (by meditating alternately on space-like Voidness during formal meditation sessions and on mirage-like Voidness during post-meditation periods), you should combine the essence of all things in samsara and Nirvana into their single common nature as Void (and meditate upon this).

Concerning this point Aryadeva has said, "Whichever watchman (mind understands the void nature) of one particular thing, that same watchman (mind should be applied for understanding the void nature) of all things. The way in which one particular thing has Voidness as its true nature is the same way in which all things have Voidness as their true nature."

Thus in your formal meditation session when you concentrate single-mindedly on Voidness according to the proper methods, you will become convinced that all things in samsara and Nirvana, whether validly existent or not, are void of the extreme of the mental fabrication that they have true independent existence. Moreover, when you rise from your meditation session and make further analysis

of things, you will then be able to see the unmistakable operation of interdependent origination working merely on the fact that things exist only on the basis of mental labelling alone. In this way things will naturally appear to you as similar to dreams and hallucinations, like mirages and the reflection of the moon in water.

All things in samsara and Nirvana resemble mirages in the sense that they exist by a process of mental labelling. However they are different from mirages since ordinary persons cannot tell that their appearance differs from their actual mode of existence. In the fact that all things exist by the process of mental labelling, you should be satisfied that things do exist conventionally. If you persist in making further and further analysis, it will be counter-productive. This point is one of the main thrusts of the Madhyamika-Prasangika philosophy.

When you have seen how the conventional existence of the appearance of things does not obscure their void nature, and how their void nature does not obstruct the operative or functional existence of their appearance, then you have realised the excellent path of the unified meaning of interdependent origination and Voidness.

Thus I, the meditator called Lo-zang ch'o-kyi gyal-tsan, who have heard many teachings, dedicate the merit gained from composing this Mahamudra text for the quick attainment of Enlightenment for all sentient beings by this excellent path. There is no way to gain peace for all living beings other than this.

This introductory text to Mahamudra has been compiled at the repeated request of Ge-dun gyal-tsan from Na-chu who holds the degree Rab-jam-pa and of Sherab seng-ge from Ha-t'ong who holds the degree Ka-chu-pa. They have seen all activities of this life mixed with worldly feelings to be dramas of madness, and now live in the remote mountains of solitude following the conduct of the Buddhas, taking this path as their essential practice. This text has also been requested by many of my other disciples who truly wish to put this Mahamudra into practice. Thus, as requested, I have explained these Mahamudra teachings which have been handed down in an unbroken lineage of inspiring practice from Buddha to my root Guru, the all-knowing Sang-gya ye-she, without any break of the Gurus' sacred words of honour to follow its practice. This has been written by Lo-zang ch'o-kyi gyal-tsan at Ga-dan Nam-par gyal-wai ling Monastery.

The Culture of Rape : Understanding Delhi Rape Horror and Underlying Perspectives

Adfer Rashid Shah

Abstract

The aftermath of the Amanat rape tragedy (December, 16, 2012) evoked a plethora of activism against and debates on the continuing crime scale and rape horror in India. A daring call to change the contemporary system (mainly perceived as the failed system) became a public slogan. People and media after the heart wrenching tragedy treated the poor victim the hero, brave heart and daughter of the nation who practically awakened and mobilized a virtually dead, deeply self-seeking and narcissistic Indian masses. Anti-Rape laws will definitely improve but will the security measures for women improve and shall the crime against women be controlled and show expected decline is a curious question. Also it is being observed that mass anger, protest and activism has been historically selective and more specific so far. Is such a rape horror the outcome of the moral degeneration as put by Dalai Lama? How China reacted to and manipulated the incident? Do we need a rethink on our current educational content, Is moral policing valid? Do we need to pay heed to moral brigade perspective? Is rape a crime only against women? etc, are certain questions, which need to be answered.

Key Words: Amanat, Delhi, China, Tibet, Dalai Lama, Jasmine Revolution

Introduction

Rightly put by His Holiness the Dalai Lama¹, that Delhi rape incident² represents the degenerating moral values³ in society and his call to revive India's traditional cultural values. The question is why degeneration of morality and why lost social fiber and the reality of acute individualism is witnessed by the Indian civilization today? Also has the India's much talked/exaggerated past or traditional ethos been women friendly when we have examples of Dev Dasi system⁴, Sati system⁵, child marriages, women illiteracy and poverty, strongly patriarchal past, etc?

Apart from this Amanat's (Victim's) tragedy was discussed, paraphrased and debated in a myriad of ways. Some called her the brave heart and compared her to the star activist, Malala Yousafzai⁶ of Pakistan's Swat province. While some called the tender rape victim the Nation's hero, a great mass mobiliser and

cause of a revolution to come. Some others perceived the agitation aftermath the incident as the Indian spring and even compared the rape victim with the Tunisian fruit vendor (Mohammed Bouazizi)⁷ whose self immolation sparked the infamous Jasmine revolution and shaped Arab Spring that still continues in Syria. Some painted the whole episode as gendered. Some played divisive politics of Bharat vs India⁸ and some threw the venom of regionalist hatred like labeling Bihari⁹ migrants as rapists to gain media attention and many others jotted poems, delivered commentaries, participated in stand ups, discussions, lit candles, mourned the innocent creatures' plight, etc,. But the fact remains that we are yet to engage with the psycho-social background and academic discourses of rape and other crimes against women in a realistic perspective to know actually what causes such situations and how such heinous crimes can be tackled and avoided. This goes without saying that only stringent anti-rape laws and installing men in uniform in every nook and cranny of India to stop such a disturbing menace is hardly the solution. But there is a greater need of approaching such a social pathology from its very roots like the pathetic socio-economic conditions and wretched life of a considerable section of Indian populace, sense of rejection and alienation among the poor, declining urban living standard, slum and ghetto culture, culture of poverty, increasing moral corruption, culture of abuse, ethical corrosion, defective socialization and broken homes, lack of education, exposure and gender sensitization need to be discussed besides having a deep insight about and repercussions of sexual pathologies like sexual addiction, incest, frotteurism, Sadism, paraphilia, voyeurism, stalking, exhibitionism, fetishism, pedophilia, etc, in a wider perspective if at all India needs to get rid of the rape shame and cease to be a rape culture.

Are We A Rape Culture

Yes, indeed we are a rape culture society, even a small *dhaba*¹⁰ (local food stall) working boy's mother is raped (culture of verbal abuse)¹¹ hundred times a day by one and all, for every one verbally abuses him be it his owner, co-workers or the customers. A rickshaw puller's sister/daughter is raped thousand times a day using foul language against him by bikers, drivers and passengers and others even for none of the faults of the poor. We are of course a culture of abuse and rape, sexual slurs, bad language against women even physical attacks on women do not seem to be shameful at all. Even the small children get acquainted and socialized with the culture of abuse and foul language in their tender age. So the culture of rape is deeply rooted in our society and has been highly routinised in this part of the world.

Understanding Amanat Rape Horror

The young Para-medical student's¹² rape and murder indeed shocked the nation and highlighted the tragedy primarily for certain reasons:

- The kind of the horrific incident it was.
- The incredible reporting and coverage of the episode by the media.
- The place of the incident being the national capital.
- Smart, active and praiseworthy role of Delhi police in nabbing the culprits within days.
- Delhi being a hub of social and political activists, NGO's, student unions, etc,
- The dramatic and deceptive style, story of the victim's suffering in the violent and inhuman incident.

The Amanat's case despite being heart wrenching has evolved a an extensive debate on the status of vulnerable female India, legal aspects and apparatus, security machinery, sociological discourses of equality and public space for women, etc,. Undoubtedly she has opened a new chapter in the domain of discussing the practical aspect of egalitarianism, humanity, male-female world, emerging vulnerabilities, concerns, apprehensions, security flaws, policing, parenting, mobility, etc,.

Amanat's tragedy also explained the horror of rape experienced and perceived by a human being. She enabled us understand that rape must not be treated merely as a crime against women but a crime against humanity for it shook the conscience of all humanity irrespective of gender. The brutal rape and murder of the innocent girl is an eye opener to those who paint such crimes purely gendered or paraphrase in feministic prism hence misinterpret the whole concept of the gender and violence in public space. It has broomed the dust from certain contested themes on gender violence like modern dress pattern, skirt craze, make up etc,. It is not the dress pattern but spatial vulnerability, criminality, psychology, violent nature, time and opportunity. Had it been only attracting dress, there would not have incidents of rapes of even minors and elderly where a 65 year old woman was raped too. Even the incest rapes of daughters by fathers, brothers and other family members is the contemporary reality. Amanat also made us understood that People's coming to streets for protests is a means for realizing women's security if not the solution in itself. But yes slut walk (Besharam Morcha)¹³ suits west only not the India's age old rich traditional ethos.

To understand the Amanat rape horror narrative it is not necessary to recount the specific case and whole episode of Amanat rape and murder but the momentum and attention this episode gained even outside India must be utilized to provide practical security to women of the sub-continent. The abused departed soul forced us to think upon:

- The need for a rethink of the holistic system
- The call for a change and need for immediate reforms in legal and regulatory apparatus.
- The urban space as vulnerable and dangerous for feminine world
- The correlation between sexual offences and the prevailing trend of Women's objectification and commoditification presented by the cinema.
- Our transitional and violent nature out of the lack of exposure
- Our faulty shared value patterns and broken social, cultural and moral fiber
- The loss of the sense of being and the loss of the sense of loss
- Culture and Socialization of abuse and common routinised language of abuse.

On Gang rape Murder and the Saga of Public Discourses China's Interpretation

Amanat rape horror followed by public protests even became a discussion in India's neighbours, reacting differently to the incident. Gunjan Singh¹⁴ writes (Eurasia Review, January 9, 2013):

The recent Incident of rape and violence against a woman in New Delhi received unprecedented media attention in China. The most simple and obvious factor behind this was that the Chinese government saw yet another opportunity to show case to its people that democratic governments face a number of problems and therefore compared to the democratic model, one party authoritarian rule is better.¹⁵

China, who is responsible for enormous Human Rights violations in Tibet, deems democracy as the basic fault in India. China has perhaps forgotten its tyrannical

rule in TAR¹⁶ and its sole responsibility of causing exodus of a huge Tibetan Diaspora. China is also responsible for the Tibetan refugees suffering and continuing self immolations by the peace loving and non-violent Tibetans. Singh further argues that 'The Chinese government realized that there is a need to prevent the spread of information regarding the ongoing protests in India against the lack of government response'. This mindset of the state reveals that it believes in repression of the voice which it has been doing in Tibet since the Communist Chinese Operation. China should hail India for being world's largest democracy and accepting the institution of protest in the country. The fact is India as a state has respected the public rage against the event and responded adequately by nabbing the culprits and sharing the people's anger, dismay and horror. Which China has hardly done so far, instead it has converted the holy Land of Lama's into a nuclear dump and attacked its tradition and resources by demographic, social, cultural and economic engineering.

Discourses from Within

Unfortunately much has been discussed on the debates on laws and hanging of the criminals, registration of FIR's, fast action of police after the incident however very less is being practically thought about whether how to control rape on the spot, how to avoid, how to protect women from such a brutal assaults and victimization, everlasting trauma. Just help lines won't suffice as offenders may snatch the victim's mobile phone instantly but what comprehensive and sound mechanism to develop so that rape like vulnerability's and horror is not created at all round the country. Instead of delving upon the post rape phenomenon we have to control, rape from happening of at all if we really believe in the dignity of our women. It must not happen at all because we have to move from the idea of security to dignity. Though much has been discussed in debates and newspaper columns on the remedial/preventive measures that could stop alarming rape cases/rates in the country but till date just emphasis on capital punishment and stringent laws has been laid but nothing much satisfying, objective and realistic has come to surface. Whereas, the positive role of mass media is hailed by one and all to foster gender de-sensitization as seen in Damini case (Amanat). On the other hand, the role of cinema and women's objectification and commodification has been highly criticized for representing women as semi-naked dancing dolls who are being displayed as sex object surrounded by groups of vulgar men especially in the new craze, I.e. item numbers¹⁷. Some writers even demand the legalization of pornography without thinking of the fallouts even? Will pornography protect crime or further aggravate the situation of immorality and sexual aggression, that is however debatable but a futile discourse in totality.

Also many news channels kept repeatedly discussing about capital punishment to culprits, some talked of chemical castration and some argued that the rapists be bobbited¹⁸. Although the criminals deserve the worse of the worst punishment but one must keep in mind that even if the anti-rape law is amended now, it will not apply on these human faced beasts because they committed the horror before the amendment and amendments are hardly retrospective. Also there were discussions on the alcohol culture and drunken state of rapists who crossed limits of brutality while being drunk. Should alcohol be banned once and for all? Yes, most of the ferocious and incest rape incidents occur in drunken cases. The other question was that should we increase police force in the big cities, will that be of any use? No, we cannot afford to make every state a police state in India. Moreover, quantity or number is not important but adequate training, administration, regulation, control and proper empowerment of the police is important. Also it is advisable that women police in collaboration with men police be assigned to handle the rape cases and FIR registration must be speedy in all cases.

Lastly, there is hardly a need for rethink on dress pattern in the public sphere as far as the rape is concerned. Yes, decent dress pattern can be a step towards valuing our age old rich ethos and morality.

The Projected Causes and Reality

Sociological inquiry proceeds less through introspection and speculation than through the observation, description, interpretation and analysis of facts says Andre Beteille¹⁹, a renowned Indian sociologist. It is not correct to conclude that Rape represents the powerless women in the society or the patriarchal system or a means of control over women, for not every man is a rapist. Rape is also not because of the Women's dependence on men but it is the social and cultural conditions that intensify or perpetuate rape. The causes and reasons for rape are deeply entrenched in our social structure. Rape is a community problem therefore needs community policing along with the all out effort to restore the women's dignity. Today moral policing may seem interference into ones privacy by others or the arguments put forth by moral brigade regarding dress pattern may seem absurd and a setback to free living in today's modern society but we strongly need strengthening and teaching of moral values to the younger generations so that to construct a morally sound society.

Policing the rape must not be identifying the culprit and nabbing him down to hang, experiences suggest that even after stringent and harsh punishment heinous crimes are still continued. The question is to identify the rape mindset, explore the rape situations and rape atmosphere, which develop the tendency to rape and

what prompts them to rape. Studying the cases of rape in a given period a finding some common connection factor about all the cases to be identified for a resolve. As for figures, Delhi has turned the crime capital. As per NCRB-2009, 68% of Delhi's rapists were illiterate or school dropouts 24% studied up to class 10th. And 21.9% were graduates.

What can be the viable solution?

- Addressing poverty, social exclusion, illiteracy, delinquency and homelessness round the country
- Redefining Juvenile in India seeing the said case and tackling juvenile crime adequately and reducing Juvenile²⁰ age from 18 to 14 .
- Making policing very active and vibrant by empowerment of police in itself rather than hollow criticism
- Role of secret information and intelligence agencies becomes a must. Every colony, society especially slum areas must be properly studied.
- Every migrant worker working in cities must be registered properly.
- Need for stringent rape legislation is imperative and there must be speedy resolution of cases pending in courts.
- Active women police should handle rape cases in collaboration with the male police so that the formalities are expedited and sense of shame among victims is reduced.
- Children in all schools of the country need education regarding the ill effects and repercussions of eve teasing, stalking, rape, etc, during early classes. Also moral education must be a compulsory part of the school curriculum.
- Child labour has to be checked strictly and culture of poverty has to be eradicated.
- Sense of feel secure psyche in all the big cities has to be restored and here the role of police, community and civil society and youth becomes central.
- Plight of public transport has to be addressed and it has to be made safer, comfortable and secure at any point of time especially in big cities.
- Activism among students has to be boosted so that to revive our rich traditional ethos based on moral values, sacred culture, religiosity and respect for women.
- Free legal aid to rape victims and speedy registration of complaints in case of sexual offences against women.

- Provision of a dignified life for the rape victims to protect suicides in these cases.
- Treatment of rape as the most heinous crime and stringent punishment for offenders
- As suggested by many groups, details of rapists along with their whole bio-data has to be made public and put online so as to create a fear of public shame in such cases. Also if a government employees is found guilty in a rape case, he must be immediately fired, same must apply to private sector also.(as suggested by NDTV panel discussions)
- Women have to avoid submissive nature and fight back, report fast and be extra cautious about their dignity.
- Fear of rape as a crime has to be created by public execution of rape criminals as proposed by Islamic scholars.
- Dalai Lama's advice on regeneration and revival of moral values in India's thousands of years old cultural history.
- Denying Jobs to rapists in all sectors and treating rape and crime against women as the most heinous one.

Last Word

Even after so much of protests and public fury over rapes in India, rapes incidents keep on happening. Where are we lacking, we need to analyze. Rape is a social problem for it affects all humanity especially all women in different ways besides traumatizing the poor victims. It has been found that One of every four crimes against children is rape.

Therefore, now is the time to raise voice against it not only for the post-rape stringent measures but the security question for women round the country to prevent the rape from happening at all. The Amanat Rape and murder tragedy has been reacted by majority of the citizens' in different ways and role of media especially has been highly appreciating. I wish we as Indian masses had equally shown such a fighting spirit for justice for the victims of Kashmir's Shopian double rape and murder case (2009, Asia & Neelofar). I wish the public would have been equally concerned and media had equally responded over and portrayed the human rights violations in India's conflict zones like mass nameless graves in Kashmir, forced disappearances, Pandit and Sikh killings, Dardpora mass rapes, fake encounters in Kashmir, etc., I wish the same public would have protested outside the Rashtrapati Bhavan in the same vigor and human heart like they protested in Amanat's case against the thousands of farmer suicides which were doom spelling (from 1995-2009 there were 240000 and 17368 suicides only in 2009). I wish media and public had been equally concerned about all the brutal

crimes against humanity like ethnic massacres, resource grab, water pollution, etc., I wish public and media would have equally campaigned against Bhopal gas tragedy, Kudankulam, POSCO, Neamgari, illegal mining in Goa, Jaitapur, Narmada, Adivasi alienation, etc., unfortunately public rage in India is short lived and masses readily develop fatigue for agitation and return back to their homes. Amanat has made us realize that we need institutions that can deliver and somewhere it is being observed that people have lost credibility in many of the institutions but that is not the solution and remedy. We have to honour institutions as institutions are always credible, actually it is the culture of negative politics and disbelief in everything, which impoverishes the holistic system. State can definitely control rape and all other crimes to a satisfactory level and restore the feel secure psyche to women, just it has to properly utilize the system at place. Let us all start reforms from ourselves and introspect what really has went wrong We must never let Amanat die, she has to live in our humane concern, friendly activism and fight for gender equality. Rapes still continue and happen every day in India, certainly it is a moral problem and we all need to ponder over the social rupture and alarming social pathology.

His Holiness-The Dalai Lama says,

There is a saying in Tibetan; Tragedy should be utilized as a source of strength. No matter what sort of difficulties, how painful experience is. If we lose our hope, that's our real disaster.

Notes

1. (Tenzin Gyatso born 1935).The institution of Dalai Lama has become a central focus of Tibetan society and identity. Dalai Lama is the symbolic embodiment of the Tibetan national character. The Dalai Lama's have also functioned as principle spiritual guides to their communities. In simpler terms it has also been referred as Grand Lama. In 1959, as the Dalai Lama and thousands of other Tibetans fled the Chinese occupation of their homeland.
2. Gang rape and torture of a 23 year old, paramedical student in Delhi on 16 December 2012, resulting in her Death ultimately 13 days later in Singapore's Mount Elizabeth Hospital. The girl was raped and tortured mercilessly by six men in a bus and later thrown out of the bus along with her boy friend. The incident caused a severe public rage in India against insecurity of women.
3. Moral values are the basic standards of good and evil which govern an individual's behavior and choices. Degenerating moral values means decline of the consciousness of such values.

4. A religious practice in parts of southern India, whereby parents marry a daughter to a deity or a temple. The marriage usually occurs before the girl reaches puberty and requires the girl to become a prostitute for upper-caste community members. They are forbidden to enter into a real marriage.
5. Sati is the ancient Indian practice of burning a widow on her husband's funeral pyre. This practice was treated associated with Hindu traditions and is hardly now in practice..
6. Malala Yusafzai is Pakistani star child activist from the town of Mingora in the Swat District of Pakistan's Khyber province. She was shot on October 9,2012 by Taliban(TTP) in a school, van in her head and neck.She was shifted to UK for the treatment and is on the path of recovery.Malala had faced death threats in the past also for her activism for children education in the most conservative province of Pakistan.
7. A [Tunisian](#) street vendor who [set himself on fire](#) on 17 December 2010, in protest of the confiscation of his wares and the harassment and humiliation that he reported was inflicted on him by a municipal official and her aides.
8. BHARAT vs India gimmick was recently thrown by Mohan Bhagwat, RSS Chief. His argument was that Rapes happen in India not Bharat, where Bharat means as rural India and India to him means Urban India but the reality was reverse as most of the crimes against women, even today occur in Rural India ,shown by statistics. Bhagwat was highly criticized for this comment. Also a Hindu Spritual Guru Asharam Bapu was caught in controversy for blaming the victim was responsible also.The spiritual Guru was harshly criticized round the country.
9. Hatred for the people of Bihari's, highly reacted by Bihari Political leaders and soial activists. This regionalist comment for publicity and media attention was made by MNS chief Raj Thackeray linking the recent crime of Delhi rape and murder as committed by Bihari migrant workers, which is however not true and merely a publicity gimmick.
10. India is known for its Street food culture. Dhabas are the small hotels, either serving tea or snacks or both to travelers, etc,. Such Dhabas/tea/food stalls are a prime feature of India's big cities .Often small children usually named as "*Chottu*" by customers work in such small hotels.
11. Culture of abuse means when people in a particular geographical setting develop abusive language and that gets more internalized in the societal values and becomes a value itself. Like to call any one Sala (Brother In Law),etc, in Delhi or some other cities is not treated bad at all. It is a norm and even friends abuse each other taking abuses and slurs as mere joking and kidding.
12. Amanat, Nirbhaya and Damini were the names given to the Delhi rape victim by media as symbolic names to hide the actual name of the murdered victim.

- Now the debates are still on about making her actual name public or naming the lawafter her, especially emphasized by the victim's father, who is willing to tell her name to the media. Both the parents of the slain girl demand the juvenile's death for what he had been the most brutal to the victim. This has also sparked a heated debate in all media circles whether he should go to reformatory institution of hanged like the rest of the criminals. Government till date has been investigating his age and the drama still continues.
13. The *Besharam* means shameless and *Morcha* means front. The *Besharam Morcha* got its inspiration from Slut walk as a mark against undesirable comments against women. It protested the stereotypical mindset and demanded gender equality, in relation to the December 16, horrible rape and murder of a 23 year girl in the India's capital. Besharam Morcha says that it is not what women wear but what men think about women. Dress code or moral brigade is not the solution of the problem, but men must mend their ways while dealing with women.
 14. The Delhi incident and China's information versus security paradox –Analysis. By- IDSA Jan 9 2013 by Gunjan Singh.
Eurasia Review, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/09012013-the-delhi-incident-and-chinas-information-vs>.
 15. IDSA: The institute for studies and defence analyses is a non-partisan , autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defense and security
 16. Tibet Autonomous Region. TAR is entirely within and encompasses most of the Tibetan Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau or the plateau of Tibet. It is also known as the roof of the world and third pole of the globe. Tibet or Xizang is a province level autonomous region of the people's republic of China (PRC). It was created in 1965 as an administrative region and actually was grabbed by Mao in 1951 leading to Dalai Lama's self imposed exile in India followed by lakhs of Tibetans.
 17. An item number or an item song, in Indian cinema, is a musical performance often sexually provocative to showcase dancing women in revealing clothes.
 18. To cut off a man's genitals.
 19. Andre Béteille is one of India's leading sociologists and a Professor of Sociology at the Delhi School of Economics at the University of Delhi. He is well known for his studies of the caste system in South India.

The Psycho-Social Understanding of Shrine Visiting Practice in Conflict Times: A Case Study of Hazratbal Shrine in Indian Kashmir

Dr Pirzada M Amin

Abstract

Kashmir is widely known as *Pir-i-Wair* ('the valley of saints) from times immemorial. There are innumerable pre-eminent shrines and temples associated with different faiths and Hazratbal being the repository of the sacred hair of Prophet Muhammad *PBUH* has emerged a leading pilgrimage centre in Kashmir. In times of personal and public troubles, the shrine has not only been the source for religious rituals but serving the socio-psychological needs. Given the long drawn conflict of two and a half decades all avenues of leisure and outing have been inaccessible to the inhabitants thus the shrines alone remain accessible to the common man irrespective of faith meeting the needs of their socio-religious worldview. As a consequence the shrines have been frequented by the people in the turbulent times to experience a socio-spiritual and psychological relief that has helped them to live up the personal and public troubles. Among the many functions that are performed by the shrine, the leisure and recreational functions stands out eminent. A cycle of fairs are held at the shrine that are considered red letter days in the times of dull lives of Kashmiri people and serve as a break from troubled times and offer an opportunities of leisure and entertainment.

In times of life crisis and life cycle events, a visit to the shrine is considered a *Baraka* (*blessing*) with a strong belief that the radiation of sacredness of the shrine would help in healing the wounds of crisis. Notwithstanding an increasing consumption of media, pilgrimage to shrines remains the most important leisure activity in Kashmir.

To sum up in this paper the central argument would be to contextualize the social reality of pilgrimage and closely examine the efficacy and relationship of pilgrimage with the personal/public troubles. Moreover, to analyze how the pilgrimage sites help in the sustained integration of society at macro and micro level during the troubled times. The preservation and protection of shrines are imperative for State and Society as these pilgrimage sites are having a crucial role in the social order across time and space. Thus through the qualitative and quantitative approach there will be an attempt to develop a sociological

knowledge of the contemporary relationship amongst the variables such as personal/impersonal troubles and the pilgrimage to the shrine at Hazratbal.

Keywords: Hazratbal Shrine, Conflict and Faith, Healing effect, Leisure, Pilgrimage.

Introduction

India with its kaleidoscopic variety and rich cultural heritage is a land of pilgrimage. Travelling for religious purposes has been there since antiquity when people used to visit their respective religious places as a part of fulfilling their religious obligations and also as a prerequisite to achieve the *spiritual Nirvana*. Practically, all religions Hindu, Muslim, Buddhism, Christian, Sikhism and Jainism have their major and minor pilgrimage centers in different parts of the country. Accorded a status of *Export House*, India's tourism industry has become one of the important sectors of its economy contributing substantially in the country's GDP with pilgrimage tourism as its jugular vein. In fact, to a majority of domestic tourists in India, pilgrimage has always been the major motivation. Representing the country in all its diversity, the state of Jammu and Kashmir stands as an epitome especially when it comes to religious tolerance and, hence, pilgrimage tourism. Considered as a holy place by people of all faiths, the state is brimmed with sacred sites thronged by pilgrims from all over the world. An *Abode of Gods* replete with the sacred places, Jammu and Kashmir expresses itself in tripartite blending of Jammu "*City of Temples*", Kashmir "*Land of Saints*" and Ladakh "*Land of lamas; Gompas and Monasteries*". Presenting an awe-inspiring range of holy sites spanning across the length and breadth of the state, each and every pilgrim spot of Jammu & Kashmir Pilgrimage Tourism from Sufism and Hinduism to Islam and Buddhism speaks of a distinct religious heritage. The entire pilgrimage tourism of the state is structured around (a) Jammu Pilgrimage comprised of Rangunath Mandir, Mata Vaishno Devi, Bawey Wali Mata, Peer Kho, Ranbireshwar Temple, peer Mitha, Panchbakhtar temple, Peer Budhan Ali Shah or Peer Baba (b) Kashmir Pilgrimage comprised mainly of Shankaracharya Temple, Amarnath ji, Charar-e-sharif, Hazratbal mosque, Khanqah-e-moula, Kheer Bhawani, Takht-e-Suleiman, Hari Parbat Forte, Shrine of saint Makhdoom Sahib, Sikh Gurudwara Chatti Padshahi and (c) Ladakh Pilgrimage comprised of Rizong Monastery, Likir Monastery, Lamayuru Monastery, Stakana Monastery, Cave Monastery, Thiksey Monastery, Spituk Monastery and Stongdey Monastery. Although each of the pilgrimages of the state are dedicated to a particular faith, yet these sacred places are held in a high reverence and awe by one and all, and hence, visited by the people of all the faiths, thereby, symbolizing the all pervasive message of brotherhood, communal harmony and peace.

Religious Background and Historical Importance of Hazratbal Shrine

Hazratbal shrine also known as the *Assar-e-Sharif*, *Madinat-us-Sani* and the *Dargah Sharif*, is the leading Muslim pilgrimage destination in Jammu and Kashmir. Located in Hazratbal area of the District Srinagar, this white marble mosque is situated on the western banks of famous Dal Lake with Nishat Garden on the opposite side and, hence, commanding a grand view of the lake and the mountains beyond. Having assumed an extra speciality for being the only domed mosque in Srinagar, its pristine white marble elegance with mountains as background when reflected in the waters of the lake offers an enchanting and spectacular view to the visitors. One of the most revered Muslim shrines, Hazratbal reflects the devotion and respect of Muslims for Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), being the repository of Prophet's hair i.e., "*Moi-e-Muqqadus*". Held in glass casket, this Holy Relic is displayed to the devotees only on certain holy, sacred and religious occasions related with life of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and his four holy companions. The marvel shrine carries the monumental and historical significance and its history dates back to early 17th century when in 1632, Sadiq Khan, the Subedar of Mughal Emperor Shahjahan laid out a garden and constructed a palace Ishrat Mahal/Pleasure House at the site of mosque. However, during his visit in 1634, the emperor Shahjahan ordered the conversion of the Pleasure House into a Prayer House with some additions and alterations. In 1699 during the time of Aurangzeb, when *Moi – e-Muqqadus/ The Holy Relic of Prophet Mohammad* (S.A.W) arrived in Kashmir, it was preserved in the shrine of Naqashbad Sahib in the heart of the city. Mirza Qalandar Baigh describes the occasion of arrival of holy relic in Kashmir as "*Kashmir Madina Ba-Shud-Az Moi-Nabi*", means thereby Kashmir have become Madina because of the hair of the Prophet (PBUH). But as the fate had it, the place of Naqashbad Sahib notwithstanding the unprecedented rush of devotees who thronged the place to have a glimpse of the *Moi – e- Muqqadus*, it was shifted to Hazratbal – the then Sadiqabad. Given this significance, the Hazratbal shrine has emerged as a powerful religio-political organization in Kashmir valley wielding an enormous influence on the lives of Kashmiri Muslims. Realizing the importance of Hazratbal shrine being the Second Madina (*Madina Thani*), the shrine has emerged as the important centre of attraction for the governing political elite of the valley, and it was because of this shrine that Hazratbal resulted in the emergence to the institution of Auqaf when Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah replaced the custodian by chairman, thus bureaucratizing the shrine in the same way what *Max Weber* calls the bureaucratization of religious structures. The construction of present day marble structure/ architectural splendor (a unique blend of Kashmiri and Mughal architecture) was started by Muslim Auqaf Trust in 1968 presided over Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and completed in 1979.

Socio-Psychological Mapping of Hazratbal Shrine

Allin Morins in his book, “Sacred Journey’s: The anthropology of pilgrimage”, states that,

Pilgrimage is born of desire and belief. The desire is for solution to problems of all kinds within human situation. The belief is that somewhere beyond the known world there exists a power that can make right the difficulties that appear so insoluble and intractable here and now.

Pilgrimage tourism as an act of religious tourism is a vehicle for change towards better and has important role in creating peace and social solidarity at various levels if properly guided by the codes of ethics and conduct that are sourced from religions and socio-cultural values derived from religions. The holy shrine of Hazratbal being the repository of holy relic of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), has been a lightening conductor for the religious fervour, besides being an ambassador of peace. The shrine because of magnetic strength has emerged as a centre of *mass faith* attracting the sick, the childless, the blind and pilgrims irrespective of gender, age, class and faith. The various socio-psychological dimensions of this historic and leading shrine can be gauged through following Sub- themes as:

- Hazratbal Shrine on the Touch Stone of Conflict:
- Shrine and normalcy
- Reunification of society
- The platform of social cohesion, peace and integration
- Agency of perceptual change and mutual harmony
- The pilgrimage to the shrine and the attendant economy

Conflicts inherently affect, even reshape, the social fabric of any society both in positive and negative ways. Apart from changing livelihoods and behavioral patterns, prolonged conflicts also affect the basic cultural ethos and particular value system of a particular society. As certain institutions become increasingly active in conflict situations, which in turn enriches and irrevocably changes the social structure. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been a worst victim to the long drawn and violent conflict/intercine warfare and stratagems of more than two decades now. Having permeated the length and breadth of the state, this

catastrophe wrecked the havoc in the lives of people especially the residents of Kashmir valley who experienced the worst form of conflict victimization in the form of genocide, disability, disappearances, homelessness, *en masse migration* of the Kashmiri pandit's, disability, physical and mental tortures, economic exploitation etc. Having deprived people of their lives, livelihood, food, shelter and survival, conflict in Kashmir affected the members of society irrespective of age, class, gender and religion. There were times when probably all the institutions and social relationships transformed into a sense of apprehension, fear and trauma. Property devastation, health problems, corporal loss, economic devastation and breakdown of social fabric became the order of the day. Freezing of employment opportunities, closing of various institutions catering to the educational and health needs of people amidst the all-around destruction added to their suffering. The spectacular landscape lost its appeal resulting in major setback to the valley's premier tourism industry. Life came to a standstill and all the means of recreation/amusement such as nature tourism, adventure tourism, and leisure tourism etc. virtually vanished away. However, despite all the crisis and offshoots of the conflict, the chain of *Khanqahs* and shrines especially, the revered shrine of Hazratbal provided a new lease of life to the disgruntled masses irrespective of their socio-cultural backgrounds by offering them a *refuge* and *psychological capital*. The role of tourism as a potential vehicle and ambassador of peace has been even acknowledged by the United Nations. World Tourism Conference in 1960 in Manila has declared that tourism as a vital force for world peace since it brings both "hosts" and "guests" together to learn about peace by understanding and appreciating diverse cultural issues. Tourism in the form of pilgrimage tourism has played a yeoman's role in achieving the desired ends of peace and integration, for it transcends government boundaries by bringing people together particularly through the understanding of different cultures, heritages and beliefs. Holy shrines being an important source of pilgrimage tourism in Kashmir act as harbinger of peace for they provide a direct contact between the diverse pilgrims and groups resulting in improving the intercultural attitudes by removing the notions of prejudice, stereotypism, ethnocentrism and also by developing tolerance, compassion, goodwill, justice and respect and, hence, are bestowed with an inherent capacity to contribute to the national integration. Hazratbal shrine because of its historicity, religious importance, enthralling surrounding landscape, centripetality and hence high accessibility has been the lead shrine in achieving the aforementioned objectives of peace and integration. As an agency of perceptual change *vis-a-vis* conflict situation, the shrine proved to be an epitome of peace and tranquility. Having emerged as a centre of pilgrimage by virtue of the unmatched faith and reverence attached to it by the masses, Hazratbal shrine represents an important landmark

in the sacred geography of Islam in Kashmir. The preservation of relic of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and sufi saints and their public displaying on special occasions has been a unique practice prevalent among the Muslims of Kashmir since hundreds of Years now and has historically been a binding glue culminating into we feeling, communal harmony and hence, social cohesion/social integration. Further assembling at shrines during the cycle of fairs, festive occasion, various rituals or life cycle events (rites de passage) is out of the deep rooted religiosity, age old culture of paying obeisance at shrines, Sufi Islamic tradition, spiritual development, leisure and recreation, etc., Amidst all this the, institution of shrines in the valley represented by the holy shrine of Hazratbal have played a pivotal role in building bridges, lessening hatred, maintaining peace and have acted as an abode of spirituality, love and reverence even in the most turbulent times.

The continuum formed by two polar ends of turmoil and holy shrines though vibrating out of phase, wherein on one hand, the turmoil characterized by the political turbulence lead to a greater social disorder, chaos, alienation, sense of insecurity and fear psychosis among people and thus created a considerable gap among different communities and groups leading to disharmony, distrust and hatred for one another and on the other hand, the holy shrines and in particular the Hazratbal shrine have emerged as vehicles of peace building and mutual harmony by providing a soothing platform to people seeking solace both at the individual and the collective level , thereby mitigating the ill effects of the turbulence. The common platform offered by the shrines by virtue of various fairs (urs), festive occasions, life cycle events etc. and shared by the people irrespective of religious affiliations resulted into the frequent interactions, exchange of feelings, mutual understanding, increased tolerance, sense of brotherhood among People, thus leading to social cohesion of even a higher order. With millions of refugees and displaced persons, shrines have become the gathering places of people uprooted from their homelands and, hence, resulting in reunification of societies. Further, as a manifestation to accomplish the spiritual and salvational ends of devotees, the holy shrine of Hazratbal has offered certain latencies in the form of leisure, outing and recreation to one and all.

Amidst the prolonged turbulence, Shrine Visiting or the trend of pilgrimage tourism in this part of the world sustained despite certain significant but more interfering factors like the increasing influence of *Wahabi* (puritan) Islam, the decades of political instability, continuing social chaos, incessantly increased access to mass media and diverse forms of home entertainment, change in life style and myriad of other leisure activities etc. This happened for certain but deeply rooted cultural traits like unbound love and historical attachment with such revered shrines and Sufi Islamic culture, deep faith in the power and belief

in the divinity of these shrines, to quench the thirst of soul by the spiritual power of these shrines, etc.,. Moreover in times of insecurity, fear psychosis and alienation only such revered places were perceived as the sites of solace, comfort and peace. People even during the most chaotic phase of the conflict situation did not abandon such age old practices of pilgrimage to shrines because of the very Sufi culture and furthermore perceived shrine visiting as a coping strategy to give vent to their inner sufferings and expressions. Also shrines continued to be visited by people during the times of life crisis and life cycle events be it the arrest of their nears and dears or killing episodes or other related incidents or events of rites de passage resulting in the dilution of distinction between religious pilgrims and secular tourists. Owing to the Spiritual and cultural value of shrines in the valley, Dargah Hazratbal is a household name and attracts pilgrims throughout the year not only for religious or spiritual motives or the various fairs or festive occasions that are associated with Hazratbal shrine or observed with religious fervor, but people benefit of its beautiful location and enjoy leisure in its premises being on the bank of famous Dal lake with scenic beauty around.

Despite of the dual proliferation of Wahabism and media consumption/access, shrine visiting practices especially that of the Hazratbal Dargah continued unabated for the majority of the masses denounce wahabi brand of Islam and do not simply feel satiated with mass media or religious programmes broadcasted on TV or radio, etc.,. People out of their age old habit or socialization or routinisation of shrine visiting practice have not paid much heed to media or other forms of leisure but take pride in seeking both divine blessings and leisure with experience at such revered places. Being the embodiments of peace despite conflict situation and prolonged turbulence, people continued to visit holy shrines as a coping strategy, thus healing their wounds while enjoying leisure in the form of arranging tea parties in shrine premises, utilizing shrines as the sites of outing, etc.

Finally, the inextricability of the economic component from the ritual and cosmological aspect of pilgrimage can't be argued, though economy has been often overlooked as an essential element of the complex system of pilgrimage. Fundamentally, every pilgrimage is closely associated with a field of economic exchange as in carnivals, fairs, marketplaces etc. The spiritual journey of pilgrimage is often structured around debit or exchange relations between the pilgrim and the deity that makes the whole journey a redistributive process. During the pilgrimage, these relations of spiritual exchange are appropriated/ mirrored in the mundane world/physical world through economic transactions in the form of money and goods leading to materialization of ritual process. Sacred shrines besides being the religious institutions are often surrounded by religious oriented business and facilities in the form of souvenir shops, lodges,

hotels, travel agencies, hospitals etc. thus providing the avenues of employment to the host community. Trade in souvenir items and other tangible goods such as icons and candles, sacred water, artisan works and other related religious items is a rich source of revenue for the people and, therefore, a sustainable source of sustenance. Given its religious, monumental and spectacular importance, Hazratbal shrine has emerged as a primary locus for both ideological and economic transactions for diverse pilgrims who throng this holy place, thereby making it altogether a complex dynamic of pilgrimage, leisure, recreation, vocation, peace and hence social integration.

Objectives

1. To identify the main reasons pilgrims visit the holy shrines.
2. To identify the role of shrines in fostering the communal harmony, peace and integration with due focus on Hazratbal shrine.
3. To provide some indication of future demand for Holy shrines.

Methodology

To study the socio-psychological dynamics of the Hazratbal shrine, a sample of 150 pilgrims/respondents was selected after purposive random sampling. Accordingly, respondents were selected based on their age groups, educational status, income levels/occupational levels with equal representation to urban and rural pilgrims with the help frequency distribution tables. A pilot study was undertaken to develop the familiarity with the shrine settings and to formulate the questionnaire in order to gather the necessary information. The structured questionnaire was then distributed among 150 respondents selected for the purpose with a response rate of 100%. This was followed by interviews and necessary observation of the devotee behavior to suffice the study qualitatively and also to remove the vagueness because of the structured nature of the questionnaire.

Discussions and Findings

In order to carry out the case study of Hazratbal shrine and to collect the preliminary data, a pilot study was undertaken to design and formulate the survey instrument i.e., questionnaire/ schedule to get all the relevant information to realize the objectives of the study. The survey instrument was two part questionnaire. The questions in the first part were aimed at getting the socio-demographic profile i.e., gender, occupation, educational qualification, income etc. of the respondents on the basis of which frequency distribution was done as to provide a proportionate representation to the various categories of respondents.

The second part comprised the questions based on various indices and relevant to the objectives of study. Besides the questionnaire, the major emphasis was put on observation of the pilgrim behavior and informal talks. To ensure equal representation to rural and urban respondents/pilgrims, frequency distribution was undertaken by selecting 75 (50%) respondents each out of the total sample size of 150 respondents. Further, an equal representation was provided to both genders to make the study more accommodative.

Table 1 N=150
Frequency distribution of respondents based upon their educational status

Education Status	Rural (75)		Urban (75)		Total
	N	%	N	%	
Illiterate	28	37.33	25	33.33	53
Under Matric	15	20	17	22.66	32
Under Graduate	19	25.33	18	24	37
Graduation and above	13	17.33	15	20	28
Total	75	100	75	100	150

From the above table, it is obvious that respondents were selected with due consideration to their educational status. As such, the respective educational status of the respondents selected in the rural category was (Illiterate - 37.33%); (Under Matric - 20%); (Under Graduate - 25.33%); (Graduation and above - 17.33%). Likewise the educational status of the respondents in the urban sample was (Illetrate- 33.33%); (Under Matric-22.26%); (Under Graduate-24%); (Graduation and above-20%).

Table 2 N = 150

Micro Frequency distribution of respondents based on the age group in rural and urban contexts

Age group	Rural (75)		Urban (75)		Total
	N	%	N	%	
Young age group (20-35)	25	33.33	25	33.33	50
Middle age group(36-50)	25	33.33	25	33.33	50
Old age group(above 50)	25	33.33	25	33.33	50
Total	75	100	75	100	150

As with the educational status, a proportionate representation was given to the respondents belonging to the specified age groups. Accordingly from each age group one third each (33.33%) of the total sample size in the respective rural and urban category was selected.

Table 3 N= 150
 Classification of the respondents based on their income/occupational status in Rural and Urban Context

Income group	Rural (75)		Urban (75)		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Below Rs. 4,000 PM (Labour class)	39	52	34	45.33	73	48.66
Rs.4000 - 7,000 PM (Service class)	19	25.33	28	37.33	47	31.33
Above Rs.7,000 PM (Business class)	17	22.66	13	17.33	30	23.33
Total	75	100	75	100	150	100

To select the respondents from different income/occupational categories, frequency distribution was resorted to. The proportion of rural respondents in the different income categories/occupational categories was (Labour class-52%); (Service class-25.33%); (Business class-22.66%). Likewise the proportion of urban respondents belonging to different Income/occupational categories was (Labour class - 45.33%); (Service class - 37.33%); (Business class - 17.33%). Collectively - 48.66%, 31.33% and 20% respondents were selected in the different income/occupational categories.

Table 3 (N=150)
Research objective 1: Why do people visit pilgrimage shrines?

Motivations	Number of Pilgrims	Percentage of Pilgrims
Pilgrim or Religious interest	77	51.33%
Spiritual Purpose	37	24.66%
Health and Wealth	30	20%
Leisure and Experience	6	4%
Total	150	100%

The above data reveals beyond doubt that the pilgrims/people thronging the holy shrines possess an array of motivations ranging from pilgrim or religious interests through spiritual purposes, health and wealth intentions to leisure and experience. This all-round motivation can be attributed to the modern times where turbulence perceived at individual and collective levels has a telling effect on the people, who, therefore, find a refuge in these holy shrines which offer them solace, leisure, answers to health and wealth problems besides help them in attaining spirituality.

Table 4: Research objective 2: Perception of pilgrims regarding Holy Shrines being places of peace and integration (N=150)

Perception of pilgrims regarding Holy Shrines being places of peace and integration

	Yes	No	Total
Number of Pilgrims	137	13	150
Percentage of Pilgrims	91.33%	8.66%	100

On the basis of above data, there is no denying of the fact that holy shrines and other pilgrimage sites have emerged as gathering places and places of cultural contact for the diverse pilgrims/visitors visiting these holy shrines. Further, when respondents were asked about the speciality of Hazratbal shrine, in achieving the objectives of peace and integration, a special preference was attached to the Hazratbal shrine by the respondents for being the premiere shrine because of its being repository of Holy Relic of Prophet Mohammad (Saw) – the messenger of peace and also because of its monumental significance alongside the spectacular attendant landscape and the rich accessibility.

Research objective 3: Indications of future demand for holy shrines

Analysing the broad motivations of the respondents, with which pilgrims visit the holy shrines and as is clear from their responses above, it is obvious that the holy shrines based on their universal appeal serve as pull factors for the pilgrims and as such always hold a sustained demand. Further the additional prospects for the continued growth in demand factor for holy shrines are evidenced in the pilgrims renewed interest in spiritual matters, renewed quest for meaning etc. coupled by the resiliency of this pilgrimage tourism sector to economic downturns.

Conclusion

To sum up, role of shrines in the tech-savvy lives of contemporary societies can't be undermined given their omnipresence in all walks of lives of people. Serving as a connecting link between two extremities of sacred (after worldly affairs) and the profane (this worldly affairs), shrines have evolved as a sustainable means to address the never ending aspirations of the devotees thronging these holy marvels. From individual disorganizations to collective ends, shrines have emerged as a panacea/universal care to the all round sufferings of the people, besides being the institutionalized means to attain spirituality and salvation. As ambassadors of peace, the shrines have bridged the gap between the varied diversity of people at both the macro and micro levels. Connecting the Diasporas, building horizons, developing inter-religious faith and the communal ethos, besides leading to attitudinal and perceptual changes at the individual level, shrines have helped in chasing the intangible and impossible. Hazratbal, being the most revered and most visited shrine of the valley, has been a spectacular abode of peace by virtue of its *magnetic strength* and *historical magnificence*. This goes without saying that the shrines have played a significant role in reunification and integration of Kashmir society, rebuilding of social order besides abridging the widened gulf between the various communities.

Based upon the findings of the study, it can be rightly pointed out that pilgrimage tourism plays a positive contributor to promote peace by reinforcing the Guest-Host relationship, fostering cross-cultural understanding, strengthening the regional economy, building international understanding and, hence results in national integration. Pertinently, in the so called hi-tech and busy lives of the people abuzz with modern facilities, where seeking physical pleasure can be a matter of click, mental satisfaction is still an imagination. Fortunately, the holy shrines with all their magnetism and universal appeal have offered everything under a single roof by being the role repertoire and wonder places for peace, solace, spirituality, leisure, outing and, hence, offering the universal cure to the all-round sufferings of the people the world over. Hence protecting these treasures for the sake of saving the precious human lives is the need of the hour.

They say, "Ultimate peace begins within but this within gets enlightened at holy shrines. For peace to seek, we need to purify our body by spiritual environs and purify our mind busting stress through leisure activities".

References

- Morins Allins, "Sacred Journeys: The Anthropology of Pilgrimage". Westpost: Greenword Press, 1992.
- Adler, A. & Jahn, E., "*Religion and Psychology*". Frankfurt, 1933.
- Freud, S., "*The Future of an Illusion*", translated by W.D. Robson-Scott, New York, Liveright, 1928.
- Freud, S., "*Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics*". New-York, Dodd, 1928.
- Jung, C. G., "*Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, New York, Harcourt Brace". 1933.
- Jung, C. G., "*Psychology and Religion*" Yale University Press, 1962.
- Jung, C. G., "*Psychology and Religion*" Yale Univ. Press, 1992.
- Jung, C. G., "*Psychology and Western Religion*" Princeton University Press, 1984.
- KIMBLE, M., Mcfadden, S.H., Ellor, J.W., & Seeber, J.J. (EDS.). (1995). "*Handbook on Religion, Spirituality, and Aging*". Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
- Koenig, G. (Ed.) (1998). "*Handbook of Religion and Mental Health*". San Diego: Academic Press.
- Koenig, H.G. (1992). "*Religion and Prevention of Illness in Later Life*". In K.I. Pargament, K. Maton, & R.E. Hess (Eds.), "*Religion and Prevention in Mental Health*". New York: Haworth.
- Shah, A. (December 17, 2012). *Narrating Amarnath Yatra: A Sociological Walk*. Eurasia Review.
- Sufi, G M. D. (1979). *Islamic Culture in Kashmir*. Light and Life Publishers, New Delhi.
- Schneider, L. (1968). *Sociological Approach to Religion*. John Willey and Sons. Oxford University Press, London.
- Soundararajan, S. (2006). *Impact of Terrorism on Tourism in Jammu and Kashmir*. Kalpaz Publications: Delhi.
- Amin, M. P and Shah, R.A. (2012). "Exploring the Sociology of Amarnath Pilgrimage in Kashmir Valley: A Critical Narrative." *International Journal of Management and Computing Sciences (IJMCS)*. Vol. 2 Number 3 July - September 2012, P. 81-98.

Locating Tibet, Dalai Lama Lineage and Tibetan Muslims: A Brief Commentary

Mushtaque B Barq

Background of Tibet

'The abode of snow', 'Land of Lamas', 'Roof of the World', 'The cool climate land' are the attributes to Tibet, a part of Central Asia. It is encircled by Nepal, Northern India, Bhutan, East of Iran, Southern Russia and Magolia occupying 2,333,125 square kilometers. Tibet was situated between the ancient civilization of China and India, separated from the former by mountain ranges to the east of Tibetan Plateau and from the latter by Himalayas. The language and dialects are classified as members of Tibeto-Burman language family. From the 7th century AD Chinese historian referred to Tibet as Tubuo. Tibetan state originated when a group under the Lig myi dynasty prevailed against Zing-po rje. Namri Songten, the leader of kinfolk controlled his neighboring clans and gained control by 630. After his assignation, the newly born regional state became Tibetan Empire. Ambassadors were sent to China in 608 and 609 so as to mark the presence of Tibet before International stage for recognition. Tibetan history witnessed Era of Fragmentation between 9th and 11th century resulting collapse of Tibetan Empire. After the break of Tibetan Empire in 842, Nyima-Gon, a representative of the ancient Tibetan royal house founded the first Ladakh dynasty. At the later period the king of Guge's elder son namely Kor-re also known as Jangchub became a Buddhist monk and sent young scholars to Kashmir and invited Atisa, a Buddhist teacher to Tibet in 1040 and Chidar (*Phyi dar*) phase thus made its entry into Tibet. It was Mongolian general Doorda Darkhan in 1240 along with 30,000 troops who invaded Tibet after a massacre of 500 people. Tibet was later incorporated into Mongol Empire. Religious and regional powers were retained by Tibetans while the Mongols managed structural and administrative powers. In 1253 Drogon Chogyal Phagpa, one of the five founders of the Sakyapa school of Tibetan Buddhism, the first vice-king of Tibet and spiritual advisor to Kublai Khan, ruler of the Mongo Empire, developed priest-patron concept featuring Tibeto-Mongolian relations. It was through the influence with the Mongolian rulers. Tibetan lamas gained consideration. In 1265 Chogyal Phagpa returned to Tibet with the concept to impose Sakya hegemony resulting division of Tibet into

thirteen mariachis. This hegemony continued up to the middle of 14th century, although challenged by a revolt which was suppressed in 1290. From 1346 to 1358 Tibet was ruled by succession of Sakya lamas. After 80 years of relative stability the country entered into internal power conflict period after 1430s. Power remained in the hands of the Phagmodru family(an appendage to Hulegu in 1251) until 1434.

Beginning of Dalai Lama lineage:

Dalai Lamas are the head monks of the Gelugpa lineage of Tibetan Buddhism. Altan Khan invited Sonam Gyatso, who later became third Dalai Lama to Mongolia in 1569 and in 1578. The meeting was held at Altan Khan's new capital, Koko Khotan (Hohot). The Fifth Dalai Lama by Gushi Khan of the Khoshut in 1641 was made highest spiritual and political authority in Tibet by over throwing the prince of Tsang. In 1688 Galdan Boshugupta Khan of Khoshut defeated Khakha Mongols, and this contributed to the loss of Tibet's role as mediator between the Mongols and the Emperor. The 5th Dalai Lama acted as a mediator between Mongols and Kangxi Emperor. In 1693, Kangxi annexed Kokonor presently known as Qinghai. In 1696 Galdan was finally destroyed. After the death of 5th Dalai Lama which was kept a secret, some Dzungars informed the Kangxi Emperor and after investigation Tsangyang Gyatso was made 6th Dalai Lama. He was enthroned in 1697. He refused to take the vows of a Buddhist monk; he resigned in 1703 under the pressure of Lhazang Khan. Lhasa came under Lhazang's control owing to the excuse of Lama's incident. Tsangyang Gyatso was sent to Beijing, but died on the way. Kelzang Gyatso was made seventh Dalai Lama. His role was symbolic but he enjoyed the influence of Mongol's religious beliefs. In 1722 Kangxi Emperor was succeeded by the Yongzheng Emperor. The Emperor ordered the conversion of all Nyingma to Gelug which created bloodshed. The Dalai Lama was sent to Litang Monastery in Kham, he was given a temporary authority over Tsang and Ngari which resulted a division between high lamas. Seventh Dalai Lama died in 1757, Jampel Gyatso, the eighth Dalai Lama was identified and brought to Lhasa in 1762. Third Panchen Lama was invited in 1779 was invited for a 70th celebration of Emperor's birthday, but he died due to smallpox in Beijing. The following year provided the Eighth Dalai Lama political power in Tibet.

Islam in Tibet

Thomas Arnold, in his book, *The Preaching of Islam*, says that marriages and social interactions were responsible for Tibetan Muslim population to grow into a sizable community around Lhasa, Tibet's capital. A group of Muslim traders from Kashmir and Ladakh came to Tibet as merchants in the 12th century, as is

believed. Many of these traders settled in Tibet and as mentioned by Thomas Arnold, married Tibetan women, who as obligation converted to the religion of their husbands. It is again believed that the Tibetan government granted freedom to Muslims to set their affairs, which provided the Muslim community to maintain their identity, but in the mean time Tibetan social and cultural traditions was already being absorbed by the community.

A report in Saudi Aramco world reveals that Muslim traders were already a long-established presence in Lhasa and other major Tibetan cities by the 17th century, the reign of the fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) marked a turning point for Islam in Tibet. According to oral tradition, a certain Muslim teacher who lived in Lhasa at the time used to pray on an isolated hill at the edge of the city. The Dalai Lama spotted the man at prayer every day, and one day asked that he be brought to him. The teacher explained that he was worshiping according to the precepts of his religion, and that he did so on the hill because no mosque existed in the area. Impressed with his faith, the Dalai Lama sent a bowman to a site near the hill and had him shoot arrows in each of the four cardinal directions. A house was built at the place from which the arrows were shot, and the land around it, extending as far in each direction as the arrows had flown, was deeded to the Muslim community. The place came to be called *The House of the Far-Reaching Arrows*, and became the site of Lhasa's first mosque and cemetery. Many Tibetan scholars have commented on how religions as diverse as Islam and Buddhism could co-exist in peace in a traditional society such as that of Tibet. The credit for this, some feel, goes to religious leaders like the Dalai Lama, who took the lead in fostering this spirit of brotherhood. For instance, a history of the Tibetan Muslim community published some years ago relates how during the 17th century, the fifth Dalai Lama readily agreed to give the Muslims land within Lhasa for building a mosque. Islamic groups exist and intermingle in the largely Buddhist society of Tibet.

Islam came to Tibet via two routes (Cabezón 14). Islam first moves west "from Turkestan, Baltistan and Kashmir into Ladakh and principally through Ladakh into western Tibet," (Cabezón 15). The other later route is by way of China; first settlements are in eastern Tibet and afterwards move into areas of central Tibet like Lhasa (Cabezón 14). Accordingly there are two groups of Muslims minorities in Tibet today; Kashmiri Muslims also known as Tibetan Muslims and Chinese Muslims also known as Hui (Cabezón 15). Tibetan Muslims are descendants of "Kashmiri, Nepalese, Ladhaki and Sikh converts" (Cabezón 15). These areas converted to Islam during various Muslim conquests between the 12th and 17th century (Cabezón 15). Tibetan Muslims existed in Tibet prior to the 17th century however it is in this century that the Fifth Dalai Lama institutionalizes their religion (Cabezón 17). This institutionalization includes such liberties as legal settlements

in accordance with Shar'iah law and land possession in Lhasa (Cabezon 17). Tibetan Muslims consider themselves to be part of the Sunni sect of Islam (Cabezon 15). Most Tibetan Muslims were and are traders of various kinds (Sharma 22). Like Tibetan Muslims, Chinese Muslims or Hui, identify themselves as followers of the Sunni sect of Islam (Cabezon 15). However Chinese Muslims differ from Tibetan Muslims as they have their own religious schools and different burial practices. Unlike Tibetan Muslims most Chinese Muslims work as butchers and vegetable farmers as opposed to traders (15). The Hui's initiation into Lhasa dates from the early 18th century (Bo 7). According to Cabezon and other scholars both these Islamic groups, to this day, live harmoniously with the Buddhist population (23). However since the Chinese occupation in the 1950's the survival of these groups has been challenged; for instance the exiling of Muslim families and individuals and boycotts of Muslims made products (Cabezon 23)

History of Tibetan Muslims in Kashmir

After China took over Tibet, the Chinese government ordered the descent of Muslim Tibetan. The history reveals that it was during the reign of Mao Zedong, religion preaching were banned and harsh laws were enforced, these Muslim Tibetans made a request to Indian Embassy in Tibet about their being Kashmiri in origin. The case was forwarded to Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, who motivated China to send the community back to Kashmir but China refused claiming the community belongs to China. As China declined India's request, the community remained there for more than one and a half year. In 1960, the then Ambassador of India to China P N Koul, who was a Kashmiri Pandit discussed the case with the foreign Minister of China and asked him to allow India to supply food to the community. The community was divided into three groups. One of the groups moved to Kashmir, second moved to Nepal and Darjeeling and the third one moved to Saudi Arabia. China finally allowed the migration. In 1962 six *lakh* (600,000) rupees were allotted by the then Government of Jammu and Kashmir to construct three buildings and Eidgah was the area assigned for it.

When Sheikh Abdullah returned to power, it was Dalai Lama who highlighted the lineage of the community which later motivated Chief Minister to allot land at Hawal on lease to construct more houses. The land was provided. According to a report published in *Rising Kashmir* on 19th January 2013 by Monisa Qadri, the community settled in Srinagar city in the areas of Hawal, Eid-Gah and Gulshan Mohalla of Makhdoom Sahab, the place now known as the 'Tibetan Colony'. Some 120 families are believed to have migrated from Tibet, and at present there are about 270 families settled in these three localities, which make up a population of about a thousand people. The Tibetan Muslims living in Kashmir are now a

mixed identity. They were ecstatic at seeing the Dalai Lama, their king, visit them in Srinagar recently. But, least bothered about the future of Tibet, they consider themselves Kashmiris and Indian citizens simultaneously; yearning for a resident status writes Bilal Handoo in *Tibet Sun* published ON THE WEB, 23 July 2012, *Kashmir Life*. The author goes on saying that: This community is easily distinguishable from the rest of Kashmiris. Speaking broken Kashmiri, carrying Mongoloid facial features, adorning a unique culture and dresses are their apparent personality traits.

On their community consciousness, Adfar Shah, a Kashmiri sociologist who has extensively written on Tibet argues that:

Tibetan Muslims have been able to preserve their social, cultural and national identity despite their settlement in a new environment. Simultaneously it may be worth arguing that they have not faced any major cultural crisis while adjusting and adopting themselves and their life pattern according to the local customs as well. (Shah, 2012)¹.

Despite the fact that this community is living a harsh life as for the accommodation is concerned, but the way the members of the community are working for the welfare of their children, it has atleast opened new gates of hope for the future generation to set a standard which not only can uplift this neglected community but also entire valley will be proud of. Before it will be late to recognize their contribution, the need is to acknowledge this significant section of youth of valley that are maliciously neglected probably because of their being in utter minority, is the Tibetan-Kashmiri Youth. This young generation (about 60% of the total Tibetan population living in Srinagar city witnessed conflict like a great confusion and double tragedy for their deep sense of Tibetan identity and high sense for the need of adjustment even in the turbulent environs. Despite being Kashmiri's they are still bearing the brunt of the refugee label and the prevailing conflict has impoverished them more in terms of the increased barriers to progress and development. Also State's or Centre's youth friendly or welfare schemes are not for them and resultantly they have been marginalized in every developmental arena and feeling of alienation has increased among the Tibetan-Kashmiri youth. Though they have been used as vote bank in state assembly elections with the promise of giving permanent state domicile, employments, proper housing facilities and access to education but so far nothing has actually happened on the ground. Such a section of hardworking youths (all Sunni-Muslims) has been ignored to go astray and hardly any concern is being paid to their welfare, education, employment and other provisions. (Shah, 2012)²

The Tibetan Muslim Youth Federation-a local welfare body of Tibetan youth, also has not succeeded considerably in its objectives and to give Tibetan community/youth their due in Kashmir, probably because of the institutional

collapse in the beginning of the turmoil (since 1989-1997) and then ailing work culture, corruption in the system, politics and tussle over refugee issue, delaying tactics, etc.. The fact remains that this hardworking chunk of youth has been pathetically neglected in all respects since their arrival to Kashmir (1961-62). Therefore, the need of the hour is to have a rethink on this social class and subculture and their plight and treat them equally a significant ethnic community in Kashmir.

Conclusion

Keeping in view the rich spiritual tradition of Buddhism and Islam, the Tibetan Muslim community shall always be considered as a connecting link between two religions. The community therefore, must be allowed to grow in the culture they carry from their ancestors and the culture their youth picking up and must not be labeled as cultural onslaught by the locals. This community must be given a due political and social status for their Kashmiri origin. The way this community has learnt Kashmiri due to prolonged cultural contact, it is believed that they the members of this community shall place themselves in a better position to speak Kashmiri language to develop comprehension so as to fill the gap that has pushed them to the walls of ignorance and to develop a better mode of communication.

References and Notes

1. Shah, A. R. (2012). Exploring Ethnicities: A Socio-Cultural profile of Tibetan Community in Indian Kashmir. *The Tibet Journal*. Autumn. Vol. XVII, No. 3. Pp.47-69

2. Shah, S.A.R.S.(March 30,2008).Tibetan Struggle: Lessons to learn. Greater Kashmir. Srinagar.

Shah, A. R. (April 23,2011). Tibet and Kashmir: The Geographies in Chaos. *Qaumiawaz.info*.

Shah, A.R. (2011). Tibetan Muslims in Exile: A Sociological Profile, *Jamia journal*. New Delhi. July 21, 2011, <http://www.jamiajournal.com/2011/07/21/opinion-tibetanmuslims-in-exile-a-sociological-profile/>

Special Report: Tibetan Muslim Refugees in Kashmir, (Tibetan Review, Delhi, May 1976, pp.15-17).

Siddiqi, A. (1991). Muslims of Tibet. *Tibet Journal* 16/4. pp. 71-85. <http://www.tibetsun.com/features/2012/07/23/indo-tibetans-of-kashmir>

Shah, A.R. (28 Dec 2010). Tibet in Kashmir: A tale of suffering and alienation. *Tibet Express* <http://www.tibetexpress.net/en/news/exile/4896-2010-12-27-09-43-51>,

Shah, S.A.R.S. (March 30, 2008). *Tibetan Struggle: Lessons to learn*. Greater Kashmir. Srinagar.

Sindhi, A.S and Shah, A.R. (2012). Life in Flames: Understanding Tibetan Self Immolations as Protest. *The Tibet Journal* Winter VOL. XXXVII, NO.4. Pp.45-55.

Creating Safe School Environment: Role of School Principals

Swaleha A. Sindhi

Abstract

The contemporary society has encountered a plethora of changes due to modernization, globalization, multifold population increase, etc. Thus the need for new quality measures has emerged because education virtually has got transformed to a more specialized field. There is a need for a more efficient administration with technical proficiency, administrative sharpness and more importantly the efficient administrators'. Therefore to meet the contemporary desired standard and cope up with the pace of fast changing era; the capacity building of school administrators (principals) has gained much importance. Over the years, concept of safe school or safety school has evolved which refers to the provision of an atmosphere that facilitates the emotional, physical and over all well being of the students. Still in Indian context hardly any schools and teachers have the necessary acquaintance and skills to make the concept of safe school workable. Therefore the programme of capacity building will enable the school principals to play a dynamic role to ensure a safe school environment besides leading to an efficient administration. Today, school principals have multifaceted roles to play. They are expected to uphold the highest educational standards in schools, develop communication and interpersonal skills among teachers and students, maintain a positive class room climate and ensure a positive classroom situation in terms of the modern infrastructure available etc. Further the issue of safety of school children confronts most of societies today due to emerged safety concerns. The provision of a safe school environment has started gaining momentum in Indian subcontinent due to emergence of certain vulnerable tendencies and security apprehensions especially among parents' and their increased concerns about the impact of unsafe environment in schools upon their children. This paper discusses about how schools can ensure a safe school environment thereby enabling students to develop resilience to strengthen their capacity and cope up with changes and circumstances they confront at school of in the wider society. Also how can the capacity building of school administrators empower the principals and lead to the emergence of a safe school environment and what obstacles need to be cleared in this regard.

Key Words: Safe School environment, School Leaders

1. Introduction

In the present times, it is very important to create such a learning environment that is safe for the children of our nation. We hear number of events about children deaths due to building collapse, fire accidents, stampede, earthquake and other natural disasters. Many schools operate in congested areas and are exposed to various hazards. To add to the vulnerability is the improper setting of these buildings, inadequacies of the structure and lack of preparedness measures. All these have disastrous consequences in the event of any natural disaster. In the year 2001 the biggest disaster was the earthquake in Gujarat where the worst affected victims were school children. Thus it is of utmost important for schools to intervene by communicating the risk, creating awareness and building capacities in preparedness to reduce vulnerabilities.

In the last few years, schools have focused on making schools a place where all students and staff feel physically and psychologically safe. The reason for emphasis on safe schools is due to the changing social attitudes. Society's attitudes about what constitutes violent behavior are changing as well. Today, violence is viewed as a continuum that includes such things as damage, verbal slurs and threats, as well as physical acts of violence and assault with a weapon (British Columbia Teachers' Federation, 1993). Violence includes bullying, sexual harassment and intimidation, all of which may be psychological rather than physical acts.

Thus, "Safe and supportive schools" refers to the provision of an environment that protects the emotional, psychological and physical well-being of students. Squelch (2001:138) defines a safe school as one that is free from danger and possible harm, where non-educators, educators and learners can work, teach and learn without fear or ridicule, intimidation, harassment, humiliation or violence. A safe school environment can directly bring effective learning and thereby contribute to the development of students as skilled and productive members of society. It is important to the health of children that they have clean water to drink, clean air to breathe, safe and nourishing food, and a safe place to learn and play. Schools act as an example for the community. A safe, clean, and well-maintained school with a positive psychosocial climate and culture can foster school connectedness, which in turn boost student and staff health as well as students' educational achievement. Creating a healthy school environment requires the involvement of virtually everyone in the school students, administrators, teachers, parents, school counselors, and nurse and kitchen staff. Schools should identify problems, then analyze them and make necessary changes. Even as schools find successful solutions to one set of problems, new challenges keep arising. Thus, a school's attention to the safety

of its environment will evolve and adapt to changing circumstances, while never losing sight of educating their students

It is important to make the students also as partners in addressing safety issues. Preparedness should be initiated from the early years of school education as it is an age where children are most adaptable. It is necessary to argue their awareness and understanding of threat from different quarters and the means to prevent them. Counseling sessions and street plays can be effectively used to enlighten the students and ease their fears. Workshops and mock drills should be conducted. According to Rogerian theory, one person becomes more creative than the next because he or she has learned to play, to be open to experience and receptive to ideas, and to rely more on self-evaluation than the evaluations of others. Contemporary psychologists sometimes use the term ego strength for psychological freedom. In the absence of ego strength, “individuals are likely to conform to others’ interpretations and fear or mistrust their own insights” (Runco, 2004, p. 22). The concept of ego strength as it relates to creativity is particularly important for teachers because educators can build children’s ego strength in ways that will allow them “to stand up to peer pressure and to express themselves as individuals, even if it means being different” (Runco, 2004, p. 22).

The school Boards time and again through its various circulars keep advising schools to ban corporal punishment and use confidence building and positive strokes to improve the performance and behavior patterns of the children. Parental involvement at every step remains a critical concern and they should be seen as partners in the teaching learning cycle. The CBSE board has also brought out ‘*Comprehensive school Health Manuals*’ in four volumes which deal with six themes and one of them is ‘*Being Responsible and Safe*’. These manuals have graded activities for various levels and must definitely be a part of school curriculum. The board through its eight regional offices has forwarded one set of the manuals completely free of cost to all schools.

Thus, the school system provides the largest organized base for safe environment education and action. School Administrators and Teachers are the important factors, which is bound to affect any safety programme. Teachers can provide a vital link in the success of safe school environment planning, knowledge, its associated problems and their solutions. The teachers need to step up their role as the guardian of the students. The development of trust and respect are a fundamental pedagogic responsibility of the teacher, as they help to establish “conditions of learning” in the classroom.

The emphasis in this paper is the role of school Principals to create a safe school environment. The school leadership is required to provide guidance to teachers and students so that they can work toward a safe school environment -

an environment in which students are free to learn and teachers are free to teach. Here the emphasis is on prevention as well as on intervention. School policies must do more than minimize unsafe, aggressive or violent behavior. The goal should be to develop students' character and sense of community.

2. Essential Components for Safe School Environment

There are various dimensions of safety which include physical, emotional and social aspects. The resources available to schools to manage safety vary as widely as the threats themselves, often creating formidable management challenges, particularly in the rural and semi urban parts of the nation.

Following are the components for safe schools.

The Physical Environment

The physical school environment encompasses the school building and all its contents including physical structures, infrastructure, furniture, the site on which a school is located; and the surrounding environment including the air, water, and materials with which children may come into contact, as well as other hazards. Children are constantly interacting with the physical environment of their schools, consciously or unconsciously. Yet not enough attention is paid to the importance of physical environment for learning. Often classrooms are overcrowded, they are not attractive, inviting or sensitive towards children's needs. In fact, the role of physical environment has been restricted merely to shelter the educational activity.

Many of our schools continue to function in rundown and dirty buildings, presenting a dull, drab atmosphere. Many schools lack playgrounds for outdoor learning activities. This compromise the quality of learning provided through the curriculum. Ensuring that minimum requirements of infrastructure and materials are available, and supporting flexible planning that will help achieve curricular aims are important features that principals, should focus on in their support to teachers. This applies to almost all aspects of school life.

Social Environment

Learning takes place within a web of social relationships as teachers and pupils interact both formally and informally. Schools are institutional spaces for communities of learners, including both students and teachers. Play and brawl with one's friends on the school grounds, free time to sit on the benches and chat with one's friends during breaks, gathering together for morning assembly and other festive and significant occasions in the school, studies carried out in the classroom, anxious turning of pages before a class test, and trips made with one's classmates and teachers to places outside the school — all these are activities bringing the students together, giving it the character of a learning community.

When it comes to giving the school its character, a very significant role is played by the teachers and the principal, it is they who work minutely on planning and carrying out daily routines, examinations and other events that mark the school calendar. They constantly think about; how can they organize the environment in the school and classroom so that such interactions support and enhance both teaching and learning? How can the space of the school be nurtured as a context where children feel safe, happy and wanted?

Psychological Environment

A school's environment is the thread that connects the huge number of activities on a campus. In many respects this thread is almost invisible, yet everyone experiences its influence. Positive social relationships and attitudes about school are as important to the environment as are safe and well-kept buildings and grounds. A safe, clean, and well-maintained school with a positive psychosocial climate and culture can foster school connectedness, which in turn boosts student and staff health as well as students' educational achievement. The psychosocial school environment encompasses the attitudes, feelings, and values of students and staff. Physical and psychological safety, positive interpersonal relationships, recognition of the needs and success of the individual, and support for learning are all part of the psychosocial environment. Other factors that can affect a school's environment include: the economy; social, cultural, and religious influences; geography; socioeconomic status of students' families; and legal, political, and social institutions.

3. Leadership Commitment for creating a safe school environment

For a school leader it is important to ensure that students learn in a safe and supportive environment. This requires ongoing planning, development and maintenance. School leader should accept responsibility for providing a safe working environment for staff and visitors to the school, regularly review and communicate the key principles and practices of a safe school, engage staff and representative members of the school community in the collaborative development of a vision of a safe school that is practical and achievable and committed to by all members of the school, identify existing school practices that are compatible with the vision ensure that the vision statement and the strategies are clearly documented as an important school policy systematically review progress in relation to the achievement of the vision, seek regular feedback on the achievement of the vision from representatives of the school community reshape and adapt the vision and the accompanying strategies.

School leaders should create a personalized, warm, safe, orderly, and inviting school environment. They should develop a uniform code of student conduct that contains clear policies, which are developed with staff and community involvement, fairly and consistently administered, evaluated on a regular basis, and openly communicated to stakeholders. Furthermore, schools leaders should make a concerted effort to educate and inform students as to the specifics of the code of conduct, as well as expectations for appropriate behavior, and the logical consequences of their behavior.

School leadership teams should collect and compile data regarding safety-related incidents and regularly conduct school safety audits, share findings with staff, students, school partners and the community, and provide student and staff training for school safety. Schools should implement prevention, intervention, apprehension and counseling programs to combat unsafe behavior. Thus a school principal should be able to develop a positive school climate, create and/or specify policies and rules of conduct assess them, provide staff training, involve community partners and develop a support network for students. School leader is expected to act as a catalyst in creating a safe school environment.

4. Capacity building initiatives

Leadership is to this decade what standards based reform was to the 1990's if you want large-scale sustainable reform (Fullan 2003a, b). The main mark of a successful leader is not his or her impact on the bottom line of student learning at the end of their tenure, but rather how many good leaders they leave behind who can go even further. A school principal is a leader who is expected to bring systemic reform in the school with the help of all the stakeholders.

Principals play a vital role in setting the direction for successful and safe schools, but existing knowledge on the best ways to prepare and develop highly qualified candidate is sparse. What are the essential elements of good leadership? How is successful leadership development programs designed? What program structures provide the best learning environments? What governing and financial policies are needed to sustain good programming? "School leadership Study: Developing Successful Principals" is a major research effort that seeks to answer these questions. Once effective processes have been identified they can be replicated, ensuring that more and more schools become vibrant learning communities under the direction of outstanding leaders. Thus, the institutions offering courses in educational administration must pay attention to not only specific learning approaches and techniques used within education but also to the professional and management processes adopted across educational systems themselves.

Capacity building requires that the organization be very clear about where they want the capacity to reside: what capacity they were trying to build for the short term as well as the long term; and how to coordinate capacity building across organizational boundaries. If a system wants to ensure alignment and coherence, it has to build structures and cultures where coordinated learning occurs and where messages and actions become consistent within and across roles and organizational levels — not a sealed off consistency but one in which problems are confronted and new learning's are incorporated as you go. "It's time for educators and all other interested in the cause of education, to deliberate over how safe our schools are, and the extent to which they offer a safe school environment to the children to fulfill the cherished promise of 'educating' them, and most importantly – the kind of future nation being created in our schools". Safety is a multidimensional concept and safe schools need to come up with a "Safe School Plan".

For the purpose of capacity building of the school leaders workshops can be conducted with the objective to increase awareness of the Principals on the concept safety and to build the capacity of integrating the safe school environment in the schools. The objective also can be to encourage principals to reflect on the current scenario in schools and to sensitize them on the need and importance of safe school environment. This will help them to gain knowledge about institutional audit and safe school environment, the relationships between the safe school environment and the learning outcome. Thus, the goal of capacity building of school administrators and raising their awareness through a process of reexamining their assumptions about the role played by the school in creating a safe environment could be achieved with the sincere efforts.

5. Approaches to create a Safe Environment.


A Whole School Approach for Creating Safe School Environment

The National Healthy school programme has identified 10 elements for the development of an effective whole school approach (NISS 2004)

- Leadership, management and management change
- Policy development
- Curriculum planning and resources
- Teaching and learning
- Culture and environment
- Provision of support services
- Staff professional development needs health and welfare
- Partnership with parents and community
- Assessing recording and reporting

A whole school approach for managing safe school environment requires all members of the school community to work together. It focuses on: **Prevention** through school safety education and safe and supportive environments; and **Intervention to** provide appropriate support for student's safety. Safety issues should be approached within the context of a school's student welfare policy with clear links to other related school policies such as the behavior management policy. The whole school approach provides a systematic and practical framework which schools can use to manage safety issues and to ensure that the well-being and individual needs of all students is supported.

Figure: A whole school approach to safe school environment education incorporating education and management strategies.



School Organization & Ethos

The ethos of a school is felt across all aspects of the school. It is the culture of the school – The development of a safe school environment ethos requires leadership from the head. The ethos can be seen and felt in a number of ways including how staff look at and talk to each other and to children of school; the type of and range of school furniture, access to toilets and drinking water; whether and what type work is displayed, and how; whether and how students play a role in decision making

and that is how that is managed; and the type and range of emotional academic and extracurricular support and opportunities there are available.

Developing a positive school climate is fundamental to creating a school environment that focuses on the well-being and individual needs of all students. Factors such as connectedness and belonging, values and beliefs, fairness, justice, and success at school all promote resilience in students. The school ethos encompasses these resilience factors and plays an important role in the provision of an effective safety education program. All members of the school community should be involved in the development of school policies and practices relating to the management of safe school education. It is also important that school policies and procedures addressing school safety are clearly communicated and understood by students, staff and parents.

Curriculum Inputs

Whilst safe education is provided within the environment studies, planning needs to occur across the whole school curriculum. The curriculum refers to both the formal teaching and learning program in the school and the informal curriculum component. This provides students with an opportunity to gain knowledge and skills, and to develop attitudes and values that enable them to make informed decisions relating to safety

Partnerships & Services

It is the responsibility of schools, parents, outside agencies and the local community to manage school safety. Schools need to work collaboratively with parents and community agencies, as this is an important factor in supporting the health and wellbeing of students. Schools have a significant role to play in providing information to parents about safety related issues through strategies such as parent information forums, the school counselor and the school newsletter. The effectiveness of a school safety education program will be enhanced by nurturing positive relationships through the involvement of parents in the development of school policies and programs. It is essential for schools to establish meaningful links with community.

Developing a School Based Safe School Environment Policy

The values of the school or school should be central to the development of the safe education policy. It is important that the policy be linked to a whole school approach which emphasizes the promotion of resilience, linked to the beliefs and values of the school community. So a safe education policy should establish

the framework for educating and managing safety related issues relevant to the school community. Specifically, it should:

- Guide all teachers and parents of the school and wider community in their responsibilities as safe school environment educators;
- Outline the safe school education program; involve parents and the community;
- advise students, parents and staff of school rules, consequences and procedures for responding to unsanctioned drug use or drug-related incidents;
- Establish guidelines for safe school environment education
- Identify specific support services/networks available to students, parents and staff;
- Ensure the ongoing professional development of all staff; and
- Show links to other related school policies.

6. Steps in Developing a Safe School Policy



Figure: Steps in developing a safe school education policy

Thus, a safe school environment education policy reflects the values of the school community and informs the practices and procedures that are adopted within the school. The development of a safe school environment education policy contains

a number of distinct steps. Whilst the development process is in place, the draft policy and processes used should be seen as dynamic and able to be refined as needed. The above Figure outlines the steps for the development of a safe school environment education policy. This process can be adapted to suit the school context, ethos and stage of development.

7. Conclusion

For promoting safety in schools, the Education Board has made it mandatory for the Schools to run according to the rules of the Board. It requires the schools to get certificates of hygiene, water, and completion of the building from the municipality, and to ensure that; “No child shall be subjected to physical punishment or mental harassment”. The following details are provided to the department of Education; Area of school campus, Total built up area, Area of play ground, No. of class rooms, Room for Headmaster-cum-Office-cum-Storeroom, Separate toilet for boys and girls, Drinking Water Facility, Kitchen for cooking Mid Day Meal and Barrier free Access. But in practice hardly these rules are followed. What is needed today on the part of the government is to evaluate their policies. The school authorities too need to regularly evaluate the policies and plans that are implemented, so that the evaluation results are reported and communicated to those who need them and can use them. Evaluation results can be used to initiate discussion, debate and proposals which can contribute to further development and support for healthy nutrition and for health promotion in schools

A school should follow an interdisciplinary, integrated and holistic approach for policy development and implementation. Policy development and implementation should take into consideration cultural background, gender issues, ethnic minorities, and the jurisdictional and legal structure of the country. A school policy should be socially inclusive and participatory. All social classes need to be targeted, particularly the most vulnerable and the poor. Evaluation and monitoring should take place throughout the whole process of policy development and implementation. Therefore, each school has to establish its own priorities, in collaboration with all parties concerned, to decide the extent to which the components should be addressed. Sometimes the school authorities do not take any initiative step in promoting school safety plans; they keep waiting for the resources from the government or the authorities. It is more important to start with small changes that are possible than to wait until resources become available to address all the safety issues.

References

- Bleich, J., Ingersoll, S., & Devine, J. (2000). National campaign against youth violence Academic Advisory Council report. Boston, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Bonny, A., Britto, M., Klosterman, B., Hornuny, R., & Slap, G. (2000). School disconnectedness: Identifying adolescents at risk. *Pediatrics*, 106(5), 1017-1021.
- Caprara, G., Barbanelli, C., Pastorelli, C., Bandura, A., & Zimbardo, P. (2000). Prosocial foundations of children's academic achievement. *Psychological Science*, 11(4), 302-306.
- Devine, J. (1996). *Maximum security: The culture of violence in inner-city schools*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Espelage, D., Bosworth, K., & Simon, T. (2000). Examining the social context of bullying behaviors in early adolescence. *Journal of Counseling & Development*, 78(3), 326-333.
- Hemmings, A. (2000). The 'hidden' corridor curriculum. *High School Journal*, 83(2), 1-10.
- Johnson, J., Cohen, P., Smailes, E., Kasen, S., Oldham, J., Skodol, A., & Brooks, J. (2000). Adolescent personality disorders associated with violence and criminal behavior during adolescence and early adulthood. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 157, 1406-1412.
- Joshi, P.T., Kaschak, D.G. (1998). Exposure to violence and trauma: questionnaire for adolescents. *Int. Rev Psychiatry* 10: 28 – 215.
- Kelly, J. (1990). Changing contexts and the field of community psychology. *American journal of community psychology*, 18(6), 769-792.
- Liska, A. & Baccaglini, W. (1990). Feeling safe by comparison: Crime in the newspapers. *Social Problems*, 37(3), 360-374.
- Lowe, S. (2000). Creating community: Art for community development. *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, 29(3), 357-386.
- Reese, L., Vera, E., & Thompson, K. (2001). A qualitative investigation of perceptions of violence risk factors in low-income African American children. *Journal of Clinical Child Psychology*, 30(2), pp. 161-171.
- Sandler, J. (1989). *Dimensions of psychoanalysis*. London: Karnac Books and Madison, CT: International Universities Press.

Twemlow, S., Fonagy, P., & Sacco, F. (2001a). An innovative psycho dynamically influenced intervention to reduce school violence. *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, 40(3), 377-379.

UNESCO (1997) *Educating for a Sustainable Future: A Trans disciplinary Vision for Concerted Action*,

Vernberg, E., Jacobs, A., Twemlow, S., Sacco, F., & Fonagy, P. Developmental patterns in aggression, victimization and violence related cognitions. In preparation.

Wasley, M., Gladden, N., Holland, S., King, E., & Powell, L. (2000). *Small schools: Great strides: A study of new small schools in Chicago*. New York: Bank Street College of Education.

World Commission on Environment and Development, (1987), p.43.

Distorted Visions of Buddhism: Agnostic and Atheist

B. Alan Wallace

As Buddhism has encountered modernity, it runs against widespread prejudices, both religious and anti-religious, and it is common for all those with such biases to misrepresent Buddhism, either intentionally or unintentionally. Reputable scholars of Buddhism, both traditional and modern, all agree that the historical Buddha taught a view of karma and rebirth that was quite different from the previous takes on these ideas. Moreover, his teachings on the nature and origins of suffering as well as liberation are couched entirely within the framework of rebirth. Liberation is precisely freedom from the round of birth and death that is samsara. But for many contemporary people drawn to Buddhism, the teachings on karma and rebirth don't sit well, so they are faced with a dilemma. A legitimate option is simply to adopt those theories and practices from various Buddhist traditions that one finds compelling and beneficial and set the others aside. An illegitimate option is to reinvent the Buddha and his teachings based on one's own prejudices. This, unfortunately, is the route followed by Stephen Batchelor and other like-minded people who are intent on reshaping the Buddha in their own images.

The back cover of Batchelor's most recent book, entitled *Confession of a Buddhist Atheist*, describes his work as "a stunning and groundbreaking recovery of the historical Buddha and his message." One way for this to be true, would be that his book is based on a recent discovery of ancient Buddhist manuscripts, comparable to the Dead Sea Scrolls of the Nag Hammadi library for Christianity. But it is not. Another way is for his claims to be based on unprecedented historical research by a highly accomplished scholar of ancient Indian languages and history. But no such professional research or scholarship is in evidence in this book. Instead, his claims about the historical Buddha and his teachings are almost entirely speculative, as he takes another stab at recreating Buddhism to conform to his current views.

To get a clear picture of Batchelor's agnostic-turned-atheist approach to Buddhism, there is no need to look further than his earlier work, *Buddhism without Beliefs*. Claiming to embrace Thomas Huxley's definition of agnosticism as the method of following reason as far as it will take one, he admonishes his readers, "Do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable."¹ He then proceeds to explain who the Buddha really was and what he really taught, often in direct opposition to the teachings attributed to the

Buddha by all schools of Buddhism. If in this he is following Huxley's dictum, this would imply that Batchelor has achieved at least the ability to see directly into the past, if not complete omniscience itself.

From a modern academic perspective, the most historically reliable accounts we have of the Buddha's life and teachings are found in the Pali canon. Most Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana Buddhists acknowledge the authenticity of these Pali writings, but Batchelor repeatedly overrides them with his own agnostic preconceptions that cause him to portray the Buddha as the spitting image of himself. For example, contrary to all the historical evidence, Batchelor writes that the Buddha "did not claim to have had experience that granted him privileged, esoteric knowledge of how the universe ticks." To cite just two of innumerable statements in the Pali canon pertaining to the scope of the Buddha's knowledge: "Whatever in this world – with its devas, maras, and brahmas, its generations complete with contemplatives and priests, princes and men – is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, pondered by the intellect, that has been fully awakened to by the Tathagata. Thus he is called the Tathagata."² In a similar vein, we read, "the world and its arising are fully known by a Tathagata and he is released from both; he also knows the ending of it and the way thereto. He speaks as he does; he is unconquered in the world."³

Batchelor brings to his understanding of Buddhism a strong antipathy toward religion and religious institutions, and this bias pervades all his recent writings. Rather than simply rejecting elements of the Buddha's teachings that strike him as religious – which would be perfectly legitimate – Batchelor takes the illegitimate step of denying that the Buddha ever taught anything that would be deemed religious by contemporary Western standards, claiming, that "There is nothing particularly religious or spiritual about this path." Rather, the Buddha's teachings were a form of "existential, therapeutic, and liberating agnosticism" that was "refracted through the symbols, metaphors, and imagery of his world."⁴ Being an agnostic himself, Batchelor overrides the massive amount of textual evidence that the Buddha was anything but an agnostic, and recreates the Buddha in his own image, promoting exactly what Batchelor himself believes in, namely, a form of existential, therapeutic, and liberating agnosticism.

Since Batchelor dismisses all talk of rebirth as a waste of time, he projects this view onto his image of the Buddha, declaring that he regarded "speculation about future and past lives to be just another distraction." This claim flies in the face of the countless times the Buddha spoke of the immense importance of rebirth and karma, which lie at the core of his teachings as they are recorded in Pali suttas. Batchelor is one of many Zen teachers nowadays who regard future and past lives as a mere distraction. But in adopting this attitude, they go against

the teachings of Dogen Zenji, founder of the Soto school of Zen, who addressed the importance of the teachings on rebirth and karma in his principal anthology, *Treasury of the Eye of the True Dharma (Shobogenzo)*. In his book *Deep Faith in Cause and Effect (Jinshin inga)*, he criticizes Zen masters who deny karma, and in *Karma of the Three Times (Sanji go)*, he goes into more detail on this matter.⁵ Since Batchelor feels such liberty to rewrite the Pali suttas, perhaps he should have a go at Dogen's writings next, to enlighten us as to their true meaning.

As to the source of Buddhist teachings on rebirth, Batchelor speculates, "In accepting the idea of rebirth, the Buddha reflected the worldview of his time." In reality, the Buddha's detailed accounts of rebirth and karma differed significantly from other Indian thinkers' views on these subjects; and given the wide range of philosophical views during his era, there was no uniformly accepted "worldview of his time."

Rather than adopting this idea from mere hearsay – a gullible approach the Buddha specifically rejected – he declared that in the first watch of the night of his enlightenment, after purifying his mind with the achievement of samadhi, he gained "direct knowledge" of the specific details of many thousands of his own past lifetimes throughout the course of many eons of cosmic contraction and expansion. In the second watch of the night, he observed the multiple rebirths of countless other sentient beings, observing the consequences of their wholesome and unwholesome deeds from one life to the next. During the third watch of the night, he gained direct knowledge of the four noble truths, revealing the causes of gaining liberation from this cycle of rebirth.⁶ While there is ample evidence that the Buddha claimed to have direct knowledge of rebirth, there is no textual or historical evidence that he simply adopted some pre-existing view, which would have been antithetical to his entire approach of not accepting theories simply because they are commonly accepted. There would be nothing wrong if Batchelor simply rejected the authenticity of the Buddha's enlightenment and the core of his teachings, but instead he rejects the most reliable accounts of the Buddha's vision and replaces it with his own, while then projecting it on the Buddha of his imagination.

Batchelor concludes that since different Buddhist schools vary in their interpretations of the Buddha's teachings in response to the questions of the nature of that which is reborn and how this process occurs, all their views are based on nothing more than speculation.⁷ Scientists in all fields of inquiry commonly differ in their interpretations of empirical findings, so if this fact invalidates Buddhist teachings, it should equally invalidate scientific findings as well. While in his view Buddhism started out as agnostic, it "has tended to lose its agnostic dimension through becoming institutionalized as a religion (i.e., a revealed belief system valid for all time, controlled by an elite body of priests)."⁸

Since there is no evidence that Buddhism was ever agnostic, any assertions about how it lost this status are nothing but groundless speculations, driven by the philosophical bias that he brings to Buddhism.

As an agnostic Buddhist, Batchelor does not regard the Buddha's teachings as a source of answers to questions of where we came from, where we are going, or what happens after death, regardless of the extensive teachings attributed to the Buddha regarding each of these issues. Rather, he advises Buddhists to seek such knowledge in what he deems the appropriate domains: astrophysics, evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and so on. With this advice, he reveals that he is a devout member of the congregation of Thomas Huxley's Church Scientific, taking refuge in science as the one true way to answer all the deepest questions concerning human nature and the universe at large.

Having identified himself as an agnostic follower of Huxley, Batchelor then proceeds to make one declaration after another about the limits of human consciousness and the ultimate nature of human existence and the universe at large, as if he were the most accomplished of gnostics. A central feature of Buddhist meditation is the cultivation of samadhi, by which the attentional imbalances of restlessness and lethargy are gradually overcome through rigorous, sustained training. But in reference to the vacillation of the mind from restlessness to lethargy, Batchelor responds, "No amount of meditative expertise from the mystical East will solve this problem, because such restlessness and lethargy are not mere mental or physical lapses but reflexes of an existential condition."⁹ Contemplative adepts from multiple traditions, including Hinduism and Buddhism have been disproving this claim for thousands of years, and it is now being refuted by modern scientific research.¹⁰ But Batchelor is so convinced of his own preconceptions regarding the limitations of the human mind and of meditation that he ignores all evidence to the contrary.

While there are countless references in the discourses of the Buddha referring to the realization of emptiness, Batchelor claims, "Emptiness . . . is not something we 'realize' in a moment of mystical insight that 'breaks through' to a transcendent reality concealed behind yet mysteriously underpinning the empirical world." He adds, "we can no more step out of language and imagination than we can step out of our bodies."¹¹ Buddhist contemplatives throughout history have reportedly experienced states of consciousness that transcend language and concepts as a result of their practice of insight meditation. But Batchelor describes such practice as entailing instead a state of perplexity in which one is overcome by "awe, wonder, incomprehension, shock," during which not "just the mind but the entire organism feels perplexed."¹²

Batchelor's account of meditation describes the experiences of those who have failed to calm the restlessness and lethargy of their own minds through the

practice of samadhi, and failed to realize emptiness or transcend language and concepts through the practice of vipashyana. Instead of acknowledging these as failures, he heralds them as triumphs and, without a shred of supportive evidence, attributes them to a Buddhism that exists nowhere but in his imagination.

Although Batchelor declared himself to be an agnostic, such proclamations about the true teachings of the Buddha and about the nature of the human mind, the universe, and ultimate reality all suggest that he has assumed for himself the role of a gnostic of the highest order. Rather than presenting Buddhism without beliefs, his version is saturated with his own beliefs, many of them based upon nothing more than his own imagination. Batchelor's so-called agnosticism is utterly paradoxical. On the one hand, he rejects a multitude of Buddhist beliefs based upon the most reliable textual sources, while at the same time confidently making one claim after another without ever supporting them with demonstrable evidence.

In Batchelor's most recent book,¹³ he refers to himself as an atheist, more so than as an agnostic, and when I asked him whether he still holds the above views expressed in his book published thirteen years ago, he replied that he no longer regards the Buddha's teachings as agnostic, but as pragmatic.¹⁴ It should come as no surprise that as he shifted his own self-image from that of an agnostic to an atheist, the image he projects of the Buddha shifts accordingly. In short, his views on the nature of the Buddha and his teachings are far more a reflection of himself and his own views than they are of any of the most reliable historical accounts of the life and teachings of the Buddha.

In his move from agnosticism to atheism, Batchelor moves closer to the position of Sam Harris, who is devoted to the ideal of science destroying religion. In his book *Letter to a Christian Nation*, Harris proclaims that the problem with religion is the problem of dogma, in contrast to atheism, which he says "is not a philosophy; it is not even a view of the world; it is simply an admission of the obvious."¹⁵ This, of course, is the attitude of all dogmatists: they are so certain of their beliefs that they regard anyone who disagrees with them as being so stupid or ignorant that they can't recognize the obvious.¹⁶

In his article "Killing the Buddha" Harris shares his advice with the Buddhist community, like Batchelor asserting, "The wisdom of the Buddha is currently trapped within the religion of Buddhism," and he goes further in declaring that "merely being a self-described "Buddhist" is to be complicit in the world's violence and ignorance to an unacceptable degree." Harris not only claims to have what is tantamount to a kind of gnostic insight into the true teachings of the Buddha, he also claims to know what most Buddhists do and do not realize: "If the methodology of Buddhism (ethical precepts and meditation) uncovers genuine truths about the mind and the phenomenal world – truths like emptiness,

selflessness, and impermanence – these truths are not in the least ‘Buddhist.’ No doubt, most serious practitioners of meditation realize this, but most Buddhists do not.”¹⁷ It is sad when communist regimes throughout the world seek to annihilate Buddhism from the face of the earth, but it is even sadder when people who are allegedly sympathetic to Buddhism seem intent on completing what the communists have left undone.

The current domination of science, education, and the secular media by scientific materialism has cast doubt on many of the theories and practices of the world’s religions. This situation is not without historical precedent. In the time of the Weimar Republic, Hitler offered what appeared to be a vital secular faith in place of the discredited creeds of religion, Lenin and Stalin did the same in the Soviet Union, and Mao Zedong followed suit in China. Hugh Heclo, former professor of government at Harvard University, writes of this trend, “If traditional religion is absent from the public arena, secular religions are likely to satisfy man’s quest for meaning. . . . It was an atheistic faith in man as creator of his own grandeur that lay at the heart of communism, fascism and all the horrors they unleashed for the twentieth century. And it was adherents of traditional religions – Martin Niemöller, C.S. Lewis, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Reinhold Niebuhr, Martin Buber – who often warned most clearly of the tragedy to come from attempting to build man’s own version of the New Jerusalem on Earth.”¹⁸

While Batchelor focuses on replacing the historical teachings of the Buddha with his own secularized vision and Harris rails at the suffering inflicted upon humanity by religious dogmatists, both tend to overlook the fact that Hitler, Stalin, and Mao Zedong caused more bloodshed, justified by their secular ideologies, than all the religious wars that preceded them throughout human history.

I am not suggesting that Batchelor or Harris, who are both decent, well-intentioned men, are in any way similar to Hitler, Stalin, or Mao Zedong. But I am suggesting that Batchelor’s misrepresentation of Buddhism parallels that of Chinese communist, anti-Buddhist propaganda; and the Buddhist holocaust inflicted by multiple communist regimes throughout Asia during the twentieth century were based upon and justified by propaganda virtually identical to Harris’s vitriolic, anti-religious polemics.

The Theravada Buddhist commentator Buddhaghosa refers to “far enemies” and “near enemies” of certain virtues, namely, loving-kindness, compassion, empathetic joy, and equanimity. The far enemies of each of these virtues are vices that are diametrically opposed to their corresponding virtues, and the near enemies are false facsimiles. The far enemy of loving-kindness, for instance, is malice, and that of compassion is cruelty. The near enemy of loving-kindness is self-centered attachment, and that of compassion is grief, or despair.¹⁹ To draw a parallel, communist regimes that are bent on destroying Buddhism from the face

of the earth may be called the far enemies of Buddhism, for they are diametrically opposed to all that Buddhism stands for. Batchelor and Harris, on the other hand, present themselves as being sympathetic to Buddhism, but their visions of the nature of the Buddha's teachings are false facsimiles of all those that have been handed down reverently from one generation to the next since the time of the Buddha. However benign their intentions, their writings may be regarded as "near enemies" of Buddhism.

The popularity of the writings of Batchelor, Harris, and other atheists such as Richard Dawkins – both within the scientific community and the public at large – shows they are far from alone in terms of their utter disillusionment with traditional religions. Modern science, as conceived by Galileo, originated out of a love for God the Father and a wish to know the mind of their benevolent, omnipotent Creator by way of knowing His creation. As long as science and Christianity seemed compatible, religious followers of science could retain what psychologists call a sense of "secure attachment" regarding both science and religion. But particularly with Darwin's discovery of evolution by natural selection and the militant rise of the Church Scientific, for many, the secure attachment toward religion has mutated into a kind of dismissive avoidance.

Children with avoidant attachment styles tend to avoid parents and caregivers – no longer seeking comfort or contact with them – and this becomes especially pronounced after a period of absence. People today who embrace science, together with the metaphysical beliefs of scientific materialism, turn away from traditional religious beliefs and institutions, no longer seeking comfort or contact with them; and those who embrace religion and refuse to be indoctrinated by materialistic biases commonly lose interest in science. This trend is viewed with great perplexity and dismay by the scientific community, many of whom are convinced that they are uniquely objective, unbiased, and free of beliefs that are unsupported by empirical evidence.

Thomas Huxley's ideal of the beliefs and institution of the Church Scientific achieving "domination over the whole realm of the intellect" is being promoted by agnostics and atheists like Batchelor and Harris. But if we are ever to encounter the Buddhist vision of reality, we must first set aside all our philosophical biases, whether they are theistic, agnostic, atheist, or otherwise. Then, through critical, disciplined study of the most reliable sources of the Buddha's teachings, guided by qualified spiritual friends and teachers, followed by rigorous, sustained practice, we may encounter the Buddhist vision of reality. And with this encounter with our own true nature, we may realize freedom through our own experience. That is the end of agnosticism, for we come to know reality as it is, and the truth will set us free.

Notes

1. Stephen Batchelor, *Buddhism without Beliefs: A Contemporary Guide to Awakening*. (New York: Riverhead Books, 1997), 17-18.
2. [Itivuttaka](#) 112
3. *AEguttara Nikâya* II 23
4. Stephen Batchelor, *Buddhism without Beliefs*, 10, 15.
5. Yuho Yokoi, *Zen Master Dogen: An Introduction with Selected Writings* (New York: Weatherhill, 1976).
6. *Majjhima Nikâya* 36: <http://www.accesstoinight.org/ptf/buddha.html>
7. Stephen Batchelor, *Buddhism without Beliefs*, 35-36.
8. *Ibid.* 16.
9. *Ibid.* 62.
10. Progress in this regard can be read by following the series of scientific papers on the “Shamatha Project” on the website of the Santa Barbara Institute for Consciousness Studies: <http://sbinstitute.com/>. Other studies have been cited elsewhere in this volume.
11. Stephen Batchelor, *Buddhism without Beliefs*, 39.
12. *Ibid.* 97.
13. Stephen Batchelor, *Confession of a Buddhist Atheist* (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010).
14. Personal correspondence, July 6, 2010.
15. Sam Harris, *Letter to a Christian Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 51.
16. Cf. B. Alan Wallace, “Religion and Reason: A Review of Sam Harris’s Letter to a Christian Nation.” In *Shambhala Sun*, October/November 2006: 99-104.
17. Sam Harris, “Killing the Buddha” In *Shambhala Sun*, March 2006, 73-75.
18. Hugh Heclo, “Religion and Public Policy,” *Journal of Policy History*, Vol. 13, No.1, 2001, 14.
19. Buddhaghosa, *The Path of Purification*, trans. Bhikkhu Ñāṅamoli (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1979) IX: B. Alan Wallace, *The Four Immeasurables: Cultivating a Boundless Heart* (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2004).

Urine Analysis in Tibetan Medicine

Lobsang Rabgay

Traditional Tibetan methods of urine analysis is unique and it can be claimed that no other system of traditional medicine have perfected this method of diagnosis as Tibetan physicians have over the centuries.

Next to pulsology, urine analysis is the most important method of finding out and confirming a disorder and its nature, locations and so forth. Though it may seem a simplistic process when one observes it being practised by a Tibetan physician, in reality it has taken the physician years of training to make it so seemingly a simple method of diagnosis.

Generally, a medical student studies the second chapter of the *Last Tantra* and uses it as a source for studying and practising urine analysis and very often complements his study with the commentary to that work.

In the *Last Tantra*, urine analysis is explained under eight sections:

1. Preliminary compliances
2. Time of examination
3. Description of container to be used
4. Compositional formation of urine
5. Healthy urine
6. Unhealthy urine
7. Death urine
8. Evil spirit urine

1. Preliminary compliances

As in the case of pulse diagnosis, a patient is required to observe certain compliances particularly during the day before his urine is to be examined, in order to present a urine specimen which gives a true compositional structure of the disorder. Dietary and behavioural compliances are particularly important because the slightest intake of food or performance of behaviour which the patient is not adapted to, will grossly affect the compositional structure of the urine. Following are some of the major compliances a patient is generally required to observe:

- a) no intake of cool food items such as tea which affects the colour of a wind urine
- b) no intake of whey and so forth which affects the colour of a phlegm urine

- c) no intake of hot food items which affects the colour of a bile urine
- d) normal intake of liquid
- e) abstinence from sexual intercourse
- f) sleeping regularly
- g) eating regularly
- h) avoidance of strenuous activities
- i) avoidance of mental exertion

2. Time of Examination

The recommended time of examination of a urine specimen is at the time of dawn when the first sunlight falls on the cup. However, when it is not possible to examine the urine at the recommended time, urine may be examined in bright daylight at any other time of the day.

3. Container to be used

Use a container which will not shade the original colour of the urine, preferably a white porcelain cup.

4. Compositional formation of Urine

Soluble and insoluble food ingested is mixed and churned by the decomposing phlegm localised in the upper part of the stomach; and when it reaches the mid part of the stomach, it is thoroughly absorbed and assimilated by the digestive bile; finally when it reaches the lower part of the stomach, it is separated into waste and non-waste products by the fire-like wind. The waste products are channelised into intestines where they are further separated into solid and liquid wastes. The liquid wastes are transferred to the urinary bladder through the ureter and urine is formed and accumulated in the bladder. In the meantime, the non-waste products are transferred to the liver where the blood is produced. Blood that is produced is of two types; waste and productive. The waste blood is transferred to the gall bladder where two types of bile are produced. The productive bile forms lymphatic fluid while the waste bile produced albumin which is transferred and collected in the urinary bladder through the ureter. Albumin is one of the most important sediments the physician looks for in the urine as its presence in quantity or absence will determine whether the disorder is of a hot or cold type. This is because albumin originates from blood and bile which flow through all the parts of the body and consequently carry with them certain characteristics of the condition of various parts of the body.

5. Healthy Urine

The characteristics of a healthy urine:

- a) at the stage when the urine is fresh:
 - slightly malodorous
 - moderate presence of steam stable steam
 - moderate sized bubbles

- b) at the state when urine stands:
 - moderate thickness of albumin
 - albumin is pervasive
 - albumin dissolutes from the edge

- c) at the stage when the urine has undergone transformation:
 - dilute and white in colour

However, it is important to keep in mind that this standardisation of a healthy urine is set on the assumption that a person does not possess inherent predominance of any of the humours. Because if he does have natural or inherent predominance of any of the humours - and this is generally the case - though he may be totally healthy the colour of his urine will vary from the standard healthy urine colour. For instance, a healthy person with inherent predominance of wind will have a slightly bluish and dilute colour, while a healthy person with inherent bile predominance will have yellowish urine.

6. The Unhealthy Urine

The Actual Method of Urine Analysis:

The actual method of analysing urine is conducted in three stages consisting of nine sections. The three stages are:

- a) the stage when the urine is fresh
 - b) the stage when the urine stands
 - c) the stage when the urine has undergone total transformation
- a) The stage when the urine is fresh, it is examined and analysed in the following order to determine disorder:
- colour
 - steam
 - odour
 - bubbles

b) The stage when the urine stands, it is examined and analysed in the following way:

- albumin
- chyle

c) The stage when the urine has undergone total transformation, it should be examined and analysed in the following way:

- transformation period
- method of transformation - post-transformational characteristics

A. Urine Analysis at the stage when the urine is fresh:

Colour

Wind urine: bluish and dilute

Bile urine: yellowish or reddish

Phlegm urine: white like milk

Vitiation of blood: reddish

Lymphatic disorder: tinted yellow

Triple humoural disorder: smoky dark chocolate colour

A combination of any of the above colours will denote that a bi-combined. disorder is present.

Steam

Developed fever: steam is profusive to the extent of shielding the colour of urine.

Hidden or chronic fever: steam is slight but persistent.

Cold, wind or phlegmic disorders: steam is negligible, and disappears instantly.

Hot and cold disorders: steam is moderate in presence.

Odour

Hot disorders: malaodourous

Cold disorders: slight or absence of odour
Dyspepsia: odour of an ingested food item

Bubbles

Wind disorder: large circular bubbles which are stable and bluish in colour

Bile disorder: minute congested bubbles in large quantity, yellow in colour, and disappears instantly

Phlegm disorder: separate, congested and stable bubbles

Blood disorder: reddish bubbles Poisoning: rainbow colour bubbles

Diffused or spreading disorder: bubbles scatter

B. Urine Analysis at the stage when the urine stands: Albumin

Wind disorder: albumin like the hairs of a goat are found scattered in the urine of albumin in the urine means that the disorder is localised in the upper extremities, while albumin located at the bottom of the urine container will mean that the disorder is localised in the lower extremities.

Basically, if **albumin** is concentrated, it means a hot disorder is present, while the absence of albumin will denote, a cold disorder. And generally, the colour of albumin will conform with the colour of the urine.

Chyle

Presence or absence of chyle in the urine helps to determine whether a disorder is hot or cold and this method of diagnosis is also extendable to the third-stage when the urine has undergone total transformation. If chyle is present and is thick in the urine, the disorder may be confirmed as a hot type while the absence or thin presence of chyle means a cold disorder. If chyle disintegrates into particles without visible cause, it may mean the presence of tumoural growth in a part of the body.

C. Urine Analysis at the stage when the urine has undergone total transformation

Time of transformation:

In the case of a hot disorder, urine transformation takes place even before the steam of the urine has disappeared. In the case of a cold disorder, however, transformation takes place only after the steam has evaporated and the urine has cooled. When the disorder is combined i.e. both hot and cold factors are involved, transformation occurs simultaneously with the evaporation of steam. However, in applying the time of transformation as a method to determine the nature of disorder it is well to keep in mind the seasonal variation and influence in the speed and process of transformation. For instance, irrespective of the nature of the disorder, during winter urine transformation occurs more or less instantly after urine has been passed; while during spring an autumn transformation takes place a little after the urine has been passed. In summer because of the heat, transformation takes place after considerable period of time after urine has been passed.

Method of Transformation:

In the case of cold disorders, transformation of urine takes place from the sides of the container to the centre. In the case of hot disorders, transformation usually occurs from the bottom of the container to the surface.

Post-transformation characteristics:

Post-transformational urine colour will generally correspond to the original colour of the urine. Urine of post-transformational stage should be analysed for its transparency and concentration. If it is concentrated and of hazy transparency and the colour of the urine is high, the disorder is definitely hot, while in the case of the urine being, less concentrated and of clear transparency with low colour, the disorder is cold.

Characteristics of specific disorder urine:

Before describing the characteristics of the urine of specific diseases it is important to be able to analyse and recognise a hot and cold disorder urine.

A. Characteristics of hot disorder Urine:

a) Characteristics of the hot urine during the first stage:

Yellowish or reddish; hazy transparency; malaodourous; steam is concentrated and stable; bubbles are minute, yellowish and have high disappearance rate.

b) Characteristics of hot urine during the 2nd stage:

Concentrated albumin is localised in the centre diffused concentrated cycle.

c) Characteristics of hot urine during the 3rd stage:

Chocolate in colour Highly concentrated

B. Characteristics of cold disorder urine:

a) Characteristics of cold urine during 1st stage:

Clear transparency, white and dilute Low steam
Absence or minimum of odour
Large stable bubbles

b) Characteristics of cold urine during 2nd stage:

Low concentration of albumin and chyle

c) Characteristics of cold urine during the 3rd stage:

Transformation takes place after urine has cooled

Post transformational characteristics: the urine is bluish and dilute

However, it is important to keep in mind the characteristics of urine that can easily be mistaken for that of either a hot or cold disorder. For instance, a bluish and dilute urine will not reflect a cold disorder if it has concentrated albumin present. So though by appearance the urine may seem to be of a cold disorder, by nature it is of a hot disorder. Similarly though the first stage characteristics of a urine is that of a hot disorder, if transformation of urine takes place after urine has cooled, the disorder is of a cold type.

Characteristics of urine for certain disorders which may be mistaken for another:

In the case of the urine of empty fever and hot blood disorder, the colour of the urine is in both cases reddish which may cause one to mistake the one for the other. However, careful observation of the concentration, transparency size of the bubbles will help to arrive at a correct and accurate diagnosis. Similarly in the case of the triple phlegmic disorder and black lymphatic disorder the similarity in colour of the two specimens of urine can cause a wrong diagnosis as both the urine colours are chocolate. Here again, careful observations of other characteristics such as concentration transparency will help to determine the real nature of the disorder.

7. Death Urine**a) Hot Disorder Death Urine:**

Reddish blood like colour

Malaodourous like that of rotten leather

Non-transformation of colour, odour and so forth.

Besides, if the patient does not respond to a hot disorder, diet, regimen, medication, and accessory therapy, the above symptoms will conclude that the disorder will prove fatal and that it is only a matter of time before death occurs.

b) Cold Disorder Death Urine:

Bluish and dilute

Absence of odour

Absence of steam

Absence of albumin
Absence of bubbles
Absence of taste

8. Evil Spirit Urine

To analyse a urine specimen believed to be of an evil spirit disorder is both difficult and ritualistic. The urine is taken in a large container and is marked with the four directions. Nine sections are created on the surface of the urine and they represent the realms of the universe, major professions human beings are involved with and the gods and spirits associated with them and so forth.

Characteristics of an evil spirit urine:

Discoloration
Images
Transformations

appear in the various sectors of the urine. It is important that no movement of urine occurs. If neither discoloration or images appear in the urine, then another method of determination is applied viz. prognostication.

However, this process is more ritualistic and spiritual and only a person with a certain standard of spiritual realisation and aptitude could apply, the method as a form of prognoses.

Basically, urine diagnosis should serve to determine whether a disorder is hot or cold. Pulse analysis should help to localise the disorder further and questioning should help in determining the type of medication to be applied.

Though urine analysis seems well defined and simple, to use it effectively as a method of diagnosis takes years of experience. Not only must one be thoroughly trained in the other methods of diagnosis and have studied the *Four Tantras*, one must develop skill and experience particularly in analysing the urine during the three different stages.

A Compendium of Ways of Knowing

Akya Yongzin Yangchen Gawai Lodro

Homage to Mañjuśri

This text concerns the mind and the ways in which it knows things. By understanding how your mind works and training it properly, you can attain Omniscience and the Full Enlightenment of Buddhahood. You will then be able to liberate from their suffering all sentient beings, that is everyone else with a mind. Homage is therefore made to Mañjuśri who manifests the complete wisdom of the Buddhas.

1. Introductory Discussion

As people have different levels of aptitude, Buddha has taught many different schools of theories to meet their needs. This text is written from the Sāvtrantika point of view. According to it all things validly knowable, that is validly cognisable, are either impermanent or permanent depending on whether or not they have the ability to produce an effect. There are three kinds of impermanent phenomena: those with physical qualities, those with qualities of consciousness and those with neither. The first category has six divisions: sights, sounds, smells, tastes, bodily sensations and objects of thought, plus the cognitive powers of the senses and of the mind corresponding to each of them. The second, phenomena having qualities of consciousness, has three divisions: primary consciousness, secondary mental attitudes and elements, and awareness of consciousness. Impermanent phenomena having neither physical qualities nor those of consciousness include instincts, people's conventional 'I' and so forth.

Something having qualities of consciousness is defined as an impermanent phenomenon of a clear awareness permeating an object. With primary consciousness you are aware merely of the fundamental data of a sight, sound and so forth. With secondary mental attitudes and elements, you become aware of distinctions in such objects, make judgements about them, react to them and so forth. With awareness of consciousness, you know that you have been conscious of something and you experience or feel your reactions to it.

Take the example of seeing a beautiful work of art. With the first type of consciousness you receive its bare visual impression. With the second you identify it as a work of art, judge it to be beautiful, react to it with pleasure and so on.

With the third you are aware of your state of mind and experience or feel your reaction of pleasure.

A consciousness in general is defined as a principal faculty of awareness upon which can be placed the impression of the fundamental data of anything that can be validly cognised. Thus consciousness refers specifically to primary consciousness, and there are six types in connection with the six cognitive powers. Visual consciousness depends on the cognitive power of the eyes to become aware of sights or forms; audial on that of the ears for sounds; olfactory on that of the nose for smells; gustatory on that of the tongue for tastes; tactile on that of the body for sensations or touch; and mental on that of the mind for anything validly knowable.

The objects and power of a particular cognitive faculty, such as that of vision, are known as the two physical bases of that faculty, and thus there are twelve such bases. When the consciousness of that faculty is added to its objects and cognitive power, they are called the three spheres of that faculty, and of these there are eighteen. When a moment of consciousness of a particular faculty, its attendant secondary mental attitudes and elements and awareness of consciousness are grouped together, they are known as conscious phenomena of that faculty or as an instance of its cognition.

Thus there are the cognitive faculties of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thinking. Encompassing all six is your faculty of knowing. Through it you know things or have knowledge of them in a variety of ways. As this faculty is an impermanent phenomenon and since such things are defined as the ability to produce an effect, then in fact what is discussed are the various ever-changing instances of the functioning of this faculty, that is specific instances of various ways of knowing things. To simplify the language of this translation, 'the faculty of knowing', 'knowledge', 'knowing', and 'ways of knowing' are often used interchangeably.

There is much involved in explaining the various ways in which you know things. For instance there is knowledge, which is something that has an object, and then there are its objects. In general, things that have objects are defined as anything impermanent that necessarily possesses or takes an object. Such things may be phenomena having either physical qualities, those of consciousness or neither. An example of the first is all communicating sounds, of the second all cognitions, and of the third everyone's conventional 'I'.

All spoken words *signify* something. Cognitions are always *of* something and a conventional 'I' must *refer* to someone. Thus each of these types of impermanent phenomena is always in conjunction with a specific object. Thus they are things that have objects.

There are definitions, synonyms and divisions of knowing, which is defined as being aware of something. Knowing, cognising, being aware of and having a clear experience of something are all mutually inclusive terms.

For two terms, 'x' and 'y', to be mutually inclusive they must satisfy the eight requirements of congruence: if it is 'x' it is 'y' and if it is 'y' it is 'x'; if it is not 'x' it is not 'y' and if it is not 'y' it is not 'x'; if there is an 'x' there is a 'y' and if there is a 'y' there is an 'x'; and if there is no 'x' there is no 'y' and if there is no 'y' there is no 'x'. Thus if you know something you are aware of it, if you do not know something you are unaware of it, and so forth. The standard example is that if something is impermanent it is the product of causes.

An example of two terms that are not mutually inclusive is a vase and being impermanent. Although if something is a vase it must be impermanent, it is not the case that if it is impermanent it must be a vase, or if not a vase it must be permanent.

The relation, then, between these two is one of pervasion. 'x' is pervasive with 'y' if all instances of 'x' are 'y', although all 'y' need not be 'x'. All vases are impermanent, but all impermanent things are not vases.

When divided there are many aspects. You can know something either with or without apprehending it correctly. Moreover you can know it in seven different ways. In addition there are both valid and invalid ways of knowing, as well as conceptual and non-conceptual ones. There are bare perceptions and inferential understandings, primary consciousness' and secondary mental attitudes and elements, and many such things.

A way of knowing something is said to be either with or without apprehension depending on whether or not through it you discern your object correctly.

When one of your types of consciousness apprehends something correctly, this does not mean that it necessarily comprehends or understands what it is. It merely means that it has grasped its object correctly the way it actually is. If you see a white snow mountain as white, you have apprehended it correctly. If you see it as yellow, you have not.

Of the seven ways of knowing, you can apprehend things correctly only through bare perception, inference or subsequent cognition. With the other four, you know something, but you have not apprehended it correctly the way it is.

Thus if your knowledge of something is presumptive, inattentive, indecisive or distorted, you have not apprehended it correctly.

However, some scholars incorrectly maintain that presumption also is a way of apprehending something because things may be discerned correctly by mere presumption.

You may apprehend something either directly or indirectly. This is determined by whether or not the aspect of the object you apprehend actually dawns on your consciousness.

When you have a bare visual perception of something blue, for instance, you have a direct apprehension of what is blue and an indirect one of what is not blue. When you hear a man speaking in the next room, you directly apprehend the sound of his voice. Although his form does not actually dawn on your visual consciousness, you know indirectly that he is there.

From the 'De-dun yi-kyi mun-sel' (by K'a-dr'ub Je): "Generally speaking, through a valid way of knowing you can apprehend an object both directly and indirectly. Things may be apprehended in either of these ways through bare perception and inference. The first statement is a very rough one, while the second is the Sautrantika position. Or you could say that the second concerns specific instances of bare perception and inference.'

Thus to say that valid ways of knowing, that is bare perception and inference, can apprehend objects both directly and indirectly, is only a rough general statement. It does not mean that they do so simultaneously. Any specific instance of these valid ways of knowing can only apprehend its object either directly or indirectly, one at a time, not both at once. This is how the Sāvtrantikas explain this topic.

'As for how an invalid way of knowing something can nevertheless correctly apprehend its object directly or indirectly, this should be understood in the same way as explained for the valid ones.'

A valid way of knowing something is defined as a fresh, non-fraudulent awareness of it. To say that your knowledge must be fresh in order to be valid precludes the possibility of subsequent cognition being considered a valid means of knowing. Since it must be non-fraudulent, presumption cannot be taken as valid, and since it must be an awareness, the cognitive power of the organ of sight, for instance, cannot be considered as such either.

Even though subsequent cognition is invalid because it is not fresh, this does not, mean that it is fraudulent. Once you have initially inferred or have had a bare perception of an object and thus have apprehended it correctly, your subsequent cognition of it continues to discern it as it is. Therefore in the same manner as these two valid ways of knowing, it too can apprehend its objects both directly and indirectly, although specific instances of subsequent cognition can do so only one way or the other at a time.

The seven ways of knowing something are by presumption, inattentive perception, subsequent cognition, distorted cognition, indecisive wavering, bare perception and inferential understanding.

Of these seven only the last two are valid. Subsequent cognition, bare perception and inferential understanding, however, each apprehend their objects correctly. Distorted cognition is the worst of all since it falsifies what is correct.

2. Presumption

Presumption is defined as a fresh jumping to a correct conclusion through an invalid way of knowing.

Through a valid means such as inference you have a fresh understanding of a correct conclusion. Here, however, you have a fresh reaching of a correct conclusion without really understanding it or knowing why it is true. With presumption, therefore, you merely seem to understand or apprehend something freshly, because what you know is true, but actually your knowledge of it is invalid. You presume it to be true either for no reason, a wrong one, or even a right one but without understanding why it is correct.

There are five kinds of presumption: presuming what is true to be so (1) for no reason, (2) for a contradictory reason, (3) for a non-determining one, (4) for an irrelevant one and (5) for a correct reason, but without knowing why. Examples of each in turn are as follows. The first is the knowledge that sound is impermanent when you reach this conclusion by merely hearing the words, ‘Sound is impermanent’. When to prove this you use lines of reasoning that are contradictory, non-determining or irrelevant, or when you rely on a correct reason—because it is a product of causes—(but are not yet convinced that this proves anything), these are the examples of the other types of presumption by which you can conclude the same.

To understand something by inference depends on a correct line of reasoning. This involves the use of a three-part-logical demonstration such as sound is impermanent because it is the product of causes. This is one of the most commonly used examples in Buddhist logic since it is used to refute the assertion by several non-Buddhist schools that such sounds as the words of certain sacred scriptures are eternal and permanent because they are the revelations of super-empirical truths without any author.

In this case sound is the subject or the basis of the proposition. Being impermanent is what is to be proved about it. These two together are known as the thesis—sound is impermanent. Because it is the product of causes is the line of reasoning or simply the reason used to prove it. The opposite of what is to be proved, in this case being permanent, is what is to be disproved. This and the subject of the proposition taken together form the anti-thesis—sound is permanent. Everything to which what is to be proved applies—all impermanent phenomena—constitutes the analogous set. Everything to which the opposite applies—all permanent phenomena—constitutes the counter-set.

To prove a thesis and disprove its anti-thesis, then, three factors must be established about the line of reasoning: (1) the reason must pertain to or be a property of the subject of the proposition; (2) it must be an exclusive characteristic of the analogous set and (3) it must be a quality never found in the counter-set. These three are known as the factors of agreement, congruence and incongruence.

In the logical demonstration that sound is impermanent because it is a product of causes, the reason—being a product of causes—is (1) a property of sound, (2) an exclusive characteristic of all impermanent phenomena and (3) never a quality of things that are permanent. Thus because (1) sound is a product of causes, (2) impermanent phenomena are the only things that are products and (3) there are no permanent things that are products, you correctly conclude that sound is impermanent with a full understanding of how and why. This is an example of an inferential understanding, a valid way of knowing something to be true that is not obvious by relying on validating reasons.

With presumption, on the other hand, because there is some fault in your line of reasoning you can only presume something to be true, for you do not fully understand why. The last four types of presumption are illustrated as follows.

You conclude that sound is impermanent because you believe it to be non-functional. If something is non-functional, it is not a product of causes

and does not produce any effects. This, however, is the Sāvtrantika definition of permanent phenomena such as space, defined as the absence of anything tangible that impedes motion. The empty space or place that a physical thing occupies does not in any way affect it. Nor is this space created when you remove the object; it was there all the time. Thus it is permanent because it is non-functional. To conclude, however, that sound is impermanent because it is not functional is contradictory to the facts. Examine the three factors. (1) Does being non-functional apply to sound? No, it does not. If you hear a loud noise you may be startled. (2) Is it an exclusive characteristic of the analogous set? On the contrary, there is not one impermanent phenomenon that does not produce an effect, for this is the definition of impermanence. (3) Is it a quality never found among those things in the counter-set? It is not, for all permanent phenomena are defined as being non-functional. Therefore to conclude that sound is impermanent because it is non-functional is a presumption based on a contradictory reason.

You may reach this same conclusion by using the line of reason: because it is something that can be validly known. (1) Can sound be validly known? Yes, it can. This reason satisfies the factor of agreement with the subject of the proposition. (2) Is being validly knowable an exclusive characteristic of the analogous set? On the one hand it is true that all impermanent phenomena may be validly known, but on the other hand everything that can be validly known is not necessarily impermanent. Both permanent and impermanent phenomena can be known in this way. Therefore this fails the test of congruence. (3) Is being validly knowable a quality that never applies to anything in the counter-set? No, everything permanent may be validly known. Therefore this reason fails the test of incongruence as well. Thus to conclude that sound is impermanent because it can be validly known is presumption based on a non-determining reason.

You may also conclude correctly as above, but for the reason that it is something that can be seen by the eye. Being visible, however, (1) is not a quality of sound, (2) is not an exclusive quality of impermanent phenomena and (3) is not a quality never found among those things that are permanent. Everything impermanent is not necessarily visible and some permanent phenomena such as an empty space may be seen indirectly. Therefore to reach the correct conclusion that sound is impermanent because it may be seen by the eye is presumption based on an irrelevant reason.

A correct line of reasoning for concluding that sound is impermanent is because it is a product of causes. However, if you reach this correct conclusion and say it is for this reason, but do not understand what being

the product of causes means or what it has to do with being impermanent, then you have presumed what is true to be so for a correct reason, but without knowing why.

These five may be condensed into two categories: presumption based on either (1) no reason or (2) some reason (that is either incorrect or, if correct, not understood). Most of the understanding you gain from merely hearing something is presumptive knowledge. Therefore it is said that the stream of continuity of such knowledge is unfirm and unstable.

Knowledge may be gained from either hearing, contemplating or meditating. When you merely hear or read a fact, however, if you do not think about it or examine it carefully to understand how and why it is true, you usually can only presume it to be so. Because you have not comprehended it fully, often you cannot remember such factual knowledge. Thus it is said that its stream of continuity is unsteady because often such knowledge does not endure. Another example is uncritical faith, which is a form of respectful belief based on no reason.

3. Inattentive Perception

When you know something through inattentive perception, an objective entity that could be conclusively known appears clearly (to one of your types of consciousness), yet you are unsure that it has. There are three varieties (1) bare sensory and (2) bare mental perception and (3) the bare perception of awareness of consciousness, when any of these has become inattentive.

In general there are four kinds of bare perception: sensory, mental, that of awareness of consciousness and yogic. With these, objective entities may be conclusively known. When through a non-defective sense organ one of your five sensory types of consciousness apprehends an object freshly and correctly, without mixing it with any conceptualisations or ideas, this is bare sensory perception. An example is the first moment of your visual consciousness correctly perceiving the form of a vase. After having such a bare sensory perception and before your mind begins to conceptualise about it, your mental consciousness must first grasp correctly the form of this vase. This is the bare mental perception of a form. It lasts only a very short time. Your initial awareness of such valid cognitions, which allows you later to remember them, is the bare perception of awareness of consciousness. When you have had such bare perceptions, yet are unsure of them or your attention is preoccupied, these are then termed inattentive.

There is no such thing as inattentive yogic perception, since no matter what appears (clearly as its conclusively known object) you are always certain of it (and give it your full attention).

Every sentient being consists of five aggregate physical and mental faculties. All his objects of cognition, including his physical body and its cognitive powers, constitute his aggregate of form. His aggregate of consciousness is his six types of primary consciousness, while his aggregate of recognition and response or feeling are his secondary mental elements performing these two functions. All his other secondary mental attitudes and elements, as well as his instincts, his conventional 'I' and all other such impermanent phenomena lacking either physical qualities or those of consciousness, as well as the permanent phenomena in his mind-stream, are grouped together as his aggregate of compositional factors. Thus this fifth aggregate includes everything else composing his cognitions that is not found in his other four aggregates. His conventional 'I' is the point of reference by which he is known. It accounts for how he and others can label the name 'I' or any name onto his particular collection of aggregate physical and mental faculties

In the Sāūtrantika theories Buddha explained that everyone does have a valid conventional 'I'. However, such an impermanent phenomenon lacks an identity that is (1) permanent and (2) can exist independently and objectively on its own apart from the ever-changing five aggregates for which it is a convenient label. These are known respectively as the coarse and subtle Identity-lessness of the conventional 'I'.

Anyone having a non-conceptual correct apprehension of either of these is called a Noble One or an Ārya. Such a being has in his meditation achieved a union or yoga of mental quiescence and penetrative insight. The former is an exhilarating state of consciousness free from all conceptualisations as well as any mental dullness, agitation or wandering. The latter is a correct apprehension of either coarse or subtle Identity-lessness of the conventional 'I'. In his meditation on Identity-lessness, then, an Ārya has bare perception directly apprehending his impermanent aggregates, the conventional 'I' of which is devoid of a permanent or substantially existing identity. In this way he indirectly apprehends the Identity-lessness of his conventional 'I'. This is known as bare yogic perception and, according to the Sautrantika explanation, it is experienced only by Āryas.

There are five kinds of inattentive sensory perception. Examples of these are an ordinary person's (that is a non-Ārya's) five types of bare sensory perception, from that grasping a form through that grasping a bodily sensation, when his mind is diverted in another direction.

When you are attentively listening to music, you have bare audile perception of its sound. At such a time your sensory perceptions of the picture on the wall in front of you, of the sound of your watch ticking, of the smell or taste of your cigarette and of the feel of your watch on your wrist are all inattentive. Although each of these sensory objects appears clearly to your visual consciousness, your audile and so forth, you cannot be certain that they are there. You take no notice of them because your attention is preoccupied, that is diverted elsewhere.

Another example is the final moment in a particular stream of continuity of any of the five kinds of sensory perception in an ordinary being's mind-stream.

When, for instance, as an ordinary being with non-defective senses, you correctly see a vase, your visual perception of it free of any conceptualisation may last for several moments. The first instant when your knowledge is fresh is your bare perception of the vase, and this is a valid knowing of it. Afterwards, although you still apprehend the vase correctly, your knowledge of it is no longer fresh and thus your subsequent cognition is invalid. During the last instant of the stream of continuity of this particular sense perception, however, you no longer even apprehend the vase correctly. Your attention is about to shift to another object and, like a candle about to go out, your clarity becomes very dim. Although the vase still appears to your visual consciousness, you are not paying full attention to it. This final moment is an example of inattentive visual perception.

The final moment in a particular stream of continuity of any bare mental perception and any bare perception of awareness of consciousness is also inattentive. Even Āryas have this specific type of inattentive mental perception. This is attested to in the 'Tsa-mar rig-pai gyan' (by His Holiness the First Dalai Lama).

Unlike Buddhas, the lower Āryas do not continue to have joint mental quiescence and penetrative insight after they leave their meditation on Identity-lessness. They have bare yogic perception only during such a

meditation period, and it is only this type of bare perception that is never inattentive. During post-meditational periods, therefore, when Āryas have bare mental perception, such as when perceiving the thoughts of others, the final moment of a stream of continuity of any such perception is inattentive. Likewise inattentive is the final moment of a stream of their bare sensory perception.

Examples of inattentive perceptions of awareness of consciousness are, for instance, those experiencing valid inferential understandings in the mind-streams of Cārvākas and Jains, those experiencing distorted perceptions and so forth.

According to the theories of the Cārvākas and the Jains, you cannot know anything validly by inferential understanding. Nevertheless, when adherents of these two non-Buddhist schools see smoke on a mountain, they know there is fire. Although such valid inferential understanding appears clearly in their mind-stream, and although their awareness of consciousness actually experiences this inference, they are not fully aware of it. This is because their mind is preoccupied with their belief that there is no such thing as inference. Thus this perception of their awareness of consciousness is inattentive.

Likewise when you have a distorted perception, such as of a blue snow mountain, and an image of one seems to appear clearly to your visual consciousness—although in fact there is no such thing—your awareness of this perception is also inattentive. Except for that of an Ārya, an ordinary being's awareness of consciousness merely experiences or is aware of a mental state or cognition. It does not understand what this cognition is of or whether or not it is correct. Thus with your awareness of consciousness you merely experience a distorted perception without knowing it is incorrect. However, because your mind is preoccupied with thinking that what you see is truly so, you are not fully aware of your distorted perception. Therefore the cognition of this distorted perception by your awareness of consciousness is inattentive.

Among the Buddhists, all perceptions of the awareness of consciousness in the mind-stream of Vaibhāsikas and the final moment of any stream of continuity of an ordinary being's awareness of consciousness are also inattentive. There are many such examples.

When Buddha taught the Vaibhāsika theories, he did not explain that sentient beings have a mental faculty of awareness of consciousness.

Although adherents of this belief experience their mental states and cognitions through such a faculty, they are not fully aware of it. This is because their mind is preoccupied with their misconception that they have no such faculty. All such perceptions in their mind-stream of awareness of consciousness, therefore, are inattentive.

4. Subsequent Cognition

Subsequent cognition is defined as an awareness through an invalid way of knowing that correctly apprehends what has already been so apprehended. There are three types: those that arise in a stream of continuity of (1) a bare perception, (2) an inferential understanding and (3) those that are neither of these two.

Both permanent and impermanent phenomena may be known validly, the former directly through inferential understanding and the latter through bare perception. Although in general impermanent phenomena change from moment to moment, nevertheless according to the Sāūtrantika explanation they still exist objectively from their own individual stance. Thus once you have apprehended a vase correctly you can subsequently do so again, for although the impermanent vase has changed from moment to moment there is still objectively a vase existing as an external object that can repeatedly be seen correctly.

Your perception of this vase may last several moments and thus it can be said to have an unbroken stream of continuity. Initially you see it with bare perception. As a fresh, non-fraudulent awareness of it, apprehending the vase correctly the way it is, this is a valid way of knowing it. As this vase changes from moment to moment, so does your cognition of it. You may continue to apprehend it correctly, but normally only the first instance of your doing so is valid. This is because only this initial cognition is a fresh awareness.

During the unbroken stream of continuity of your awareness of this vase, each subsequent moment of cognition depends on the immediately preceding one as the immediate condition for its clarity. The initial moment in such a sequence, however, has no such dependency. It is clear by itself and thus only it is truly valid according to the Sāūtrantika explanation. This is because they say that each moment in a sequence exists objectively as first, second and so forth.

Each moment in a Buddha's perception, however, is fresh and valid, without ever relying on the immediately preceding one for its clarity. But for all other beings, including Āryas, each stream of continuity of a cognition having an initial moment that is fresh and valid has subsequent

moments also. In these, what has already been apprehended correctly continues to be so, but through an objectively non-fresh and therefore invalid way of knowing it. Such moments are known as subsequent cognitions.

There are many kinds of subsequent bare perceptions, such as sensory, mental, that of awareness of consciousness, yogic (and that which is none of these four). Examples of each progressively are the second moment (in the stream of continuity following from a specific instance) (1) of any of the five bare sensory perceptions; (2) of a bare extra-sensory mental perception cognising someone else's thoughts; (3) of the bare perception of an awareness of consciousness having continuity and (4) of a bare yogic perception of an Ārya still training for perfection. The second moment (in the stream of continuity following) from a bare perception in general is accepted as a subsequent bare perception not specifically in any of these four categories

A subsequent cognition of an inferential understanding is, for instance, the second moment (that is the next moment) after a fresh and valid one. As for the third type, a subsequent cognition that is neither of a specific bare perception nor of a specific inferential understanding, this would be, for example, (the second moment of) a confirmation to which you have been led by another individual bare perception or inference, and also the second moment in the stream of continuity following from a valid knowing of anything in general.

You hear a buzzing nearby. If later you confirm that there is a mosquito in the room either from having inferred it from the sound or from actually having seen this insect, then the second moment in the stream of continuity of such a confirmation is an example of this third type of subsequent cognition. Also in this category are all cognitions of remembering something, including their first moment.

All these varieties of subsequent cognition may be condensed into two sorts, conceptual and non-conceptual.

Bare perception and inferential understanding are non-conceptual and conceptual respectively. Therefore subsequent cognition of the former is likewise non-conceptual, while that of the latter and that which is neither are both conceptual.

5. Distorted Cognition

Distorted cognition is defined as a way of knowing something that grasps its object in a contrary manner.

Of the five invalid ways of knowing things, inattentive perception and subsequent cognition are not necessarily detrimental to your spiritual progress. The former may lead to a correct and valid cognition and the latter may follow one. For instance, the last moment of your conceptual understanding of Identity-lessness before you have bare yogic perception of it is inattentive, yet leads directly to this beneficial state of mind. Your subsequent yogic perception of Identity-lessness, though invalid since not fresh, nevertheless leads to your full acquaintance with this true way in which all things exist. By developing such familiarity with this correct apprehension in meditation, you will be able when becoming a Buddha to have valid bare perception of it at all times.

Distorted cognition, however, is extremely detrimental to your development. Nevertheless it can have a last instance. If the proper opponents are applied, all such cognitions can be destroyed. A true practitioner feels that delusions and distortions are much easier to overcome than external enemies. This is because he realises that neither bombs nor sophisticated weapons are needed to root them out. By developing the proper opponents in his mind-stream, he can be free of all such obstacles to his Enlightenment.

Distorted cognition may be either conceptual or non-conceptual. The former is defined as an awareness of something by a conceptualising mind that is deceived with respect to what would be its implied object. The definition of the latter is an awareness of something appearing to exist clearly that is deceived with respect to its approach in grasping (such a thing, which in fact does not exist at all). Examples are grasping at any person's or thing's identity, on the one hand, and, on the other, a sensory cognition of what appears to be a blue snow mountain.

All types of conceptual cognition are deceptive in that a mental image is confused with an actual object. 'Not all are distorted. The object that appears to such a cognition is a mental image. What this mental image is of is known as its implied object. In the case of a non-distorted conceptual cognition, such as one of Tibet, for instance, the mental picture you have of this land is the object that appears to your consciousness, while Tibet itself is the implied object. Although your idea of what Tibet is like is not the same as the country itself, nevertheless Tibet is something validly knowable.

In a distorted conceptual cognition, however, such as that of the permanent identity of your conventional 'I', your mental image of such an identity is the object that appears to your consciousness, while this permanent identity itself would be the implied object. But, since your

conventional 'I' has no such thing as an actual permanent identity, this conceptual cognition is deceived with respect to what would be its implied object. As such an implied object does not exist, any conceptual cognition in which a mental image of one appears is distorted.

When you see a white snow mountain as blue, such as through a haze at a great distance or when wearing tinted glasses, or when you see two moons, by looking at the real one cross-eyed, such objects seem to appear clearly to your consciousness. They are not mixed with any mental images. But your non-conceptual cognition of them is distorted. What seems to appear to your consciousness in reality does not exist at all. Your consciousness is approaching such seeming objects in a manner that is deceptive and therefore your cognition is distorted.

From the 'Tsa-ma yi-kyi miin-sel' (by K'a-dr'ub je), 'Distorted conceptual cognition, conceptual distorted cognition and interpolation are allmutrally inclusive terms. An indecisive wavering inclined towards an incorrect conclusion is also a conceptual distorted cognition.'

6. Indecisive Wavering

Indecisive wavering is a secondary mental attitude that fluctuates between two conclusions concerning its object of cognition. There are three varieties: that which is inclined towards (1) a correct conclusion, (2) an incorrect one and (3) that which is evenly balanced between the two. Examples of each in turn are knowing a sound and wondering whether it is impermanent, permanent or one or the other. There are two traditions concerning indecisive wavering. One asserts that any form of it is pervasive with being a root delusion. The other differentiates two kinds, that which is deluded and that which is not.

It is this latter tradition that is commonly followed. Thus an indecisive wavering inclined towards a correct conclusion is not considered a delusion, while those that are inclined towards an incorrect one or are evenly balanced are taken as deluded. A delusion, or moral and mental defilement, is defined as any state of mind that when developed brings about uneasiness and suffering. The six root ones are longing desire, general fearful and angered repulsion, pride and arrogance, ignorance, deluded indecisive wavering and the speculative defilements.

7. Bare Perception

When knowing something, if an objective entity is the object that appears to one of your types of consciousness, this is a bare perception. If it is a metaphysical entity that appears, it is a conceptual cognition.

According to the Sautrantika explanation all validly knowable things are either objective or metaphysical entities. The former are impermanent. They arise collected from, that is dependent on being a product of causes and circumstances, and they have the ability to produce an effect. The latter are all permanent. They arise uncollected from, that is without being a product of causes and circumstances, and they have no ability to produce an effect. Objective entities exist objectively or substantially from their own individual stance and cannot be known by a conceptual cognition through a mental label. On the other hand, metaphysical entities do not exist objectively, yet they do exist inasmuch as they can be known by a conceptual cognition through a mental label.

Included among objective entities are all impermanent phenomena, that is those having physical qualities, those having qualities of consciousness and those having neither such qualities. As ultimate truths they cannot be designated by words. They must be directly perceived and personally experienced in order to be known. You cannot describe in words to someone the difference between the sweetness of sugar and that of chocolate. He can only know it by tasting it directly himself. The same is true of the pleasure and pain of giving birth and what it is like to have suicidal tendencies or the latent talents of a genius. These are all validly knowable objective entities. When they are the object that appears to one of your types of consciousness, you know them through bare perception. What are designated by words, then, are metaphysical entities. Because they are known through verbal conventions, they are called conventional truths. For example, if you have ever given birth, you have an idea of what it feels like based on personal experience. Even if you have never experienced it yourself, you may have an idea of what it is like based on hearsay. You can describe this to someone and then he too will have his own idea. But what has been talked about and come to be known in this case is merely a verbal approximation. It is only an idea of what the experience of giving birth is like, not the actual experience itself. Such an idea is a metaphysical entity and when it appears to your consciousness you know it through a conceptual cognition. The actual experience of giving birth, on the other hand, is an objective entity and can only be known directly through bare perception.

Metaphysical entities such as ideas, then, are permanent in the sense that they are uncollected phenomena incapable of producing any effect. When a woman tells you what it is like to give birth, an idea arises in your mind-stream. Her telling you is the occasion that marks this arising, but unlike actually giving birth, your idea was not the result of a long process of cause and effect. It was not conceived and nurtured over a period of nine months and did not require a special diet and rest or the help of nurses and doctors. It was not collected by any accumulation of causes and circumstances, it merely came about uncollected, as it were. Moreover, your idea of giving birth is incapable of producing any effect. It does not make you exhausted or your muscles ache, nor does it produce something that needs to be fed or have its dirty clothes changed. When this idea is the object that appears to your consciousness, your conceptual cognition of it may make you feel happy, but your idea itself did not produce this effect. This, then, is what it means for a metaphysical entity to be permanent.

Other examples of metaphysical entities are the empty space or place that something occupies and the Identity-lessness of the conventional 'I'. Although such things can be thought about conceptually, an empty space or the Identity-lessness of someone's conventional 'I' can never appear directly as the object of your bare perception. Nevertheless they can be indirectly apprehended by such perception when there directly appears to one of your types of consciousness what occupies this space or the five aggregates that are known in terms of the conventional 'I' that is void of this permanent identity. In this instance your bare perception directly apprehends the object that appears to it, an objective entity. The metaphysical entity that it apprehends indirectly is also considered its conclusively known object, but it is not an object that appears to this bare perception. If a metaphysical entity actually appears to your consciousness, then it is through a conceptual cognition that you know it.

Bare perception is defined as a non-deceptive awareness of something devoid of any conceptual cognition. There are four types: sensory, mental, that of awareness of consciousness and bare yogic perception.

As these four are non-deceptive, it is important first to know the causes for deception of which they are free.

The four causes for (a cognition to be) deceptive are (1) the cognitive organ upon which it relies, (2) its object, (3) the situation in which it occurs and (4) its immediate condition.

(1) A cognition may be deceptive through reliance on a defective sense organ. If you are cross-eyed you will see two moons. (2) If the object of your cognition is moving very quickly, such as a torch being whirled around in the dark, you may be deceived into seeing a ring of fire. (3) If you look out from a moving train, you may see trees approaching and rapidly receding. (4) If immediately before looking at something your mind is violently disturbed by anger you may see red or, with paranoia, threatening figures when no one is there. Bare perceptions are not affected by any such causes for deception.

Bare sensory perception arises from the cognitive power of one of the physical senses as its main condition. There are five types, from that which takes a visible form (as its object) to that which takes a bodily sensation.

Thus there are bare sensory perceptions of sights, sounds, smells, tastes and bodily sensations or touch.

Each of these perceptions can have initial and valid, subsequent or inattentive moments.

When you see a vase non-deceptively and without conceptualising about it, the first moment is your valid bare perception of it. From the second instant you have subsequent visual perception, while the last moment is inattentive. Seeing this vase while listening intently to music is also an example of an inattentive visual perception.

When a bare perception arises dependent on the cognitive power of the mind as its main condition, this is a bare mental perception. There are five kinds, such as that which takes a visible form (as its object) and so forth.

When you remember, imagine or dream about a sight, sound, smell, taste or touch, the object of your cognition is an idea or mental image of these sense objects. In these cases you know a metaphysical entity by a conceptual cognition. However with bare perception you are aware of an objective entity, one of these five actual types of sense objects, through the cognitive power of your mind without any conceptual cognition of it. You have such bare mental perception of a vase, for instance, immediately after your visual perception of it and just prior to conceptualising about it. The stream of its continuity lasts only a very short time.

The bare perception of awareness of consciousness is the non-deceptive experience of a conscious phenomenon free of any conceptual cognitions about it. Both of these, (mental perception and that of awareness of consciousness), can have three varieties, that is an initial valid cognition, (a subsequent and an inattentive one), in the same way as was explained above (concerning sensory perception).

Bare yogic perception is that which arises in the mind-stream of an Ārya (during his meditation session on Identity-lessness) having as its main condition the force of his single-minded meditation in a joint state of mental quiescence and penetrative insight.

As explained previously, bare yogic perception has only initial valid and subsequent moments. It never is inattentive. However when an Ārya is not meditating on the Identity-lessness of his conventional 'I', he may have initial valid, subsequent and inattentive moments of sensory or mental perception or that of awareness of consciousness.

When divided from the point of view of its basis, (that is who experiences it), there are the bare yogic perceptions of Srāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Mahāyāna Āryas.

Both Srāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas work for their own personal Liberation from rebirth with suffering in samsara. The former rely on a teacher throughout their entire training, while the latter during the final stages do not. Bodhisattvas, on the other hand, work to achieve the Full Enlightenment of Buddhahood in order to be able to liberate all others. According to the Sāūtrantika explanation, when any of these three achieve bare yogic perception of the Identitylessness of his conventional 'I', he becomes an Ārya either of the Srāvaka, Pratyeka-buddha or Bodhisattva, that is the Mahāyāna class according to his motivation and style of practice.

From the point of view of its nature, each of these three has its bare yogic perception of the path of seeing, meditation and perfection.

Srāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas each progress to their goals through a five-fold path. When they have developed as their motivation a pure renunciation of the suffering of samsara and its causes, Srāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas enter their first path. Bodhisattvas enter theirs when in addition they develop a pure motivation of Bodhicitta, that is an Enlightened Motive of working to become a Buddha for the sake of all sentient beings.

Although their motivations and goals are different, and thus from this point of view their paths are also different, nevertheless according to the Sāūtrantikas each of these three follow similar practices on each of their five paths and develop the same wisdom.

On the first path, then, that of accumulation, they develop single-minded concentration in mental quiescence meditation. On the second, the path of preparation, they gain conceptual cognition of the Identity-lessness of their conventional 'I', that is valid inferential understanding of this, in penetrative insight meditation. On the third, the path of seeing, they gain a bare yogic perception of this Identity-lessness in their meditation state and become Āryas of their respective classes.

On the fourth path, that of meditation, they follow the Eightfold Path of the Āryas to overcome the obstacles preventing either their Liberation or Omniscience. They achieve these goals on the last path, that of perfection, when Srāvakas and Pratyekabuddha Āryas overcome the former and become Arhats of each of these classes and Bodhisattva Āryas surmount both obstacles and become Buddhas. As Omniscient Buddhas they perceive the Identitylessness of their conventional 'I' at all times.

From the point of view of its object, there are bare yogic perceptions of what things are and what they are like.

With bare yogic perception you can apprehend things either directly or indirectly. Directly, you can apprehend the object that appears to it. This is an objective entity, what a thing is, which by definition is an ultimate truth. What it apprehends indirectly does not actually appear to it. It is a metaphysical entity, what a thing is like, and as such is a conventional truth. Thus with bare yogic perception you directly apprehend the ultimate truth of your five impermanent aggregate physical and mental faculties which are known in terms of a conventional 'I' lacking a permanent or substantially existing identity. Indirectly, you apprehend the conventional truth of this permanent Identity-lessness of your conventional I. Thus directly you apprehend what you are and indirectly how you exist.

8. Seemingly Bare Perception or Deceptive Cognition

The opposite (of bare perception) is seemingly bare perception.

This is mutually inclusive with deceptive cognition and is defined as an awareness that is deceived with respect to the object that appears to it. It

takes the appearance of something to be the actual thing itself. Distorted cognition, on the other hand, is deceived with respect to what actually exists, not merely with its appearance.

Both deceptive and distorted cognitions may be conceptual or non-conceptual. In a conceptual cognition the object that appears or the object grasped in a metaphysical entity, namely a mental image or idea, such as that of a vase. Its implied object is the vase itself, an objective entity. Conceptual cognitions are deceptive inasmuch as they confuse an appearance with the actuality it implies, such as the mental image of a vase with an actual vase. If what would be the implied object of a conceptual cognition is non-existent, then it is not only deceptive, but distorted as well. An example is one in which the mental picture of a rabbit's horn is confused with an actual rabbit's horn, although there is no such thing. Although all conceptual cognitions are deceptive, not all are distorted. In fact, some of them, such as inferential understandings, are valid cognitions inasmuch as they are an initial non-fraudulent awareness of the object that appears to them. Thus because such a cognition correctly and freshly apprehends its object, the mental image of a vase, it is valid and in this respect not fraudulent. But because it confuses it with an actual vase, it is deceptive.

In a non-conceptual valid bare perception directly apprehending a vase, for instance, the object that appears or is grasped is the vase itself, an objective entity. There is no implied object. However, when a near-sighted person looks at this vase, he sees a blurred object and thus has only non-conceptual seemingly bare perception. Relying on a defective sense organ, his perception is deceived because it confuses the object that seemingly appears to it, a blurred vase, with what is actually there, a vase. It is distorted as well because there is no such thing as an actual blurred vase. It is non-conceptual because it does not mix the blurred vase that seemingly appears to it with a mental image of one.

There are seven types of seemingly bare perception, six conceptual and one non-conceptual.

Included are (1) those that are totally deceptive, (2) those of conventional truths, (3) those of valid inferential understandings, (4) those derived from such inferential understandings, (5) those of remembering something and (5) those of speculating about something. There is also (7) the type of seemingly bare perception that is blurred.

(1) Conceptual cognition that is totally deceptive is distorted as well. It is the conceptual seemingly bare perception of anything distorted, such

as the idea that sound is permanent. Also included in this category are ordinary people's dreams and fantasies which confuse fiction with reality.

(2) Conceptual cognition of a conventional truth is not distorted. It is a correct apprehension of a metaphysical entity, such as the impermanence of sound or the idea of a vase. It is deceptive in that it mixes this metaphysical entity with an objective one, an actual impermanent sound or an actual vase. It thus superimposes a conventional truth onto an ultimate one.

(3) All inferential understandings are conceptual cognitions in which you know something obscure and not readily obvious by relying on a valid line of reasoning. They are deceptive because they confuse the object that appears to them with their implied object. For instance, you can validly know that sound is impermanent by relying on the reason: because it is a product of causes. You correctly reach this conclusion because the three factors of agreement, congruence and incongruence are satisfied. Being a product of causes is a property of sound, an exclusive characteristic of impermanent phenomena and never a quality of anything permanent. Your conceptual inference, then, has these three factors as the object that appears to it. Although it is valid, it is deceptive because it mixes this with its implied object, the correct conclusion that sound is impermanent. Thus when knowing the three validating factors you say you know the conclusion. A Buddha would not need to rely on such a conceptual cognition of an inferential understanding to know the impermanence of sound. When having a bare audial perception directly apprehending a sound, he would indirectly apprehend its impermanence without any use of logic.

Another example of this third type of conceptual cognition is knowing an effect and saying that you know its cause, such as feeling the warmth of the rays of the sun and knowing by inference that the sun is hot. Also included is giving the name of an effect to its cause, such as calling a Buddha a Compassionate One. In this case you are mixing the effect of being a Buddha, that one is compassionate, with its cause, that one is a Buddha. Another example is thinking of sound as being the product of causes, which also mixes an effect with its cause.

(4) Conceptual cognitions derived from inferential understandings are your subsequent cognitions of what you have already apprehended correctly through inference. An example is your conceptual knowledge that sound is impermanent, gained after inferring this from the three validating factors.

(5) A conceptual cognition of remembering something in the past mixes a mental image with the original event or object.

(6) One of speculating about something in the future, or about what might have been if things were different, confuses a plan or an idea with the actuality of the present moment. Thus all six of these types of conceptual cognition are deceptive since they mix the object that appears to them with their implied object.

(7) Anon-conceptual seemingly bare perception of a blurred object is also deceptive because what appears to it in actuality is not so.

(From the 'Pramanasamuccaya' by Dignaga,) 'As has been explained, the first six are conceptual seemingly bare perceptions, while the last, a blurred knowing of something, is a non-conceptual seemingly bare perception.' For a detailed explanation of the meaning of all these terms, you should refer to such texts as the 'Tsa-ma rig-gyan' (by His Holiness the First Dalai Lama). However it should be noted that non-conceptual seemingly bare perception, the type of knowing in which something not present seems clearly to be so and non-conceptual distorted cognition are all three mutually inclusive.

Conceptual cognition is the awareness of something by a conceptualising mind in which what is grasped is mixed with an idea based on either hearsay or first-hand experience.

If you wish to specify something precisely so that it will not be confused with anything else, you would say that it is what is left over after you have excluded or eliminated everything it is not. A mango is not an orange, a peach, an apricot, a cantaloupe and so forth. These are all non-mangoes. When you exclude all the things that a mango is not, then what you are left with is the opposite of a non-mango, namely a mango itself. This is called the double negative of a mango and every permanent and impermanent phenomenon can be individually specified by its own double negative.

An idea of a mango is the mental picture or image you have of one based on the exclusion of everything it is not and which you use for conceptually thinking about one. You can have a mental picture of a specific mango or of mangoes in general, and it can be of its shape, smell, taste and so forth. If you have actually seen or eaten one, then your idea of a mango is based on first-hand experience. If you have not, then you may have an idea based on hearsay or merely on the word 'mango' itself.

Double negatives, mental images and all sorts of ideas are metaphysical entities. They are permanent phenomena incapable of producing any effect. Thinking about your mental picture of a mango may make you hungry, but your idea of the fruit cannot fill your stomach. When you have bare visual perception of a mango, you see merely the mango itself, an objective entity. When you have conceptual cognition of it with your mind, you mix

this objective entity with your idea of it. This is why it is deceptive, because the object that appears to such a cognition—an idea—and its implied object—the mango itself—are mixed together or superimposed one on the other.

Buddhas do not have conceptual cognition. Ideas or mental images do not exist in their mind-stream, although they are able to perceive such metaphysical entities cognised by others. When they were sentient beings an idea of a mango may have become existent in their mind stream occasioned by their first hearing about or eating one. While this idea was present it was permanent in the sense that it could not produce any effect. When they became Enlightened it disappeared and became totally non-existent. Buddhas, then, know everything through bare perception, either directly or indirectly.

There are two types of conceptual cognition, those that conform to reality and those that do not.

Conceptually thinking about a vase in terms of an idea of one is undistorted and conforms with reality. This is true also of your conceptual cognition of Identity-lessness arising From inference. Your mental image of the Identity-lessness of your conventional 'I' corresponds to its actual Identity-lessness. But your conceptual cognition of a rabbit's horn, a permanent sound or the permanent identity of your conventional 'I', on the other hand, is distorted in that it does not conform to reality.

There are many other ways of classifying conceptual cognitions. There are those that involve semantics and those that involve descriptions.

(1) In a conceptual cognition involving semantics you know the definition of something and take it for that which is being defined. An example is thinking this object with a fat belly, an indented flat base and from which I can pour water is a vase or a pitcher. (2) In one involving descriptions you know a quality or characteristic of something and take it for that which has this quality, such as thinking this blue porcelain object is a vase or that thing over there holding a stick is a man.

The conceptual cognition that mixes an actual vase with the idea of something having a fat belly, an indented flat base and from which water can be poured is one that involves both semantics and descriptions. This is because having a fat belly and so forth is both the definition and a qualitative description of a vase or a pitcher. But not all such cognitions involving descriptions necessarily involve semantics as well. An idea of a

blue porcelain object can be applied when thinking conceptually about a vase, a bathtub or many such things and is not the definition of any of them.

There are conceptual cognitions that rely on labels, those that interpolate extra descriptive qualities and those that involve descriptive qualities that are not obvious.

(1) In conceptual cognitions that rely on labels you know something through its mental label. For instance, you know the four-legged animal with a great hump of flesh on its neck through the label 'brahmin bull' or your five aggregates through the label of your conventional 'I'. Thus when your stomach is empty you think 'I am hungry', mixing your idea of an 'I' with your aggregates of form, feeling and so forth.

(2) The Tibetan word for interpolation literally means tying a feather to a bamboo arrow. Thus in an interpolated conceptual cognition you tie or superimpose an idea of some extra descriptive quality onto an object that is not qualified by it. For instance you may think of sound as something permanent or your conventional 'I' as having a permanent identity. As these qualities do not apply to what you are ascribing them, such thoughts are conceptual distorted cognitions as well.

The opposite of interpolation is repudiation. With it you deny qualities of an object that pertain to it. Thus instead of thinking of sound as permanent, you would deny that it is impermanent. Interpolation and repudiation prevent you from cognising a middle path of the actuality of things.

(3) In a conceptual cognition involving a descriptive quality that is not obvious, you mix an object with one of its obscure attributes that you have not apprehended directly through bare perception. For instance, if there is a man hiding behind a house and you have not seen him, but someone tells you he is there, you come to know something that is not obvious when you look at the house. Likewise when you gain a conceptual understanding from inference that sound is impermanent or that your conventional 'I' lacks a permanent and substantially existing identity, you also know something that is not directly obvious to your bare perception. In such a conceptual cognition you mix an idea of an obscure quality, such as impermanence, with an object qualified by it, such as sound.

In addition there are the conceptual cognitions that arise from hearing, contemplating and meditating. Examples of these in turn are as follows. The first is your conceptual awareness of something in which you grasp at it merely with

an idea, based on hearsay, of what it might mean. The second is your confident conceptual understanding of it gained from having contemplated or thought about its meaning. The third is the awareness you gain of it with your conceptualising mind when, having familiarised yourself thoroughly with its meaning as you have understood it through contemplation, you then focus on it with the force of the higher attainments of meditative concentration.

Your Guru tells you about the Identitylessness of your conventional 'I'. Based merely on the teachings you have heard, you now have an idea of what this means based on hearsay. When conceptually you are aware of Identity-lessness in terms of such an idea alone, then you have the conceptual cognition of it that arises from hearing. This is also an example of presuming something true to be so for a correct reason, but without knowing why.

When you have contemplated the meaning of what you have heard through the use of valid logical arguments such as inference, you will gain a confident conceptual or intellectual understanding of what Identitylessness means. You will then have the conceptual cognition of it that arises from contemplation.

Through repeated inference you will gain a thorough familiarity with the meaning of Identitylessness. When you have achieved a state of mental quiescence and the higher attainments of meditative concentration, you can then focus your single-minded concentration in meditation on your fully confident and familiar conceptual understanding. This will then be the conceptual cognition of Identity-lessness that arises from meditation.

If in addition to the collection of insight you have accumulated from such meditational practice as this, you have also built up a vast collection of merit from having done many virtuous deeds with pure motivation over a long period of time, you will then as a result achieve bare yogic perception. This comes about not mystically through a leap of faith, but simply through a process of cause and effect. Your single-minded concentration on your conceptual understanding that the conventional 'I' by which your five aggregates are validly known lacks a permanent substantially existing identity will then automatically become a bare yogic perception. Thus single-mindedly and non-conceptually you will directly apprehend your impermanent aggregates void of a conventional 'I' having such an identity and indirectly its Identity-lessness. With this achievement, you become an Ārya, a Noble One.

9. Valid Ways of Knowing According to Other Systems

There have been various distorted conceptual cognitions regarding how many distinct valid ways of knowing there are. These discrepancies have arisen as follows. The Cārvākas and Jains accept only one valid way of knowing something, namely through bare perception.

In not accepting inferential understanding as valid, the Cārvākas and Jains assert that you can only know things that are obvious. If you cannot directly see something or hear it and so forth, they say you cannot know it.

The Sāmkhyas assert that there are three valid ways: bare perception, inferential understanding and knowing something through verbal indication.

When you understand what someone means by what he says or you learn something that is true by reading it in a text of scriptural authority or hearing it explained by someone trustworthy, you have known something by a verbal indication. The Sautrāntikas classify such knowledge under inferential understanding, but the Sāmkhyas and many other non-Buddhist schools classify this as a separate valid means of knowing.

Included in this category is not only the knowledge of what someone means when you hear him speaking in the next room, for instance, but also knowing that he is there. However, according to the Buddhist explanation of the Sautrāntikas, you can apprehend such knowledge indirectly when you have, bare audial perception of his voice.

The Nyāyas and Vaiśeṣikas accept four, adding to these three knowing something by analogy.

You have never seen a zebra. You go to a zoo and someone points out a mule and says a zebra looks like that but has black and white stripes. Then later you actually see an animal that fits this description. When you identify it as a zebra, and thus correctly match an object with its name, you have known this through analogy.

Through such means, then, you can come to know something you cannot perceive directly by thinking of it in terms of an analogy with something more obvious. Thus by the analogy of a hairy elephant you know what a mammoth is.

Some of the Mimāṃsakas say there are definitely only six valid ways of knowing, adding to these four knowing something by implication and knowing the absence of something.

The fat man Devadatta does not eat during the days because Devadatta is fat and because people must eat in order to be fat and can do so during either the day or the night, you know by implication or disjunctive reasoning that Devadatta must eat at night. Another example is you know someone is in your two-room house, but you do not see him in the front room. By implication or process of elimination you know he must be in the back one.

There are four types of absences: prior, disintegrated, mutually exclusive and absolute. The Mimāṃsakas say that there is a separate means of cognition for validly knowing such absences. For instance, when you see milk you can know of the prior absence of yoghurt in it, that is the yoghurt's not yet being in the milk before it has curdled. Later when you see the yoghurt you know of the disintegrated absence of the milk in it, for once it has curdled the milk is no longer there. When you know of the mutually exclusive absence of a horse in a bull, you see that a bull is not a horse and a horse could not be a bull for these two are mutually exclusive. When you see a rabbit's head and know of the absolute absence of a rabbit's horn on it, you know of the absence of something that does not exist. Although you might fantasise and see a mental image of a goat's horn on a rabbit's head, you cannot possibly imagine a rabbit's horn there, because there is no such thing.

However, the Cārika School of the Mimāṃsakas say that the number of distinct valid ways of knowing is definitely eleven. To the above six they add knowing something by synthetic reasoning, non-perception, tradition, inclusion and coincidence.

With valid inferential understanding you use analytic reasoning to infer the cause from an effect, for instance where there is smoke there must be fire. The reverse of this is to know something by synthetic reasoning, which is to deduce the effect from a cause. An example is where there is fire there must be smoke. With the former, then, you reason backwards from an effect to its cause; with the latter you reason forwards from a cause to its effect.

If you do not perceive something when if it were there you would, then you know by non-perception that it is not there. For instance, you

can know of the absence of horns on a rabbit's head by your non-perception of them, because if they were there you would surely see them. This is different from simply knowing the absolute absence of a rabbit's horns, where you know something because of the absence of an object. Here you know something because of the absence of a valid means of cognising it.

When you know something by tradition, you believe something to be true because everyone else does. An example is knowing that a certain tree contains a spirit because all your ancestors and everyone in your community believe it does. Also you know by tradition to shake hands with your right hand, and to feed a cold and starve a fever.

When you know something by inclusion, you know about the individuals included in a group by knowing about the group itself. An example is knowing that there are at least ten people in the classroom when you are sure there are fifty, or that a certain person is Japanese because you know he is a member of a Japanese delegation to a conference.

If for no apparent reason you have an intuitional feeling that your mother will visit you today and she actually does, then you knew she was coming by coincidence. Although such cognitions do occur, they are unreliable and usually a form of wishful thinking. It is by coincidence that they are true, because more often than not, unless you have achieved the higher attainments of meditative concentration, your expectations or predictions are false.

From the point of view of this text, however, that of the Sautrantikas, it is certain that there are only two (distinct, valid ways of knowing), bare perception and inferential understanding.

The reason there are only these two is because there are only two kinds of validly knowable or validly cognisable things—objective and metaphysical entities. These two are mutually inclusive terms for impermanent and permanent phenomena. The former are objects that are obvious and can be apprehended directly through bare perception. The latter are either obscure, such as the impermanence of sound, or extremely obscure, such as the fact that wealth is the result of generosity practised during previous lives. Such things cannot be apprehended directly through bare perception, although by Āryas they may be indirectly so perceived. Ordinary people know them through inference and thus it is necessary for there to be only two distinct valid ways of knowing. To differentiate more as separate methods is superfluous.

A valid way of knowing something, then, is defined as a fresh, non-fraudulent awareness of it. There are two kinds, bare perception and inferential understanding. Divided differently, there are valid ways of knowing that it either is or is not self-evident what something is. From the point of view of etymology, there are valid persons, speech and cognition.

You may know something validly by relying on either valid persons, speech or cognition. A valid person is a Buddha. Valid speech is his teachings, such as those in the first turning of the wheel of Dharma concerning the Four Noble Truths and those in the second, the ‘Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras’. The Four Noble Truths are of suffering, its cause, its cessation and the path leading to this. The ‘Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras’ concern the hidden meaning of Voidness within the context of the widespread action teachings of the Enlightened Motive and also the stages and paths to Enlightenment. Reliance on such persons or speech will lead you to valid knowledge. You will attain this as well through the valid cognitions of bare perception and inferential understanding.

These three types of knowledge are valid in the sense that they arise from valid sources. But since your cognition of what Buddha has said may be presumptive or inattentive, these are said to be valid only in an etymological sense and not in an actual one.

10. Inferential Understanding

Inferential understanding is the comprehension of something obscure through reliance on a valid line of reasoning. It is explained that there are three types: those based on (1) the actual powers of logic, (2) popular convention and (3) conviction.

(1) To know directly something obscure and not readily obvious, you must rely on the valid support of either logic, convention or conviction. For instance, when your neighbour is making a great deal of noise you may become annoyed and impatient because it is not obvious that sound is impermanent. However if you rely on the actual powers of logic you can prove to yourself that this noise will pass simply because it is man-made. To do so you must rely on the three factors of agreement, congruence and incongruence. This noise was made by a man; everything man-made must pass; and nothing man-made has endured forever. Therefore through this first type of inferential understanding you can be certain that this noise will also pass. With such valid knowledge you can then control your anger.

(2) just as Westerners have traditionally seen a ‘man in the moon’ when looking at its craters, Indians have seen a ‘rabbit in the moon’. When in Sanskrit and Tibetan literature you read about ‘that which has a rabbit’, these words do not refer to their obvious, literal meaning. You know that such a literary allusion refers to the moon through an inferential understanding based on a popular convention. In Western literature you know that a man’s best friend is his dog through a similar valid means. This is also the method by which you know what any word means when you hear it, for all words are popular conventions.

(3) There are certain things that are extremely obscure and only when you become a Buddha can you have bare perception of them. Before that you must rely on your conviction in the Buddhas’ scriptural texts to know them at all. Since Buddhas are valid persons and what they have said is valid speech, you can infer that by relying on them you will have valid cognition. Thus through an inferential understanding based on conviction, you can be sure that prosperity is the result of previously practised generosity.

(1) Inferential understanding and (2) such an understanding as a valid means of knowing something are to be taken as mutually inclusive.

Therefore all inferential understandings relying on correct lines of reasoning are valid.

11. Validly Knowing That It either Is or Is Not Self-evident What Something Is

If when validly cognising something validly knowable you are certain that you could not have grasped what this object is unless its meaning were established on it, then you have validly known that it is self-evident what this object is. If, however, you realise that you will have to resort to an additional valid cognition in order to be certain of this, then you have validly known that it is not self-evident what this object is.

You see something red in the distance. It is self-evident that if it were not red you could not see it as red. However from where you are standing you cannot tell for certain whether it is a fire or a red cloth. In the words of the definition, it is not self-evident that if it were not a fire you could not see it as one. Therefore when you see this red object and realise that it is red, but you will need to have a closer look before you can be certain that it is a fire, then you have validly known that it is self-evident that this object is red, but not that it is a fire.

Another example is seeing a tree at a distance. That it is a tree is self-evident, but not that it is an oak. Only when you come closer will this also become self-evident.

If it is a valid way of knowing that it is self-evident what something is, then it must be one of the following five, either (1) a valid bare perception of awareness of consciousness, (2) a valid bare yogic perception, or (3) a valid inferential understanding. Or it must be a valid bare sensory perception either (4) of the manifestation of something's ability to produce an effect or (5) of something the meaning of which is totally familiar to you.

(1) When your faculty of awareness of consciousness has fresh valid bare perception of a state of consciousness, what it is aware of is self-evident to it. No further cognition is necessary. (2) The same is true of valid bare yogic perception cognising the Identitylessness of your conventional 'I'. If what was apprehended by such perception were not self-evident to it, you could not have apprehended it at all.

(3) With valid inferential understanding your each a correct conclusion horn a valid line of reasoning. Nothing further is required to know this conclusion, therefore it is self-evident what it is.

(4) When you have bare sensory perception of the manifestation of something's ability to produce an effect, such as a fire's consumption of fuel, you are directly perceiving what is happening. If it required another cognition to know what it was you were perceiving, then you could not say you were actually witnessing the manifestation of such an effect. You would riot know specifically what you were perceiving at all.

(5) If you have seen your friend's son every day and are totally familiar with him, then whenever you have valid bare sensory perception of him, even at a distance, it is self-evident that he is the son of your friend. If you are a master repairman, then whenever you see a broken appliance you know immediately what is wrong and how to repair it. Because of your complete familiarity, this is self-evident to you without the need of further cognition.

From the point of view of its etymology, there are three types of valid ways of knowing that it is not self-evident what something is. These are bare perception of something (1) for the first time in your life, (2) when your mind is distracted and (3) that is affected by a cause for deception.

(1) When you see an utpala lotus for the first time, it is self-evident that it is a blue flower, but not what specific kind it is. To realise when you see this that you will need further information and cognition to identify it is this first type of knowing that something is not self-evident.

(2) The second type occurs, for instance, when someone says something to you while you are engrossed in thinking about something else. Aware that you have heard something, you realise that it will have to be repeated for it to become self-evident what has been said. Such valid cognition often occurs with inattentive perception.

(3) When you see a mirage of water in a desert and realise that you will need to have a closer look to be certain what you have seen, this is an example of knowing that something is not self-evident when your perception is affected by a cause for deception.

These last two types of cognition are valid in the sense that with them you realise that what you are perceiving is not self-evident. But because the cognitions themselves are inattentive or distorted, they are valid only in an etymological sense and not in an actual one.

There are further classifications such as a valid way of knowing that (1) what something appears to be is self-evident, but what it is in fact is not, (2) what something is in general is self-evident, but what it is specifically is not, and (3) it is not self-evident whether anything has even appeared to you. Although such varieties have been explained, it is important to differentiate which are actually valid ways of knowing something and which are merely called valid.

(1) An example of this first type is seeing something red in the distance. What appears to your bare sensory perception, a red colour, is self-evidently red, but that this is in fact a fire is not self-evident.

(2) The second is seeing a tree in the distance. What it is in general, a tree, is self-evident. To know specifically that it is an oak, you will have to go closer.

(3) You see a man on a hill out of the corner of your eye. Unsure if you actually have seen a man, you realise you will have to look at the hill more carefully to be certain. This is an example of the third type. Another one is seeing someone and, wondering if you have ever seen him before, realising that you will need to have another look to be sure.

These first two are actual valid ways of knowing something. But knowing that it is not self-evident whether anything has even appeared to you is only called valid. In actuality it is inattentive or may even be distorted.

In general, knowing that it is not self-evident what something is a valid knowing of something, but specific instances of it may not necessarily be considered a valid way of knowing. Detailed precision is needed here.

Thus you may invalidly know something, such as a mirage, but validly realise you will have to look at it again to be certain what it is. This is valid from the point of view of correctly knowing that something is not self-evident. But because it is based on a distorted cognition, this cannot actually be considered valid.

12. Objects of Cognition

There are four types of objects that can be known: (1) those that appear, (2) those that are grasped, (3) implied and (4) conclusively known objects. Objects that appear to one of your types of consciousness are mutually inclusive with those that are grasped. Except for such (sensory cognitions) as the false feeling of hair falling, which does not depend on an external object, all cognitions have an object that appears to them.

In general, cognitions may be divided into sensory and mental. Each of these include valid and invalid cognitions, correct apprehensions and distortions. Sensory cognitions are never conceptual. They may be either valid bare perceptions or subsequent, inattentive or distorted ones. When they are distorted, such as those of a person with cataract who has the false feeling of hair falling over his eyes, there is no actual object that appears or is grasped by his sensory consciousness. There only seems to be one. This is because there is no external object as hair actually falling over his eyes.

All other types of sensory, as well as every mental cognition, have an object that appears to them. What appears to a non-distorted sensory cognition and to a non-conceptual mental one is an objective entity, such as a vase. The object that appears to a conceptual mental cognition is a metaphysical entity, such as a mental image or an idea of a vase. These, then, are the objects that are grasped by the consciousness of that cognition.

Implied objects are an exclusive phenomenon of conceptual cognition. Every such cognition that conforms to reality has one.

The object that appears to a conceptual cognition, then, is a mental image such as an idea of a vase. The implied object is what this is a mental picture of, in this case an actual objective vase. Conceptual cognitions that do not conform to reality, such as one of a rabbit's horn, are distorted. Although an image of such a horn is the object that appears to such mental consciousness, there is no implied object since in fact there is no such thing as a rabbit's horn.

A conclusively known object is what is known at and as the conclusion of a valid way of knowing. All such ways of knowing and all persons with such valid knowledge have this type of object.

To the valid bare perception of a vase, the object that appears is an actual objective vase. This is directly apprehended and is the object conclusively known. Although the vase continues to be the object the appears to subsequent bare perception, it can no longer be considered conclusively or validly known. It still appears to inattentive perception as well, but it is no longer self-evident what it is because your mind is distracted. Whether or i of you realise it is not self-evident is another matter altogether. In none of these cases, however, is there an implied object because bare perception, whether valid, subsequent or inattentive, is always non-conceptual.

In the valid bare yogic perception which directly apprehends your five aggregates, known in terms of a conventional 'I' void of a permanent identity, and indirectly apprehends its Identity-lessness, your five aggregates so qualified are the object that appears, while Identity-lessness is not such an object. However, the aggregates so qualified and Identitylessness are both objects that are conclusively known. In subsequent yogic perception they are no longer conclusively or validly known, but are still correctly apprehended.

In the non-conceptual distorted perception of a blue snow mountain, there only seems to be an object that appears to your visual consciousness. But because there is no such thing as a blue snow mountain, there is no actual object that appears. There is no implied object either and nothing is conclusively known. Such cognition has arisen without direct reliance on an external material object or objective condition. It is distorted because there is a fault in its manner of grasping at an object, as well as deceptive because it is mistaken with respect to what seems to appear to it.

When you see an object and conclude it is a vase because it has a fat belly, a flat indented base and can be used to pour water, the first instance of such knowledge is a valid inferential understanding based on popular convention and also a conceptual cognition based on semantics. What

appears to such a conceptual cognition is the mental picture or label of a vase, and this is what is directly apprehended. The vase itself is the implied object and is apprehended only indirectly. As a result of this inference what you conclusively know is the vase itself. You have known it through the label 'vase', but it is not this label that you conclusively know. Such valid cognition must be considered deceptive, however, because what appears to it is mixed with an implied object. In subsequent moments of such inferential understanding, the actual vase will no longer be conclusively known and the cognition will no longer be valid since it is not fresh. Everything else about it as described above will remain the same.

Although the object that appears to a conceptual cognition must be a metaphysical entity, it is not always the case that the implied object must be an objective one. For instance, in the valid inferential understanding of an empty space, a mental image of an empty space appears and is directly apprehended. The actual empty space, itself a metaphysical entity, is the implied object indirectly apprehended and conclusively known. Such cognition is still deceptive for the same reason as the one of the vase.

In the distorted conceptual cognition of a blue snow mountain, the mental picture of such a mountain appears to your mental consciousness. A blue snow mountain would be the implied object if such a thing existed, but since it does not, there is no such object and nothing is conclusively known. Such cognition is both distorted and deceptive because it is mistaken in regard to both its implied object and what appears to it respectively.

Thus objects may be conclusively known only by a valid way of knowing or by someone who has such valid knowledge. Nothing is conclusively known by subsequent, inattentive or distorted cognition, presumption or indecisive wavering.

Thus although the implied object of a conceptual cognition is apparently known by it, it is not the object that appears to it. Likewise, although the object that appears may be something you are 'implicitly' and compulsively attracted to, it is not the implied object.

This is playing on two different usages of the Tibetan words 'nang' and 'then'. An object that appears is a 'nang-yuil'; to be apparently known is 'nang'. An implied object is a 'zhen-yul'; an object of compulsive ('implicit') attraction is a 'zhen-sa'. In Tibetan, as in most languages, many words have several meanings and usages, some of which may seem

contradictory. Therefore it is important to differentiate what a word actually means in its context from its etymological meaning.

13. The Conditions for Cognition to Arise

There are three conditions for bare sensory perception (to arise). These are known as the objective, main and immediate conditions.

What causes you in general to have the cognitions you do is your previous karma. As the result of your past actions you experience things in the present. These three types of conditions are what help bring about the cognitions caused by your karma.

In the bare sensory perception grasping a form, the objective condition is that thing which presents an aspect of itself (to be the object of this cognition). In this case what is being defined is the form itself.

Thus the objective condition for the bare sensory perception of a vase is the vase itself. In the distorted sensory perception of a person with cataract seeing hair falling over his eyes, there is no objective condition because there is no hair falling as an external object. Such distorted perception arises from other conditions independent of an objective one.

That which generates such a bare sensory perception by its own power is known as its main condition. Such a condition may be either an unspecialised or a specialised one. An example of the former is the cognitive power of the mind and of the latter, that of the eyes.

In a general sense the cognitive power of the mind can be the main condition for any bare mental or sensory perception grasping any kind of object, a form, a sound and so forth. Thus it is unspecialised. On the other hand, the cognitive power of the eyes is a specialised main condition since it serves as such only for a bare visual perception. Any specific bare perception, however, has only one main condition for its arising. A specific visual one relies on the specialised main condition of the cognitive power of the eyes and a specific mental one on the unspecialised main condition of the cognitive power of the mind.

That which generates the clear awareness of such a bare sensory perception is the third type of condition, (the immediate one). In this case it might be the mental cognition (grasping this same form) that immediately preceded it.

When you have sensory cognition of a vase, the first instance is your bare perception of it, an initial valid way of knowing. The next moments are subsequent cognitions and the last is inattentive. This sequence is followed immediately by non-conceptual mental cognition grasping this form, which also has initial valid, subsequent and inattentive moments. Immediately following this sequence you may go on to have conceptual mental cognition of the vase, or you may revert to non-conceptual bare visual perception of it once more. In such a case the mental cognition of the vase immediately preceding your return to bare visual perception of it is the immediate condition for this sensory perception.

For specific moments within a certain sequence of sensory and mental perception of one object, however, each moment of cognition is the immediate condition for what follows it. The initial moment of the first bare sensory perception of this object, before which you were cognising something completely different, does not necessarily arise dependent on an immediate condition. However generally speaking, there is a continuity of clear awareness for your cognitions no matter what their object is.

As for such things as bare sensory perceptions grasping sounds and so forth, (their conditions are to be understood) in a similar fashion.

From the Cittamatra point of view, the main and immediate conditions (of bare sensory perception) are explained in almost the same way (as from that of the Svātrantikas). However these two systems differ in that they have separate ways of accepting whether there is an actual objective condition or only a nominal one.

Using skilful means Buddha taught many different systems of theories, each giving a progressively more refined level of explanation concerning the mind and other topics. In the Sāvtrantika one, Buddha explained that there were substantially existing external objects and thus all bare sensory perceptions have an actual objective condition for their arousal. However from the Cittamatra point of view Buddha explained that in the sense that nothing can exist independently of being cognised or cognisable, there actually are no external objects as such.

From the Sāvtrantika point of view, cognitions arise from their potential which has been planted in your mind-stream in the form of karmic instincts or seeds. According to the Cittamatra explanation, such instincts are planted specifically in your foundation consciousness (alayavi- jnana), which is another type of primary consciousness that each sentient being

possesses. These instincts, however, are not only for the conscious portion of your cognitions—that is their primary consciousness, secondary mental attitudes and elements and awareness of consciousness—but also for their objects. This is because, in a certain sense, objects of cognition cannot exist separate from your cognition of them. Therefore according to this theory, the objective condition of a cognition is only nominal because it does not exist as an external object. The object of a cognition, then, does not precede or cause your cognition of it, as the Sāvtrantikas would explain, but rather the two occur simultaneously.

These explanations concerning external objects, foundation consciousness and the nominal existence of objective conditions are further refined in the Madhyamika theories of the Svāntrikas and Prasangikas.

Gyan K'an-po has explained that there are three ways of accepting how bare mental perception arises in this context: (1) from the second moment on, bare sensory perception becomes bare mental, (2) bare sensory and mental perception arise in waves one after the other and (3) these two alternate. However this (threefold division) is not accepted in the present explanation. Bare mental perception may be considered to arise only at the end of a stream of continuity of bare sensory perception.

Thus in this work, which is considered accurate today, only the second of the three explanations of the Indian Abbot Gyan K'an-po is accepted. After an initial moment of valid bare sensory perception, it is not the case that each subsequent moment is bare mental perception. Nor does one moment of each follow the other in rapid succession. Instead you first have a stream of continuity of bare sensory perception in which the first moment is a valid knowing, the second and what follows is subsequent cognition and the final is inattentive. Only after this last moment of sensory cognition does a wave of bare mental perception arise, also having initial valid, subsequent and inattentive moments. Bare mental perception, however, is something extremely obscure, of which only a Buddha has complete knowledge.

The difference between conceptual and non-conceptual cognition may be understood roughly from what has been explained previously. Sensory cognitions and bare perceptions (that is sensory, mental, those of awareness of consciousness and yogic) may only be non-conceptual. On the other hand mental cognitions may be either conceptual or non-conceptual.

14. Primary Consciousness and Secondary Mental Attitudes and Elements

There are primary consciousnesses and secondary mental attitudes and elements.

In any cognition there are always these two kinds of conscious phenomena, which share live timings in common. They have a common (1) object, (2) reliance, (3) aspect, (4) time and (5) immediate source.

In a bare visual perception of a blue vase you have both primary visual consciousness and such secondary mental attitudes and elements as recognition, feeling and so forth. (1) These all take the blue vase as their common object. They arise from the same objective condition. (2) They share a common main condition as well, for they all rely on the cognitive power of your eyes. (3) They take on the same aspect of the object that appears. (4) They occur at the same time, although to be more precise they are not exactly simultaneous. And (5) they arise from the same immediate source, namely the potential for this cognition in your mind-stream.

When you place a clear piece of glass over a blue cloth, the glass takes on the same blue aspect as the cloth. If placed on a yellow cloth it would take on a yellow aspect, although the glass itself is neither blue nor yellow. A conscious phenomenon is like a clear piece of glass. Although it has no physical qualities of its own, it takes on whatever aspect of an object that appears to it. In any specific moment of cognition, then, both the primary consciousness and all its attendant secondary mental attitudes and elements take on the same aspect of the object that appears.

Two things are said to have a single immediate source if they share a common, immediately preceding fundamental cause. The fundamental cause of a pot is the clay from which it is made. The light of two bulbs in a fixture are of one immediate source, since they both light up simultaneously when you switch on the electricity. Similarly, the primary consciousness and secondary mental attitudes and elements of a cognition all 'light up' simultaneously when their common potential is activated. According to the Cittamatra explanation, the object of the cognition as well shares this same immediate source.

Although the primary consciousness and secondary mental attitudes and elements of a cognition share these five things in common, they are not identical, for their double negatives are different. The same is true

with respect to the Cittamatra explanation of a conscious phenomenon and its object. Although consciousness and its object share a single immediate source, a seed of karmic instinct planted in your foundation consciousness, and in this respect are non-dual, this does not mean they are identical. This is because 'subject' and 'object' have different double negatives. Thus when you exclude everything that is not the subject and everything that is not the object, you are left with two different things.

Primary consciousness, the mind and consciousness are all mutually inclusive terms for the same thing. There are six types, from visual consciousness to that of the mind.

With primary consciousness you are aware simply of the fundamental data of anything that can be validly cognised. The six types accepted by the Sāūtrantikas are visual, audial, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental. The Enlightened Motive of Bodhicitta is also a primary consciousness having as its object the attainment of Buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. It is classified as a type of primary mental consciousness.

In some of the Cittamatra explanations, Buddha taught eight types of consciousness, adding foundation and delusion consciousness to these six. The former cognises all objects roughly and, as that in which seeds of karmic instinct are planted, is the foundation for all cognitions. It is neither a primary consciousness nor a secondary mental attitude or element, and was unspecified by Buddha to be either virtuous or non-virtuous. The latter is what in delusion cognises the former as being permanent and substantially existent from its own individual stance.

There are fifty-one secondary mental attitudes and elements, namely the five ever-functioning and the five discriminating elements, and the eleven general virtuous, the six root defiled, the twenty branch defiled and the four changeable attitudes.

With a secondary mental attitude or element you are aware of distinctions and qualities in an object, the fundamental data of which you cognise with a primary consciousness. There are a great number of such attitudes and elements which have been condensed into various lists. This particular enumeration of fifty-one derives from the 'Abhidharmasamuccaya' by Asanga. Among the many items not specifically mentioned here is karma,

which is defined as the secondary mental element bringing about virtuous and non-virtuous actions as well as the results of these actions.

Feeling, recognition, mental impulse, decisive attention and contact make five. Because these always function in accompaniment with every instance of principal or primary consciousness, they are known as the five ever-functioning secondary mental elements.

Feeling is the experience of happiness, unhappiness or indifference in response to pleasurable, painful or neutral contact with an object of cognition. It is how you experience the ripening of your virtuous, non-virtuous or unspecified karma. Feelings may be either disturbing or undisturbing depending on whether you are attached to your contaminated aggregates or have gained bare yogic perception of Identity-lessness.

Recognition is what grasps the significance of an object that appears to either a conceptual or a non-conceptual cognition and identifies or labels it with either a conventional name or a meaning. Mental impulse is what moves the attention of your primary consciousness towards a potential object of cognition in accordance with your karmic instincts. Decisive attention makes the specific choice as to what you will cognise, accepting and rejecting alternatives. Contact is what connects to primary consciousness the secondary mental attitudes and elements and awareness of consciousness, as well as objects of cognition and the cognitive powers of the senses or the mind. It may be either pleasurable, painful or neutral depending on your previous karma.

Every moment of cognition is accompanied by these five. Thus whenever you know something, a mental impulse has moved your attention towards it and decisive attention has made the specific choice to cognise it. You have had pleasurable, painful or neutral contact with it and experienced this with a feeling of either happiness, unhappiness or indifference. And with recognition you have grasped the significance of what you have experienced. Moreover you are aware of all this through awareness of consciousness, which is what actually experiences these feelings and so forth, allowing you afterwards to remember them.

Intention, fervent regard, mindfulness, fixation and the wisdom of discriminating awareness make five. Because these make individual discriminations with respect to a specific object you have cognised they are known as the five discriminating secondary mental elements.

Intention is the wish to have a specific thing as the object of your cognition. Fervent regard is firmly cherishing such an object and wishing to preserve it. Mindfulness or memory keeps you from forgetting a

specific object with which you are familiar. It refers to the conscious activity of remembering or being continually mindful of something, not the passive storage of impressions. Fixation is the placing of your attention on a specific object of cognition for any length of time.

When perfected it becomes single-minded concentration. The wisdom of discriminating awareness analyses a particular object, discriminating between what is to be accepted or rejected and which actions are to be practised or avoided. When perfected it becomes the wisdom of understanding Identitylessness and Voidness, thus accepting the actual way in which all things exist and rejecting false distorted notions of true independent identities and existence. The wisdom of discriminating awareness is often referred to as common sense intelligence.

Respectful belief, a sense of propriety and self-respect, a sense of decency and consideration, the three roots of virtue—detachment, imperturbability and open-mindedness—enthusiastic perseverance, flexibility of mind, care and awareness, clear-minded tranquility and sympathy (are the eleven general virtuous secondary mental attitudes). Each of these is virtuous from any point of view in that each is an opponent (force for a non-virtuous state of mind), shares the five things in common, plus a single set of fundamental data (with a virtuous state) and so forth.

Respectful belief is the positive attitude you have towards objects that are virtuous and worthy of respect. Depending on whether it is motivated by no apparent reason, an emotionally unstable state of mind or sound reasons well understood, it is known as uncritical faith, longing faith or conviction.

A sense of propriety and self-respect is your concern for the consequences of your actions on yourself. A sense of decency and consideration is your concern for such consequences on others.

Detachment is the attitude of not clinging to objects of cognition, being neither covetous nor possessive. With imperturbability you never become angry with any human being. With open-mindedness you are never unwilling to learn. As the roots of all virtue they are the absence of the three poisons, namely longing desire, fearful and angered repulsion and closed-mindedness.

With enthusiastic perseverance you exert great effort in performing virtuous actions and take pleasure in so doing. Flexibility of mind is the power to control and use your mind in any virtuous manner you wish.

When perfected in mental quiescence meditation, it results in a feeling of physical ecstasy and exhilarating mental bliss.

With care and awareness, conscientiousness, discretion or prudence, you feel concern and take care about your own virtues. Clear-minded tranquility is a state of mind temporarily free from mental dullness and mental agitation. With sympathy, you feel great concern for the welfare of others.

Any of these eleven is an opponent force for combating a non-virtuous state of mind. Moreover each of them and a virtuous state of mind share a common object, reliance, aspect, time and immediate source, as well as a single set of fundamental data. Two things are said to share a single set of fundamental data if, when perceived in the same cognition, they cannot be perceived separately. Just as milk mixed with water cannot be seen as two different things when seen mixed, so you cannot separate out detachment, for example, from a virtuous state of mind and perceive them as two distinct things in one specific cognition, such as the virtuous one of viewing a woman with detachment.

Longing desire, general fearful and angered repulsion, pride and arrogance, ignorance, deluded indecisive wavering and the speculative defilements are the six root defiled secondary mental attitudes. These are the main things that bring your mind-stream to a state of moral and mental defilement.

Longing desire is regarding something impure and contaminated as being worthwhile and attractive. General fearful and angered repulsion is the generation of violence or agitation with respect to any object of cognition, animate or inanimate. When such anger is directed specifically towards another human being, this is called simply fearful and angered repulsion. With pride and arrogance you feel you are unique and special, better than everyone else.

Ignorance is the attitude of being unaware of Identity-lessness and Voidness, the actual way in which all things exist. It is the root of continuing rebirth with suffering in samsara. Included under this defilement is closed-mindedness, the foolish attitude of stubbornly closing yourself off from learning something new and potentially threatening.

With defiled indecisive wavering you fluctuate between two conclusions concerning the object of your cognition and are either inclined towards the incorrect conclusion or evenly balanced between the two. Thus in a state of nervous indecision concerning an object of virtue, you either

head towards distortion and non-virtue or are left in a state of paralysis of the mind, unable to decide or do anything.

A moral and mental defilement is defined as any secondary mental attitude that when developed brings about suffering and uneasiness either to yourself or others. These first five root ones are known as the five non-speculative defilements. Their distorted theoretical bases are the five speculative defilements.

The first is to regard that which changes as being your concrete ego-identity. This is your mistaken view of who it is you think you are. Your five aggregate physical and mental faculties are constantly changing. However with this speculative defilement you single out certain aspects of your aggregates and identify them with your conventional 'I' which you imagine exists as something permanent and substantial. Looking at yourself from the view-point of this 'I', you regard what you identify with as being your concrete ego-identity. Thus you view everything as truly existing in terms of 'me' and 'mine'.

The second speculative defilement is to regard your ego-identity from an extreme point of view. Grasping at your supposedly concrete ego-identity, you either cling to it as something permanent or, close-mindedly and defensively, deny it completely.

The third is to believe that the indulgence of your ego-identity will lead to Liberation from suffering. Grasping at that which changes as being your concrete ego-identity and feeling that this is the type of person you will always be, you believe that if you act according to this personality you will attain Liberation. For instance, with the first speculative defilement you identify yourself as someone young and strong. With the second you feel that this is the way you will always be. With the third, then, you would feel that if you could always keep yourself physically fit and looking young and attractive, you will solve all your problems and never be unhappy.

The fourth speculative defilement is to hold the mistaken view that improper discipline and vowed conduct will lead to Liberation from suffering. With such defilement, you would stand on one foot all day or sleep on a bed of nails and regard it as a true path to Liberation.

The last is to hold distorted views. This is to believe that that which is always true and is always the case is never true and never the case. Such distorted views would be, for instance, to deny the law of cause and effect, to believe that there is no such thing as Liberation from suffering and so forth.

These, then, are the root defilements, the main things that delude your mind and bring you suffering.

Aggressiveness, resentment, concealment of non-virtue, annoyance, jealousy, miserliness, concealment of shortcomings, pretentiousness, haughty disapproval, merciless cruelty, shamelessness, inconsideration, foggy-mindedness, mental agitation, disrespect, laziness, recklessness, forgetfulness, inattentiveness, and mental wandering make twenty. As these are secondary developments that grow and spread from the root mural and mental defilements, they are called branch defilements.

Aggressiveness is strong anger approaching violence. With resentment you stubbornly hold a grudge and seek revenge. Concealment of non-virtue is the devious attitude of attempting to hide from others the fact that you have committed a specific black karmic-action. Annoyance is the residue of a strong feeling of anger expressing itself in your use of harsh and abusive language.

With jealousy you cannot bear to see or hear about the good qualities of others. With miserliness you always want your possessions to last and increase. Concealment of shortcomings is the ambitious attitude trying to gain advantage by hiding your faults from others. With pretentiousness, you claim to possess qualities and abilities you do not have.

Haughty disapproval is an attitude of depreciation deriving from feelings of superiority. With it you are filled with self-importance, always criticising and finding fault with everything you meet. Merciless cruelty is a total lack of feeling or consideration for others. It causes you to treat others as if they were inanimate objects, often with great maliciousness. With shamelessness you are unconcerned about the consequences of your actions on yourself. With inconsideration you are similarly unconcerned about the consequences to others.

Foggy-mindedness is a state of mind in which your body feels weak and your mind works slowly. You are overcome with sluggishness and do not wish to do anything. With mental agitation your mind, compelled by attachment or longing desire, loses its hold on an object of cognition and is drawn uncontrollably to another one, either virtuous or non-virtuous. Disrespect is your disinclination to virtue, often based on laziness. Laziness is the attraction you have to relatively easy and generally non-virtuous activities.

With recklessness, negligence, carelessness or indiscretion you do not guard your actions to see whether they are virtuous or non-virtuous. It is the opposite of care and awareness. Forgetfulness prevents you from remembering what you once knew. With inattentiveness you intentionally seek mental distractions and spend your time daydreaming. Mental wandering is an attitude of restlessness motivated by any of the three

poisons of longing desire, fearful and angered repulsion or closed-mindedness. With this your mind is never steady, but always flitting from one object to the next.

As all these attitudes derive from the six root moral and mental defilements, they are known as branch defilements.

Sleep, regret, general and analytic discernment are the four changeable secondary mental attitudes. They are so called because they change to become virtuous, non-virtuous or un-specified in accordance with your motivation.

Sleep is a state of total sensory darkness in which your five types of sensory consciousness cease to function, “leaving you only with mental cognition. Depending on your state of mind when falling asleep, such cognition will be virtuous, non-virtuous or what has been unspecified by Buddha to be either.

Regret is an attitude preventing mental bliss or satisfaction. Feeling badly about non-virtuous deeds you have committed in the past is virtuous. On the other hand to feel this way about your virtuous acts is non-virtuous since it prevents you from enjoying their fruits.

With general discernment you seek a rough understanding of an object of cognition with little analysis of particulars. With analytic discernment you seek a more precise understanding of it. How these secondary mental attitudes are classified depends on whether the object you choose to understand is virtuous and so forth.

Thus every cognition you have entails secondary mental attitudes and elements. Some are always present, neither beneficial nor detrimental. Some are virtuous, others are not. By learning to discern which attitudes accompany your perceptions, inferences and so forth, you can make all your cognitions virtuous as well as valid.

15. Other Buddhist Theories and Conclusion

According to the explanations of the Sautrāntika division of the Mādhyamika-Svāntrikas, the Mādhyamika-Prāsangikas and the Vaibhāsikas, there are only three types of bare perception: sensory, mental and yogic. They do not accept that there is such a thing as the bare perception of awareness of consciousness. However, according to the Sautrantikas, Cittamātrins and the Yogācāra division of the Mādhyamika-Svāntrikas, there are all four types of these.

The purpose of Buddha’s teaching many different theories, such as those concerning the mind and how it knows things, is to help lead sentient

beings to Enlightenment. Although such explanations may seem contradictory at first, upon deeper contemplation it becomes evident that they are not. First Buddha teaches a very rough, general description of how the mind works. When you have understood this much, then you are ready to comprehend further refinements and more precise descriptions. If you wish to define something specifically and exactly, you use a double negative—it is what is left over after you have excluded everything it is not. The more precise an explanation of the mind, then, the more you know what it is not. The more you know what it is not, the finer your understanding of what it is. Therefore it is important to train yourself through the graded explanations of Buddha's different schools of theories, from the Hinayāna ones of the Vaibhāsikas and Sāūtrantikas through the Mahāyāna ones culminating in the Mādhyamika-Prāsangikas, in order to attain Enlightenment for the sake of benefiting all sentient beings.

One of the major points upon which further refinements are given is awareness of consciousness—how it is that you experience what you do and later can remember it. A more precise understanding of the actual way in which all things exist leads to a finer appreciation of what it means for something to be an external object, or something in the past. Thus there are further discussions of objective conditions for bare perception, what is subsequent cognition, what are the natures of objective and metaphysical entities, what is appearance, reality, deceptive cognition, ultimate and relative truths, direct and indirect apprehensions, and so forth. Another topic discussed is how karmic seeds of instinct for future cognition are transmitted from lifetime to lifetime. In this context foundation consciousness, the mind-stream and the process of mental labelling are examined further. A finer understanding of Identity-lessness leads to further refinements concerning bare yogic perception, who has it and at what stage of development.

By following a path of learning how the mind works validly, you can come to understand how the omniscient mind of a Buddha knows everything. By hearing this, contemplating and meditating upon it, you can develop such an omniscient mind yourself. Such training, then, is part of the pathway to Enlightenment.

Because I feared that this work might become too long and complicated, I have restricted myself merely to presenting some basic lists (of things involved in studying the ways of knowing). For further explanations and examples of what I have merely defined, please consult such general works as the 'Tsa-ma rig-gyan' (by His Holiness the First Dalai Lama).

16. Epilogue

In order to help those of fine intelligence to differentiate and discriminate the hair-splitting differences between what should be accepted and rejected, this compendium of ways of knowing has been composed by someone called Lo-zang. By the virtue of the effort made in this work may the eyes of all beings be opened to see what is correct or defective. By following to its conclusion this excellent and unmistakable path, may everyone quickly attain the Omniscience of Buddhahood.

This work, 'Blo-rigs-kyi sdom-tsig blang-dor gsal-ba'i me-long' by A-kya Yongs-'dzin dByangs-can dga'-ba'i blo-gros (late eighteenth century) has been translated by Sherpa Tulku, Khamlung Tulku, Alexander Berzin and Jonathan Landaw following an oral explanation given by Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey. Assistance has been gratefully received from Serkong Tsanzhab Rinpoche, Doboong Tulku and Alan Wallace.

Adfer Rashid Shah.(2012). “Restless Beings: Understanding Kashmiri Youth in Sociological Contour.” *The Tibet Journal*, Winter Issue, Vol. XXXVII, NO.4, Pp 3-33.

Reviewer: Aijaz Ahmad Mir

Restless Beings: Understanding Kashmiri Youth in Sociological Contour’ published recently in the winter issue of the Tibet Journal is a massive work and a dense text. The paper is actually an analytical overview by the Delhi based and forward-looking Kashmiri Sociologist-Adfer Shah, who has fully explored the dynamics of the transformation of youth in Kashmir from a transitional and conflict hit, vibrant and multi-cultural Kashmiri society to a modern but chaotic era shrouded with the conflict situation since decades. The paper, aptly titled, “*Restless Beings: Understanding Kashmiri Youth in Sociological Contour*”, is actually a long journey through the ideological terrain of Kashmiri youth who on one hand are striving to streamline the governance by acting like a pressure group, polish the socio-political apparatus and make good way outs for themselves and for their future generations. But on the other hand are in utter identity and personality crisis and emotionally driven to devastation and culture of violence. The paper is a critical reflection on the ideas of changes and challenges that the writer says is meant for youngsters especially aged between 15 to 35 (years) and of whom he has discussed the whole sociological narrative of life style, problems, sensitivities, aspirations, frustrations, vulnerabilities, grievances against the system, mishandling by the state, youth’s resilience, push and pull factors, etc, and hence drawn a beautiful discourse like a coherent story in detail. He argues,

Youth is the foremost part of society copious with powerful resources, which can either construct or destruct the whole nation. For society to attempt to solve its desperate problems without the full participation of even very young people is imbecile.

As the paper presents a blueprint for possible change but at the same time it has analyzed the (cancer ailing situation) which the Kashmiri youth are facing due to the modern means of 'information and communication technology' to whom the youths were alien off till the recent past . This has led to an extreme deviance from the respective cultural traits and the transition due to the prevailing conflict has proved like the last nail in the coffin. The author paraphrases the youth culture skillfully as,

Our youth culture is no doubt the culture of leisure. Both male and female students spend a lot of time in gossiping, chitchat, loitering, enjoying music, video sharing and playing etc. Batch mates develop friendship and little consideration for individual friends. Especially the campus youth culture is manifested in the form of group formation. Youth sit, walk, talk, eat and spent time with particular colleagues and friends.

The writer in this work amply covers all sections of the Kashmiri youth and balances his arguments academically. He directly blames the long pending unresolved conflict as the source cause of the transitional state of affairs focusing youth and says that the youth have suffered most from last 22 years in the line of attack to their power by the controlling agencies of law and order, torturing, killings, kidnapping, disappearances, murdering etc, in the violent way. Devoid of economic, political, social and psychological support for livelihood, they are being humiliated by the might of power in the form of corruption, unemployment, defective livelihood schemes, and wretched recruitment policies, (the list flows on), simply to make them dependent and deviate their minds from being ground-breakers.

Adfer Shah has also narrated a jam-packed story of *Kashmiryat* with its cultural moral, ethical and social roots which were destroyed by the emergence of violent conflict resulted into the migration of the marginalized/ minority communities particularly the Kashmiri Pandits and is in favor of their return with honor unlike many scholars actually pseudo-scholars. He like a functionalist argues,

Government of India must set return of all Kashmiri migrants to Kashmir Valley as priority for the welfare of all be that Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs, Christians or Muslims. Delay in their return is causing more and more damage to the people of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole as every Muslim believes that Pandits are the part and parcel of our society and without them Kashmiryat and Kashmir's pluralistic ethos is incomplete.

More importantly, Adfer shah has been able to unfold some of the marginalized communities like Kashmiri-Tibetans and has made a thoughtful analysis of Tibetan youth in Kashmir that he aptly names as *Tibetan-Kashmiri youth* as a primary concern to highlight their problems. This is a fact that these people are facing problems more severe than the migrant Pandits. They are being devoid of providing the Permanent residence despite being living in Kashmir from last 60 years now. As the writer maintains,

More than 40% of them are first generation learners and to their misfortune and double tragedy, they are yet to be allowed to have access to higher education in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Though none of them is illiterate today but they have more been subjected to religious education for two reasons, one, the Islamic ethos of the Tibetan Muslim family, culture of meditation and serenity and second, the lack of access and acceptance by higher education centers for their lack of state domicile. Such a problem has virtually been pressing them for decades and victimizing them even in this age of globalization.

Despite living here for decades now, they are still treated as outsiders and refugees by locals and neglected by the Government as well. However, Tibetan-Kashmiri's are also themselves responsible for their plight as the community has not demonstrated ample activism or struggled much for their rights.

Lastly the paper espouses the effective measures to be taken to stabilize the Kashmiri society with a tough sagacity of youth empowerment in every respect i.e., Socio-psychological, politico-economical which will emancipate their command of being communal and Social and who believe in redressal and redemption. The paper is like a holistic approach to understand Kashmiri youth of all sections and classes. Though the paper is not deeply grounded with theoretical inputs and somewhat sounds a narrative on the sociology of youth in Kashmir, but the author has been able to express the vulnerability and plethora of challenges that Kashmiri youth face today. Further the paper is written in a very lucid form and author has not merely played with words but maintained a fine balance between the value neutrality and the ethnomethodology.

Adfer Shah has been writing on Tibet issue since long time now and thus has extensively carved out an identity of a tibetologist by his academic works on Tibet and Tibetan Muslims. I consider this work his best work on Kashmir so far wherein he has candidly traced and narrated the journey of youth especially the marginalized youth like Tibetan-Kashmiri's through the winds of conflict, confusion, tradition and modernity. In fact a worth reading work.

Book Reviews

***At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities.* Jean Amery.1966. Sidney Rosenfled & Stella Rosenfled, (Trs.) Bloomington, In. Indiana University Press. Pp: xvi +111.**

Adfer Rashid Shah

About the author of the book

Jean Amery (originally Hans Maier (1912-1978) was an Austrian Jew and a Holocaust survivor. *At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities* is basically the English translation of his original German work titled, *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne. Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten*, which he jotted as separate essays and first delivered as radio addresses. The essays appeared in book form in 1966, published by the Szczeny-Verlag in Munich. The work of Amery contains five texts: (i) At the Mind's Limits (ii) Torture (iii) How Much Home Does a Person Need? (iv) Resentments and (v) On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew.

A Critical Glimpse of the Text

This narrative of suffering by Jean Amery is a very dense philosophical text describing the realities of horror and victimhood. While one goes through the book, it simply turns to be like a diary of suffering of an intellectual, written by him, who believes he and other fellows suffered to the worst for nothing and no one supported them which increased their misery. The text is a witness to the brutal violence and atrocities inflicted upon the political prisoners and Jews by Nazi forces in concentration camps. In the beginning Jean Amery defines an intellectual to discuss their credibility and later to describe their fate and the treatment they received by Nazi's. He argues,

All of us know lawyers, engineers, doctors, probably even scholars who may be intelligent and perhaps even outstanding in their fields, but whom nonetheless one can hardly designate as intellectuals. An intellectual, as I wish to define him here is a person who lives within what is a spiritual frame of reference in the widest sense.(p.2)

This text basically the assemblage of Amery's five essays on suffering and horror do not merely look like a last sigh of a bruised intellectual but makes us conceptualize the social structure, ideological and repressive state apparatus, killing for pleasure, law and the institution of coercion, punitive measures, social realities the then, the horrible treatment towards the fellow human beings, the sense of protest and resistance, human rights domain, sense of insecurity and worthlessness of human lives by then, horror and suffering, etc.. The title, "At The Minds Limits" explains the subjective state of mind under torture and state of mind in Auschwitz like death factory.

The text is also a unique philosophical narration of suffering from within. The author was imprisoned for he was treated as a Jew though he was a non believer. For Amery being a Jew means nothing but tragedy and inhuman and violent torture, which made him to lose interest and trust in the world. He conceives of himself an Auschwitz survivor which was a chain of death factories, a torture camp complex where human means nothing, most of his narration reveals his understanding of life which went through suffering, agony and pain, which he could never forget and get rid of. His saddening description makes readers visualise to imagine those times of horror and the situation of being an Austchiwz inmate. It also enables one to imagine the thought process and unbearable suffering of all those captured and imprisoned Jews. The book also beautifully describes how use of fear/terror by Nazi's was a used as a tactic to destroy the victim's sense of self and the use of fear was made integral to the concept of torture to create horror and dehumanise the system.

Amery in utter dismay also talks of the plight of those learned people who were forced to dig dirt in the concentration camps. He recalls his meeting with a well-known philosopher from Paris, who was in the camp like him. He searched him out with great effort and risk, walked through the camp streets with him and attempted to engage in to an intellectual conversation with him under way. But received what he says, 'monosyllabic, mechanical answers and finally entire silence', from the other side. Amery maintains that the inmate French intellectual had not become insensitive but simply no longer believed in the reality of the world and rejected an intellectual word game that according to him no longer had any social relevance by then. Amery understood how mind, reason and intellect had proven futile weapons before the realities of Auschwitz horror. To Amery as a defenseless prisioner, the intellect had lost its prime feature of transcendence. He further says,

Not only was rational-analytic thinking in the camp, and particularly in Auschwitz, of no help, but it led straight into a tragic dialectic of self-destruction. (p.10)

He treats home as a taken for granted security and like roots of one's identity, in his essay, 'how much home does a person need', he describes his sorrow of not having a home, which to him have meant being secure. The disappointment of exile and feeling of a 'home lost' besides the bruised past created distrust, fear and anxiety in him. He feels Jewishness as a forced label on him as he was brought up by his catholic mother. but then he got conscious of his latent identity and revolted against the Nazi occupation in Belgium, was arrested in 1943 as he belonged to a small German speaking organization, united in the Belgium resistance movement, he was charged of spreading Anti- Nazi propaganda among the German occupation forces, imprisoned at Fort Breendonk (erstwhile headquarters of king Leopold of Belgium and now turned an interrogation centre under Nazi Occupation). he says,

Yet I am certain that with the very first blow that descends on him he loses something we will perhaps temporarily call "trust in the world." Trust in the world includes all sorts of things. (p.28).

He beautifully philosophizes torture and relates it to death as, he writes,

In the end, we would be faced with the equation: Body = Pain = Death, and in our case this could be reduced to the hypothesis that torture, through which we are turned into body by the other, blots out the contradiction of death and allows us to experience it personally.(p.34)

The fifth essay, "On the Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew" reflects his confused identity, being a son of a Jewish father and Christian mother, brought up in catholic atmosphere, far from Jewish traits, language, etc.,. He still feels like a Jew, as he was tortured for that and put into ruthless menial labor in prison. Which reflects his being stranger to Jewish culture, but he doesn't give up, he then argues, perhaps the answer why he felt himself a Jew later, he writes,

Certainly, it could be argued that a heritage can be acquired, ties established, and that therefore to be a Jew could be a matter of a voluntary decision.(p.83)

Amery says that even after 22 years of torture, he is still dangling over the ground by his dislocated arms and only he knows what torture means. He believes that the scars of torture never get healed as it destroys human dignity and faith in the world.

It is not Being that oppresses me, or Nothingness, or God, or the Absence of God, only society. For it and only it caused the disturbance in my existential balance, which I am trying to oppose with an upright gait. It and only it robbed me of my trust in the world.(p.100).

Compared to Gandhi's, autobiography, *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, the *At the Mind's Limits* is very different though both are the narratives of pain and suffering. As for the former, the title is most suitable as the whole book revolves round Gandhi's encounters with life's different experiences both sweet and bitter and the title itself speaks a lot about the book. The beauty of the whole book lies in the simplicity of its writing which is quiet simple, spontaneous and natural and no use of big jargons. But the later, is a more philosophically dense but composed of five small autobiographical essays.

Last but not the least, the book is a peep in history of Nazi regime as well and a reflection of victim hood, not only of the author but of all those who were put behind the bars and subjected to ruthless treatment and even intellectuals not spared. He even changed his name from Hans Mayer to Jean Amery to show resentment to German culture and to show his assimilation with French culture, he finally killed himself in 1978 by taking overdose of sleeping pills. This makes us understand that suffering does hardly end in hope but remains a grave suffering for all times if not addressed.

Tail piece

The book is a worth read, in the beginning one feels difficulties in comprehension but while engaging with the text with interest, one gets to know the real meaning of suffering. The saddening and brutal face of violence by power over the innocents like in Tibet, Palestine and so many conflict zones of the world today. This work is also a good source to know about the plight of even intellectuals in the conflict situations in the past especially in the Nazi regime. The book is also a work par-excellence and a good piece for the students of philosophy and sociology, conflict and diaspora studies to get the idea how concepts move from context to texts, and what Amery did after observing rather living with the experiences of inhuman torture at Auschwitz and Third Reich. It also makes us conceptualize suffering and Jewish victimhood, terror, horror and the experiences of trauma of a scholarly prisoner who just believed one thing after surviving from Nazi's, that the torture destroys intellect, use of language or philosophical speeches.

***The Ninth Karamapa's Ocean of Definitive Meaning* by Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche. Oral Translation by Lama Yeshe Gyamtso. Edited, Introduced and annotated by Lama Tashi Namgyal. Snow Lion Publications, Ithaca, New York. Pp.146. Price 16.95 US dollars.**

D.R. Chaudhry

The Ninth Gyalwang Karampa Wangchuk Dorje(1556-1603), wrote three important books on how to attain the realization of mahamudra, nonconceptual meditative awareness. The book under review is Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche's commentary on one of these three books- The ocean of Definitive Meaning which is supposed to be the most detailed oral instructions on mahamudra meditation ever put into writing.

The commentary of the book is most in-depth analysis of those parts of the book thought to be most beneficial. It emphasizes the two most important versions of mahamudra- samatha(tranquility or calm abiding and Vipashyana(insight). It specially focuses on obstacles in the path of mahamudra and how to avoid them. The essence of mahamudra is that the basic cause of suffering is the distorted version of reality. Sufferings can end if the reality is fully grasped. Compassion is one of the most important components of Buddhism. However, it must be accompanied by wisdom the lack of which ties one to the realms of suffering of conditioned existence.

We watch and feel objects and phenomena in the world through our senses and take them to be real. This is misconception. They lack inherent existence and are imbued with causes and conditions. They are empty of essence. The emptiness or sunyata is the nondual, nonconceptual wisdom awareness which is attained through mahamudra and dzogchen. The realization of this is sure to bring happiness and harmony on our small planet torn with strife, warfare, tension, greed, malice and many such other destructive emotions.

In July 2002, the Venerable Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche led a mahamudra retreat where he gave instructions on The Ocean of Definitive Meaning. The book under review is a compilation of these instructions. The text has three main sections dealing with preliminaries, tranquility and insight. The section dealing with preliminaries is skipped over as those attending the retreat were not novices.

The utmost emphasis is laid on tranquility and insight. First of all, the mind should be tamed with the practice of tranquility which is the most important prerequisite for the practice of tranquility.

The mind is the most important instrument to grasp every kind of phenomenon around. It consists of eight consciousnesses-the first six which are most important. relate to the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body and mental consciousness. The first five sense consciousnesses are just confined to mere experience of

individual objects and thus are not conceptual. They are incapable of judgment, appraisal or conceptualization. Thus, they are not concerned with tranquility meditation. It is the sixth consciousness – mental consciousness which in fact performs tranquility meditation which pacifies mental afflictions.

The process of changing the mind and pacifying the functioning of the sixth consciousness is the starting point of the tranquility meditation. Thinking about the past as well as the future is to be suspended during the course of practice. Further progress is possible after achieving stability of mind. The first category of tranquility meditation is to grasp the mind with focus on something, image of the Buddha or some other deity. The second category is grasping the mind without focus. The mind is to be held in a state free of conceptual focus. Third category relates to grasping the mind with the breathing, inhalation, retention and exhalation. One needs to be free of torpor or dullness as the basis of the practice of meditation is the cultivation of mindfulness and alertness.

After the mind has been grasped it is to be stabilized. This is done with the help of visualizations which is a difficult process for a beginner and one needs the help of a seasoned teacher. Excitement or regret disturbs the practice and for which subterranean Samadhi is the antidote and this also requires visualizations. The mind in a normal course is in a state of flux. Senses are active when one is wide awake, seeing sights and hearing sounds and all kinds of ideas come to the mind and disappear followed by new set of ideas and the process continues without break. However, one should not interfere with the process. See, hear, smell, taste, feel everything and have interface with ideas without applying any check on the process. However, one should not develop craving or aversion to any phenomenon in the process. One is in the deep of all this and at the same time above it. One has to develop what Socrates calls philosophic detachment.

After mastering the practice of tranquility one comes to the practice of insight. Tranquility meditation pacifies thoughts. Thought is the medium of kleshas-all kinds of afflictions, obscurations and destructive emotions. However, tranquility meditation alone cannot eradicate kleshas. It is the insight meditation which is the sure antidote to kleshas. At this stage one has to grasp the importance of Four Noble Truths which is the basic structure of the Buddhist thought and approach. Kleshas can be eradicated by developing prajna or discernment- the essence of the phenomenon. Nothing has inherent existence; all phenomena are empty of essence and thus emptiness is the nature of all things. Emptiness is not just nothing. Things and phenomena do exist but this existence is relative as nothing has intrinsic existence. In final analysis every thing is empty of true existence. When one has grasped this truth all kleshas evaporate into thin air.

The book under review is a masterly presentation of complex concepts and arduous practices in a style which is concise and lucid. However, mahamudra meditation is not every body's cup of tea and one needs the help of an accomplished and compassionate teacher to master it.

My Experiments with Truth, Gandhi, M.K. (Tr.) Mahadev Desai. (1977). *An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmadabad. Pages 454. Price 30 INR.

Adfer Rashid Shah & Swaleha Sindhi

'The Story of My Experiments with Truth' is a massive but attractive volume, written as his autobiography by Mahatma Gandhi only at the insistence of his friends. It has five major chapters and each chapter with many relevant essays enlightening chronologically on his life's experiences in one way or the other.

The first part with twenty five headings, mainly deals with Bapu's birth, parentage, childhood, marriage, schooling, childhood mischief's and mistakes, his truth consciousness, his studies in England and aura of sufferings he faced, etc.,. The book is attractive in look and is quite accessible everywhere in India and reasonably of a cheaper cost. As per the translator of the autobiography, Mahadev Desai mentions in the preface that first edition of this work was published in 1927 for the first time.

As for the title given to the autobiography, it seems more suitable as the whole narration revolves round Gandhi's encounters with life's different experiences both sweet and bitter and the title itself speaks a lot about the book, which makes the work more lucid and comprehensible to the readers.

One of the major theme and eye catchers in the work is the deliberations of Bapu on the concept of truth and his experiments with it, which justifies the very title given to the book beautifully. He discusses his conception of truth throughout but his using it in the title connotes the meaning of sovereign, supreme and absolute. He seems to be the desperate searcher of truth as he says, "I am prepared to sacrifice the things dearest to me in pursuit of this quest". (selected works, Vol.6.p. 95) and at the same time he argues about the absolute and relative truth, which speaks of his intellectual vision and a worth learning difference for the students, he argues, " but as long as I have not realized this absolute truth so long must I hold by the relative truth as I have conceived it" (SW,P.95). For him absolute truth is truth '*as it is*' and relative truth is as it appears to us.

While going through a number of essays, the beauty of Gandhi's simplistic narration unfolds. The simplicity of the lexicon applied, writing which is quiet simple, spontaneous and natural and no use of big jargons and phrases engages the reader with body and soul. Gandhi believes that his method of realization of truth is experimental and yes he is right because he tastes every experience both bitter and sweet, which tells the reader the tale of his suffering and amusements as well. His experiments with truth are numerous and are thus a part of his struggle to realize the truth. The idea of experiment with truth primarily means the way

one follows truth and lives in it. Living in truth means abiding by the principle of truth in thought, action. Especially dealing with the chapters of part-I, one perceives that it is not Babu's effort to carve out a piece of literature but a true life story telling and a narrative of life's events and sometimes more than a narration, it sounds more a confession, where in Gandhi express remorse over the lapses committed in the past but the beauty of the book lies in his narration of even the most awkward activities just to speak truth shamelessly, which Gandhi loved the most. While turning over the pages, the reader feels that each chapter of the book is his life's reflection and an important learning lesson for Gandhi. As Gandhi himself insists that The work is not in the strict sense an autobiography. It is a selective record of experiments with truth, involving vegetarianism, celibacy, non-violence, and many other things. For him mere mental adherence to truth is not enough, because it has to be translated into action. The idea of truth in mind must be translated into action by making actions follow truth. For Gandhi, thought, action and speech make one unity since one is involved in the other. Therefore what is true in thought must be true in action and speech. Gandhi's idea of truth is free from any theological connotation because, though he calls truth God, he does not intend to keep truth within the domain of religion alone. For Gandhi, truth transcends the rigid framework of all religions and therefore cannot be appropriated by any religion for that matter. Truth is the foundation of all religions and so cannot be part of any religion. He simply says about the period from his birth (1869) up to 1921. He remembers her religious mother, he remembers his books which used to be his lone companions in school, he remembers his loving father and he recounts of his child marriage at the age to 13 to Kasturba. He argues of his being suspicious and strict to her and simultaneously talks of her rebellion. He talks of being a child but a stubborn husband and so indifferent to his wife, he remembers his friends who even took him to brothel, and he remembers his submissive nature. He discusses all his sufferings and even bad habits and above all he talks of his truth consciousness naturally inherent in him. He feels a great pain when he was convicted of lying for missing his gymnastic class, though he spoke the truth. He argues that a man of truth must also be a man of care. He did not copy the question even when instructed to do so by his teacher, which speaks of his honest and truthful nature right from his childhood.

In the chapter, Stealing and Atonement (Part-1,viii), Gandhi engraves few heart wrenching lines which really a visionary soul can do only, that is why he could only reach to the status of *Mahatma*. He writes, "I stole a bit of gold out of my meat eating brother's arm let". Later he writes, "I resolved never to steal again, I also make up my mind to confess it to my father. I was afraid of the pain I should cause him. I handed a confession letter to my father..... He read it through and pearl drops trickled down his checks wetting the paper. He closed his eyes and then tore the note."

From such a sad recounting, he quickly jumps to another humorous but true anecdote, in the lesson, *A Tragedy (Contd...)*, He writes of his experience of a bad night after having the mutton.

He writes, “As every time I dropped off to sleep it would seem as though a line goat were bleating inside me.” (p.31). Here every line is a serious story about a man who no doubt started as a common man but surely was carrying the charismatic genes with him, he steals but feels bad, he wants to reveal it but could not, not because of fear but not to hurt his father, he still confesses and is ready for punishment, his father understands the child’s pain from within, he cries and Gandhi cries too. He realizes from this real experiment “the power of the Ahimsa is a tool of transformation very beautifully by citing the example of his act of stealing and then confessing before his father and the scene created and then arguing that, “when ahimsa becomes all embracing, it transforms every thing it touches and there is no limit to its power” (p.39). It seems that Gandhi to the best of his writing capacity has tried to explain himself and also wishes readers to follow his footsteps. He goes serially in discussing his issues of life covering every area like even discussing his hatred for gymnastics, discussing religions, his company of friends, etc, which infers that while writing he does not want to employ artificiality of events and arrangements of words to add spice for decorating his autobiography only ,but writes things as they had happened, he hardly cares to be admired as a prolific writer but as an ardent propounder of truth which reflects from his every word.

Also he writes in such a style which transcends a certain time period, like he recounts his days in England when he used to miss his mother and family and missing his home with trickling tears but hardly shows any concern for his wife simultaneously.

Also the book cannot be described as the lessons of truth only but what he writes about his effort for its search and also truthfully what he found there. The beauty of the book is that despite being an autobiography, serially arranged, well connected and being composed of many chapters but each of the chapter can be even read and understood individually. He has amply thrown light upon religion, political involvement, education, languages, justice, law, etc, but over emphasized his marital relations and food habits. However, hardly conceals his life events, even in the least bit. He does not care about the temperaments and understanding of his diverse readers but simply writes, whether one nods in yes or no. He even discusses his lustful nature and lusty love for his wife, in the chapter the “My Fathers Death and my Double Shame” (part-1,ix), he openly discusses his lust as the reason for not being at his dying fathers bed what he calls his shame for which he can be criticized as such a language does not suit a Mahatma. But simultaneously see his quest for truth, he is ready to invite dishonor, shame and

hatred of all but to him the truth comes first and is must what he calls as absolute as God and that he treats everything and argues that truth should prevail even if everything perishes. He remembers his going to England in 1887 and promises his mother that he will strictly abstain from women and meat. He narrates about his travel to South Africa in 1893, the major portion of which he omits; perhaps he thinks readers already aware of that entire episode, as his life later never remained his personal one. Moreover, his vision and concept of Satyagrah is enlightening and during the Boer war, he organized an ambulance corps for the British unit and commanded a Red Cross Unit and then went for his campaign of Indian rights, which speak of his philanthropy and activism. Returning India and then back, he found that besides fighting British Colonialism, we need to fight against untouchability, poverty and class system, which speaks of his concern for oppressed and subaltern classes.

One of the most important features of the book is that it gives a good picture of India the then. His meeting eminent personalities like Gokhale, Tilak, Nehru, Ray, and Vallabhbai, shows us his credibility and how India was full of active leaders. He describes his life as a series of events performed on truth, non violence, Brahmacharya, Ahimsa, etc,. Last but not the least, one gets the idea that he began with truth, lived with truth, acted through truth and lived for truth. The book is a worth read and must be gone through by the students of all streams especially to broaden the horizon as it brings the inspiration and encouragement of Gandhi's example to a still wider circle of his admirers. Over all the work is a master piece which introduces a different Gandhi to people and introduces him as a child, as a youth, as an activist, his suffering for truth, principles for life like ahimsa and celibacy and finally as a legend though he bores with endless words on vegetarianism, marital phenomenon, lust, etc,.

Post Script

Today we all need a serious introspection as Bapu's birthday has just remained a government holiday throughout the country. The majority of Indians feel happy not for the man of millennium and his unforgettable contribution to motherland but for the free holidays we get because of him.

Contributors

Adfer Rashid Shah (Adfar Shah) is currently a Doctoral Candidate at the Department of Sociology, Jamia Millia Islamia, Central University, New Delhi. He is a featured author at amazines.com and has more than 45 national and international publications, besides hundreds of conceptual and opinion articles to his credit. He maintains a keen interest about socio-political and religious developments in South Asia and Middle East. He has been writing on Tibet issue since long and also has been contributing as guest Columnist and freelancer in certain reputed newspapers, websites and web portals in India and abroad. His interests include Sociology of Religion, South Asian Politics, Sociology of Youth, Change and Development and Diaspora Studies. He can be reached at adfer.syed@gmail.com).

Aijaz Ahmad Mir is a Research Scholar at the Department of Sociology, University of Kashmir, India. He can be mailed at aijazaijazmir@gmail.com

Michael Zrenner (MPhil) was educated in Great Britain, receiving a BA in *Politics and English Literature* from the University of York in 2005 and an MPhil in *Tibetan and Himalayan Studies* from the University of Oxford in 2007. His main research interest lies in the scholastic traditions of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan Madhyamaka-Prasangika interpretations of Nagarjuna and Candrakirti as well as biographical and historical literature.

Mushtaque B Barq is a columnist, a short story writer beside the poet and a Founder of Kashmir Images Literary Club. His blogs are published in Spiritual Net work and HT Syndicates.

Ms. Swaleha Sindhi is Assistant Professor at the Department of Educational Administration, Faculty of Education & Psychology in the M.S. University of Baroda, Gujarat, India. & Vice President of the IOCES. She can be mailed at ms.swalehasindhi@rediffmail.com.

Pirzada M Amin (Dr.) is Head of the Department of Social Work and the Associate Professor of Sociology in the University of Kashmir. His specialisation is Sociology of Religion and Sociology of Change and Development. He can be mailed at pirzada.aminkashmiruniversity@gmail.com.

